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The family ownership context has been investigated across many business settings, 
within the manufacturing, trade, and services industries. The consensus among scholars has been 
that families that own and operate firms act in self-serving ways and frame organizational 
problems and make decisions with the primary goal of satisfying the family’s affective needs, 
i.e., preserve or augment what is referred to as socioemotional wealth. However, the theoretical 
reasoning of socioemotional wealth theory may fall apart in traditional university settings, where 
self-serving behaviors may lead to (pronounced) agency conflict. Universities have been long 
understood for their politicized governance environs in which multiple stakeholder groups have 
representation in decision-making. Within this reality, families involved in higher education 
management may be challenged to act self-servingly and protect or enhance certain 
socioemotional wealth. They may need to act in altruistic ways to avoid agency conflict. I 
investigate whether this is the case through a single, critical case study approach conducted at 
one family-owned or -managed university in India. I rely on what Yin (2003) refers to as “rival 
explanation as patterns” to test socioemotional theory relative to a rival theoretical framework. I 
ask the important question of whether this rival theory can address the limitations of 
socioemotional wealth theory when applied to the higher education context. As expected, 
findings generally suggest that where socioemotional wealth theory fails to capture family 
decision-making behaviors, the rival theory is relevant. This finding is important to consider and 
has several implications to theory, practice, and future research. Importantly, the findings support 
 
 
that current family-owned business theorizing is not enough to capture family decision-making 
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This heritage began with my grandfather, who seeking to develop areas devoid of postsecondary 
options and industry, founded a number of educational institutions in the provincial areas of 
South Korea. Among these institutions is a four-year university and a two-year college. While 
my grandfather is no longer with my family, his legacy lives on in the work of my father who 
now is the president of the university. Eventually, I am to succeed my father as the university’s 
third-generation president. Following my grandfather and father’s path is not so much a process 
of choosing a career, but one cultivated into existence over time and through myriad personal 
and meaningful encounters with my grandfather and father, as well as the faculty and staff 
working at our university.  
This dissertation comes at an opportune time where I am now preparing for my eventual 
leadership transition in earnest. Completing this dissertation was a deeply personal process that I 
believe brings me one step closer to fulfilling my vocational purpose. Thus, I take a moment here 
to recognize the people who have inspired and helped me along the way.  
First and foremost, I would like to thank Dr. Hans de Wit as the chair of my dissertation 
committee. Your mentorship, encouragement, and unwavering support, especially during my site 
visit but throughout the whole process, were invaluable. Completing my dissertation would not 
have been possible without your guidance and support. My deepest thanks to you. I also wish to 
extend equal appreciation to the members of my dissertation committee, Dr. Philip G. Altbach 
and Dr. Andrés Castro Samayoa. Thank you for patience in working with me, and inspiring me, 
to produce a dissertation that I am proud of.  My sincere thanks to the both of you.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
To the common understanding, university control falls under governments, nonprofit 
boards of trustees, for-profit corporations, or even powerful academic senates. As discussed by 
many scholars (e.g., Brubacher & Rudy, 1997; Austin & Jones, 2015; Dobbins et al., 2011; 
Hirsch & Weber, 2001; Minor, 2004; Shattock, 2014), these forms of control dominate practice 
across public and private sectors, globally. 
However, there is a model of control or management that also may be found globally 
without the awareness of the academic community. This model concerns universities and 
colleges within the private higher education sector that are owned and operated by families. 
These universities are called family-owned or -managed institutions (FOMHEIs). I define a 
FOMHEI as an institution governed and/or managed by a family unit whose intention is to shape 
the institution according to a distinct family vision in a manner that is potentially sustainable 
across successive familial generations. I explain how I arrive at this definition in the literature 
review. This special class of institutions share a number of characteristics with nonfamily 
universities, or those controlled by the government, nonprofit boards, or academic senates. For 
example, there are nonprofit boards of trustees in FOMHEIs. FOMHEIs can also be for-profit in 
status just like many nonfamily counterparts. However, FOMHEIs, while sharing these 
characteristics, may be distinguished for having a fundamentally unique trait not found in 
nonfamily types. FOMHEIs are ultimately controlled by a family unit. In the case of FOMHEIs 
with a nonprofit board of trustees, the managerial family typically controls the board. And in the 
case of for-profit FOMHEIs, the family controls the for-profit company that the university or 
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college has affiliation. In other words, the managerial involvement of a family unit sets 
FOMHEIs apart from nonfamily types. This is quite unique, as we will learn in this study.   
Focus of Study and Research Questions 
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate and profile the decision-making 
behaviors and intent of families involved in higher education ownership or management. The 
study’s thrust comes from the assumption that families involved in traditional university 
ownership or management (nonprofit universities) may behave differently from the normative 
decision-making patterns espoused by what is referred to as socioemotional wealth theory. This 
theory is found in the family firm literature and assumes that families involved in business 
ownership and management frame organizational problems and make decisions according to 
whether they gain or lose socioemotional wealth (SEW). According to Berrone et al. (2012), 
SEW may be understood as the nonfinancial endowments of a family-owned firm and broken 
into five distinct, but related components: family influence, identity with the firm, binding social 
ties or relational capital, emotional attachments, and renewal or family-based succession. For the 
families owning and operating commercial businesses, augmenting SEW is a major 
preoccupation and a more important goal than any other organizational objective including 
economic gain (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007).  
However, in the context of traditional higher education settings, managerial families may 
reference other criteria besides socioemotional wealth when framing problems and making 
decisions. In other words, decision-making may not be entirely based on whether or not there is a 
real or perceived risk to losing socioemotional wealth, or the nonfinancial endowments of family 
firms (Berrone et al., 2012). Rather, families in the nonprofit higher education context may 
negotiate decision-making with additional sensitivity to the realities of the academic governance 
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culture (which are not found or found to a lesser extent in commercial settings). My assumption 
is that the realities tied the academic culture, which will be clarified in later chapters, place 
expectations and pressures on families to behave in certain ways—effectively restricting their 
ability to satisfy their affective needs (protect SEW). For example, faculty in higher education 
may expect decision-making to be open and democratic. This may pressure the family to keep 
decision-making open and democratic. Thus, in such a reality, the family may be challenged to 
protect or argument the SEW dimension of family influence, which espouses centralized 
governance structures and absolute authority in the family.   
The above assumption prompts the following primary research question: How does the 
owner family at one nonprofit FOMHEI negotiate organizational decision-making where 
inherent governance realities may place limits on the ascribed decision-making authority of 
the family? This question is supported by three secondary questions:  
a. What prototypical characteristics of (private nonprofit) higher education may be found at 
a nonprofit FOMHEI? 
b. What family-based characteristics may be found at a nonprofit FOMHEI? 
c. What are the factors resisting family-centric decision-making behaviors at a nonprofit 
FOMHEI? 
Answering these questions hopefully will clarify whether families in higher education 
management make decisions according to the principles of SEW theory or not. Ultimately, these 
questions were designed in congruence with the purpose of theory testing, referring to the testing 
of existing theory, and its propositions, in new contexts (Crabtree & Miller, 1999). I attempt to 
extend the theoretical underpinnings of socioemotional wealth theory to the higher education 
context where as Altbach (2005) and Altbach et al. (2020) infer that hundreds, if not thousands, 
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of family ventures exist. The investigation of higher education in relation to SEW theory is first 
of its kind and is expected to produce new findings diverging from those catalogued in the 
existing family firm literature. In other words, I expect to identify gaps in SEW theory by 
evaluating its key proposition(s) in the never-before investigated context of higher education. 
The expectation is that higher education, having unique organizational realities tied to the 
(traditional) academic culture (e.g., the need for shared governance), is a context where family 
decision-making behaviors, or rather a significant part of decision-making, are mostly 
determined by what the academic culture and the realities of the academic culture allow. In this 
way, my expectation is that families involved in university management may diverge in their 
decision-making patterns from those in commercial settings. To note, I test theory in this 
dissertation using a single, critical case study in the tradition of Yin (2003). As explained in the 
methodology chapter, a critical case sampling approach may be combined with a single case 
study design when the purpose of the study lies in “testing a well-formulated theory.” My 
methodological approach is further clarified in the methodology chapter.  
As part of my approach to theory testing, I propose that another theoretical framework, 
outside of the family firm literature, may reconcile the (assumed) limitations of SEW theory. 
This theory is stakeholder theory and it may be better suited to explain decision-making in the 
context of higher education. It may more accurately capture the decision-making dynamics 
associated with higher education, where multiple stakeholders can influence decision-making 
and even come to politicize it.  
Importantly, this study is not seeking to replace SEW theory, a widely accepted family 
theory, with a nonfamily-based theoretical lens. The complete dismissal of SEW theory may 
neither be prudent nor possible. This is because SEW theory may have a rightful place in 
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accounting for the family dimeson of business, regardless of industry. In other words, every 
family-owned venture across industries is expected to retain idiosyncratic characteristics that 
make the venture family-owned. Thus, this study expects to rely on both theoretical frames (SEW 
theory and stakeholder theory) to explain managerial family decision-making behaviors in higher 
education. The novelty of this approach in relation to current family firm theorizing is two-fold: 
(1) in the need to consider another theory alongside SEW theory and (2) in the argument that 
SEW is not the primary or only criteria that families in university management may reference 
when framing problems and making decisions.  
Statement of Problem 
Altbach (2005) calls on the academic community to investigate FOMHEIs in his article, 
“Universities: Family Style.” He argues that the worldwide phenomenon of family-owned or -
managed higher education institutions requires understanding—and scrutiny. These institutions, 
operating in both nonprofit and for-profit sectors, are integral to the increasingly diverse and 
expanding global higher education landscape (Altbach, 2005). Altbach foregrounds several other 
reasons warranting their investigation relative to the lack of academic attention they receive.  
FOMHEIs have a worldwide presence and may be found in all regions of the world: 
Latin America, Asia, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and even North America. In many 
national contexts, such as Korea, India, Colombia, and Brazil, FOMHEIs are significant in 
numbers. Therefore, understanding their role in and contribution to society, both in local and 
international spheres of operation, is needed. FOMHEIs need to be studied also because the 
managerial involvement of the family creates all sorts of opportunities and challenges that may 
not be found in nonfamily institution types. One challenge is related to the excessive 
concentration of power in the family unit. This may have a suppressing effect on academic 
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freedom and faculty autonomy. This may also lead to organizational conflict where the family 
uses its power to satisfying goals unrelated to the academic mission. There are also opportunities. 
According to Altbach (2005), FOMHEIs may be understood as organizations that can readily 
adapt to changes in the marketplace and test innovate pedagogical approaches or other new 
initiatives as a result of centralized authority. His understanding is that centralized authority 
makes decision-making streamlined, and conducive to solving problems in a quick and efficient 
manner.  
Unfortunately, Altbach’s (2005) call to research has been virtually unmet, until recently. 
Altbach et al. (2020) coedited a book titled The Global Phenomenon of Family-owned or 
Managed Universities and this book is a first attempt to provide some substantive understandings 
of the governance of FOMHEIs as well other characteristics. Importantly, it is a comparative 
piece that draws commonalities and differences from across a number of case studies to profile 
the FOMHEI landscape globally. The book concludes with saying that FOMHEIs are hybrid 
organizations possessing dual characteristics, those rooted in the family system and those related 
to higher education.  
However, the book still leaves some important questions unanswered. While providing a 
conceptual framework to understand FOMHEIs, the book does not delve deeply into exploring 
how the two systems, one related to the family-based characteristics of institutions and the other 
related to the higher education system, interact. This interaction is important to consider because 
the higher education system may have particular needs tied to the academic culture that the 
family system does not or cannot fully meet. In other words, the family system in which the 
family makes decisions to pursue SEW may lie in conflict with the higher education system in 
which the pursuance of certain SEW may not make sense. Indeed, there is some anecdotal 
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evidence that this is the case. In Altbach et al. (2020), the authors from Bangladesh explained 
that faculty and other nonfamily stakeholders (e.g., government officials who sit on university 
boards) come to have little power in their ability to influence decision-making. This was echoed 
by a number of other chapters in the book, all from different parts of the world. It is reasonable 
to suggest that such a reality would be problematic, especially for nonfamily faculty who 
according to the higher education literature value their participation in decision-making 
(Birnbaum, 2004; Gutmann, 1999) and according to Teferra (2014) do not fear authority. Teferra 
further explains that “academic freedom—is not that compatible with the principles of business 
and corporate regimes” (p.2). Shared governance is aggressively defended by faculty who 
consider their contribution as vitally important to keeping the university accountable to its 
mission. How then do they (the faculty and other nonfamily stakeholders) react to such 
circumstances? Answering this question is important to answering the primary research question 
stated earlier: How does the owner family at one nonprofit FOMHEI negotiate organizational 
decision-making where inherent governance realities may place limits on the ascribed decision-
making authority of the family? 
Significance 
The significance of this dissertation is manifold. Importantly, it is a first attempt to 
understand the governance and decision-making at a FOMHEIs through qualitative research 
using a single case study. The case study approach is expected to emerge findings not arrived at 
in the comparative volume of Altbach et al. (2020). Second, it has a pioneering focus on testing 
an established theoretical framework of the family firm literature in a new organizational 
context. The potential outcome of generating new knowledge through theory testing is quite 
exciting. This study thus “becomes instrumental to the theoretical contribution” (Crabtree & 
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Miller, 1999, p.66) of SEW theory. Furthermore, the application of stakeholder theory to the 
context of higher education also carries some significance. This is because as Powell (2007) 
claims only a handful of studies exist that attempt to “evaluate the relative influence of the 
different stakeholders in postsecondary education [decision-making]” (p.13). Indeed, this study 
fills these gaps, and should appeal to the academic interests of scholars based in both higher 
education governance and family-owned businesses fields, especially those interested in theory.  
Practitioners employed by the hundreds, if not thousands, of FOMHEIs also stand to 
benefit. They may draw policy/practice lessons from this study to illuminate and enhance their 
work. Notably, they may learn about both effective and ineffective governance and decision-
making practices in an environment where the two systems of family and business values clash 
and interact. Finding a balance between these two systems with respect to managing a university 
may be a key takeaway for practitioners.  
This study is significant for another reason. Societies around the world generally have a 
negative perception of FOMHEIs. Much of the criticism centers on family-based leadership 
styles that do not conform to fair and ethical business standards and practices. Many families in 
higher education management are known for “getting their way” which means different things 
from family to family, but sharing the same characteristic of prioritizing family interests over 
those of the university. In some countries, the public generally associates FOMHEIs with 
malpractice and low-quality education. While this may be true for many FOMHEIs worldwide, 
this critique is problematic for its broad application to the entire family venture landscape in 
higher education.  
There are many FOMHEIs around the world of positive repute. In some national 
contexts, some are even considered elite and are nationally ranked among the top institutions 
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operating there. These FOMHEIs are well regarded for their invaluable role in providing both 
local externalities (e.g., employment opportunities) and supporting national economic growth. 
The owner families of these FOMHEIs, with the support of their staff and faculty, operate from 
deep educational convictions and a vision to transform society through innovative services and 
programming. For these families, owning a university is less about running a business and 
profiteering than fulfilling a mission to nurture the educational curiosity of upcoming student 
generations.  
Unfortunately, the stories of these FOMHEIs, and the families that operate them, become 
lost in the negative public discourse. Their reputation suffers at the hands of a few or many, 
depending on national context. This study seeks to push back on this discourse and illuminate 
positive aspects of the FOMHEI organizational culture. Importantly, this study hopes to discuss 
family ownership and higher education as two systems that can co-exist (and even be mutually 
reinforcing) without suffering the academic mission. This study seeks to illuminate FOMHEIs as 
an integral and important part of the higher education landscape.  
Definition of Key Terms 
Governance. Governance “refers to the structures and processes through which institutional  
participants interact with and influence each other and communicate with the larger  
environment” (Birnbaum, 1988, p. 4). According to Austin and Jones (2015), governance is 
essential to the functioning of higher education (p.22). Further, governance structures, when 
appropriately articulated, acts as boundaries within which organizational order is created and 
organizational success may be achieved (Austin & Jones, 2015). In this study, governance is 




Shared governance. Shared governance refers to the set of practices within which college faculty 
and staff collectively make key decisions concerning the operation of their institutions 
(American Federation of Teachers, n.d.). Within higher education, some (e.g., Nadler et al., 
2010) discuss shared governance as specifically pertaining to the representation of faculty in 
institutional decision-making.  
 
Constituents/constituencies/stakeholder. These terms are interchangeably used in this study and 
any one of them may refer to “all the groups and individuals that can affect, or are affected by, 
the accomplishments of the organization’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984, p.25). 
 
Dominant family coalition. The dominant family coalition (DFC) refers to family members, 
including the founder, who are involved in controlling and managing a firm. The DFC is 
dominant in influencing firm activities and have the ascribed right to pass on ownership to 
successive generations.  
 
Organizational/institutional decision-making/decisions. This type of decision-making refers to 
key decisions that alter an existing condition on behalf of the whole organization. This condition 
may be related to the services the organization provides and internal policies and procedures. 
This level of decision-making is strategic in purpose and affects multiple stakeholders.  
 
Socioemotional wealth. According to Berrone et al. (2012), socioemotional wealth refers to the 
nonfinancial endowments of a family-run firm. These endowments not only define the family 
firm, but the pursuance of these endowments is said to drive family involvement in firm 
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activities. Berrone et al. (2012) organize socioemotional wealth into five interconnected 
dimensions. These are family influence, identification with firm, binding social ties, emotional 
attachment and renewal through dynastic succession.  
 
Power/influence. Power refers to the ability to affect the outcomes of others (Cartwright and 
Zander, 1968). Influence is similarly defined as power. Banfield (1962) views influence as the 
ability to affect the actions, thoughts and feelings of others. In this study, power and influence 
are used interchangeably and refer to the ability of one stakeholder or stakeholder group to exert 
pressure on others involved in decision-making with the aim of representing personal interests in 
the outcomes of a decision. Simply, power/influence refers to the ability affect organizational 
decisions, goals, and outcomes.   
 
Power relations. Above, power is defined as the ability to affect the decision-making outcomes 
of others. Power relations takes this notion of power and makes it a relational concept. In other 
words, this study does not define power as a juridical element to be possessed and used by 
people, let alone one stakeholder group, in a controlling way. Rather, power is a relational 
construct circulating among different stakeholders and manifesting in the very structures of 
higher education governance. These governance structures, academic senates and other 
mechanisms, facilitate the circulating of power. To a large extent, this conception of power, as 
being relational and structurally embedded, finds some anchoring in Foucault (1975). Notably, 
he avers that where there is power, there is resistance (p.95). The concept of power relations is 





Loose-coupling. Popularized by Weick (1976), as well as others (e.g., Cohen et al., 1972), loose-
coupling refers to a characteristic casting organizations (institutions) as an assemblage of 
subcultures that operate as autonomous and distinct units without coordination. Some scholars 
(e.g., Deal & Celotti, 1980) contend that loose coupling in organizations preclude institutional 
coherence where the administration holds a strong and central position in decision-making. In 
other words, loose-coupling undermines centralized authority.  
Overview 
This dissertation is organized as follows. Following this chapter, chapter two provides a 
comprehensive literature review at the nexus of three areas: the family firm scholarship, the 
higher education scholarship, and the theoretical scholarship of stakeholder theory. Chapter three 
provides a detailed overview of this study’s research design. Notably foregrounded are the key 
assumptions that come to bear on the topic of investigation; the research methods related to 
sampling, data collection and analysis; and descriptions of research site and interview 
participants. Chapter four presents an overview of the Indian higher education system with 
attention to describing the accountability environment in which Indian universities and colleges 
operate. This leads into the fifth chapter where I zoom into describing the case example of this 
study with respect to the governance structure and key personnel found there. Some information 
regarding the roles and responsibilities of the interview participants is also provided in this 
chapter. Both chapters 4 and 5 are written to provide background information about the case 
study. Findings are then discussed over four chapters with each chapter focused on answering 
each of the research questions of this dissertation. Chapters 6 and 7 are written to answer the first 
two research questions and establish that both higher education and family-based traits exist in 
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the case study. Establishing that both characteristics exist in the case study is crucial for the 
purpose of theory testing, further explained in the methodology chapter. Chapter 8 then 
investigates whether and how these characteristics interact. Further, this chapter clarifies the 
governance realities, or factors, that limit family-centric decision-making behaviors. The final 
findings chapter then clarifies how the owner family of the case study approaches organizational 
decision-making, within the overlapping governance realities described in chapter 8. Answering 
the research questions in this order should build an understanding of decision-making at Grand 
Hall University, gradually, and set the proper stage to answer the final research question. Finally, 
the last chapter, chapter 10, discusses the findings in relation to their import to theory and 
practice. I will also address the limitations of this study in this chapter, as well as potential future 












CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a comprehensive literature review on three strands of discourse: the 
family firm literature, the higher education scholarship, and the theoretical scholarship of 
stakeholder theory. These bodies of scholarship have particular salience to providing background 
information on the concepts being explored in this study. Importantly, they set the stage for 
problematizing SEW theory in higher education and considering the rival theoretical framework 
of stakeholder theory as a better suited (and perhaps complimentary) lens to investigate and 
illuminate decision-making behaviors of families involved in higher education management.  
Before examining these bodies of scholarship, it is important to review what literature exists 
regarding FOMHEIs to see what is out there. Some of the existing literature, namely the book 
mentioned in the introduction, provides valuable background information on FOMHEIs, which I 
use in this study.  
Existing Literature 
As mentioned, there is virtually no literature on FOMHEIs except for the recent book 
edited by Altbach et al. (2020). This book is a first attempt to provide substantive understandings 
regarding the governance culture at FOMHEIs and other characteristics that may be found at 
these institutions. Several points are made by Altbach et al. First, FOMHEIs are hybrid 
organizations possessing dual characteristics, one related to the higher education system and the 
other related to the family system. FOMHEIs are inevitably higher education institutions 
typifying characteristics found in private (and public) nonfamily types. These characteristics 
include organizational and operational properties defining the general higher education 
population of institutions, and relate to such dimensions as academic offerings, funding 
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mechanisms, and compliance and accountability pressures. On the other hand, FOMHEIs are 
uniquely family-based organizations possessing family-based traits. These traits are described 
further down in this chapter. Another important point made by Altbach et al. is that FOMHEIs do 
not constitute a monolithic group of institutions. There is diversity in the FOMHEI landscape in 
the forms of institutional mission, styles of management, and type (i.e., nonprofit vs for-profit). 
In addition to Altbach et al. (2020), I identified only a handful of articles on the topic of 
family-owned or-managed institutions (e.g., Bae et al., 2012; Calucag & Drucker, 2012; Razzak, 
2012; Tsamenyi et al., 2013). These articles, while offering some novel insights into family-
based governance and practices, contribute little in substance and are limiting in a number of 
ways. Foremost, the sum of their work lacks coherence with each article caring little about 
integrating what others have done. Second, none of the articles provide a proper literature review 
that situates FOMHEIs as a unique research context. Third, some of the articles have 
questionable quality in terms of methodology, findings, and discussion, and do not provide any 
conceptual framework to understand FOMHEIs.  Given these limitations, I rely on the family-
owned business literature to build a conceptual framework to understand this unique class of 
institutions.  
The Family-Owned Business 
The literature on family-owned businesses (FOBs) is extensive (e.g., Ashwin et al., 2015; 
Berrone et al., 2012; Davis, 1983; Davis, 1968; Gomez‐Mejia et al., 2010; Lansberg, 1983; Litz, 
1995; Miller et al., 2008; Steier, 2001; Whiteside & Brown, 1991; Zahra et al., 2004). These 
studies represent the long history on and comprehensive coverage of the varied characteristics of 
the family-owned enterprise. Topics may be found on the corporate social responsibility of 
family firms (e.g., Zientara, 2017), the challenges associated with leadership succession (e.g., 
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Jaskiewicz et al., 2016; Handler, 1994; Wang et al., 2004), the earnings management strategies 
of family managers or dominant family coalitions (DFCs) (e.g., Stockmans et al., 2010), and the 
marketplace advantage that family-owned businesses possess (e.g., Ashwin et al., 2015; 
Benedict, 1968; Churchill & Hatten, 1987; Davis, 1983; Habbershon & Williams, 1999; 
Lansberg, 1983; Zahra et al., 2004).    
All these topics open potential pathways to pursue novel and exciting research on family-
owned or -managed higher education institutions (FOMHEIs). While research directions abound, 
the novelty of FOMHEIs as a research area of interest calls for research having a foundational 
purpose. This purpose concerns laying down theoretical groundwork as a way to understand the 
uniqueness of FOMHEIs and the decision-making behaviors of family management in higher 
education. The vast body of scholarship on family-owned businesses (FOBs) is used as a starting 
point to understand FOMHEIs. 
Thus, this study foregrounds literature with salience to informing a fundamental 
understanding of organizational decision-making within family-owned ventures. The focus on 
governance and decision-making is not arbitrary. Much of the FOB literature discuss family 
firms as being unique relative to nonfamily firms from the perspective of governance. Namely, 
two areas of the family firm literature qualify for this purpose. The core definitional articulations 
of the family firm comprise one area. The other strand of literature focuses on a dominant family 
firm theory, socioemotional theory, that makes clear the motivational drivers undergirding 
family decision-making behaviors. This theory may also be used to delineate the core 
characteristics of the family firm. 
A Definition of the Family Firm  
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The literature rallies mainly behind two definitional approaches to describing family-
owned businesses. One common definition is in the ‘components-of-involvement’ perspective.  
According to this approach, firms are family-owned on the basis of satisfying at least one of the 
following conditions: (1) a family is the owner, (2) a family manages the firm, or (3) a family 
controls the firm (Kraiczy, 2013). These conditions are interrelated and in practice the presence 
of any single condition typically means the presence of the other two. In other words, families 
that own firms also typically manage and control them. On a more operational level, the 
components-of-involvement approach is concerned with to what extent, through what modalities, 
and what members of the owner family have managerial involvement in the governance of the 
firm they own (Astrachan et al., 2002; Klein et al., 2005; Sharma & Salvato, 2013).   
The application and discussion of the ‘components-of-involvement’ definition may be 
found across many studies. For example, Ashwin et al. (2015) discuss ownership and control as 
concepts tied to the occupation of both Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and board chairman 
positions by a single family member. The occupation of these positions by a single family 
member is referred to as “CEO duality,” where the family member tightens his/her control over 
firm affairs by consolidating responsibilities that typically in nonfamily firms are divided among 
different people. Berrone et al. (2010) discuss other components of (family-based) involvement. 
For example, families are understood to own their firms when multiple family members occupy 
seats on the board and/or when the representation of family members exceed that of nonfamily 
members on the board. Still another proxy of ownership comes from other scholars who tie the 
ownership of businesses to family members controlling a minimum percentage of company 
shares. Villalonga and Amit (2006) use a five percent threshold. Kraiczy et al. (2015) apply a 
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stricter rule and understand a firm to be family-owned if 25 percent of the company (as a 
percentage of shares) is controlled by the family.  
While the ‘components-of-involvement’ approach has gained traction among scholars, 
not all scholars accept this definitional approach. To them (e.g., Litz, 1995; Sharma & Salvato, 
2013; Shanker & Astrachan, 1996), the operational focus of involvement and control is limiting 
and does not capture more important and what they refer to as essential qualities of the family 
venture. These qualities concern the belief, vision and intent of the families involved in firm 
management and operations. They also concern the distinctive behaviors and activities that 
family managers or dominant family coalitions (DFCs) adopt to fulfill the firm outcomes they 
most desire. The focus on these aspects—intent and behaviors—is understood to better capture 
the “essence” of the family firm.  
Thus, critical scholars of the ‘components-of-involvement’ approach adopted a new 
definitional framework known as the ‘essence’ approach. The new definition centralizes the 
DFC’s vision and behaviors and applies the following criteria to defining the family firm: (1) a 
family’s influence over the strategy of the firm, (2) a family’s vision and intention to maintain 
control over the firm throughout successive generations, (3) family firm behavior, and (4) 
distinctive familiness (Chrisman et al., 2003; Kraiczy, 2013). 
Some further clarification on these criteria are warranted. For one, the essence approach 
builds on the components-of-involvement definition by incorporating the activities of control and 
involvement. It is thus a more expansive definition. Second, it locates the objective of 
transgenerational succession within the vision of the DFC, meaning that family leaders and 
managers desire to pass on their firms down generational lines as part of a family vision of 
success. The passing on of ownership rights from the proprietor to successive familial 
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generations is integrative and generative to the vision of all DFCs. Chrisman et al. (2003) make 
this clear: family firms may be defined by “the systemic vision of the familial coalition that 
generates distinctive familiness for transgenerational value creation” (p.471). Third, the criteria 
of family firm behavior and distinctive familiness allude to what Habbershon and Williams 
(1999) call familiness. The familiness of a firm may be understood as the nonfinancial resources 
(not concerned with profit) that DFCs generate through their managerial involvement. These 
resources include a participatory family culture that promotes care and loyalty (regarding the 
firm and peers) among both familial and nonfamilial employees; family language (a 
communication style allowing for more privacy and efficiency among family members); a 
stewardship orientation to the management of employees (owners treat and nurture employee 
relationships like any other valuable resource of the firm); the unification of beliefs and vision; 
flexibility (both family and nonfamily personnel can adapt to multiple roles while maintaining 
strong social bonds); and a culture that promotes creativity and innovation.  
In sum, the essence approach captures a broader array of family-based characteristics, 
compared with the components-of-involvement approach, that lend to a more comprehensive 
understanding of the family firm. Incorporating all of these components is the most commonly 
used definition in the literature: 
The family business is a business governed and/or managed with the intention to shape 
and/or pursue the vision of the business held by a dominant coalition controlled by 
members of the same family or a small number of families in a manner that is potentially 
sustainable across generations of the family or families (Chua et al., 1999, p.25). 
 
This literature review draws from Chua et al. (1999) to propose an expanded working definition 
for the family-owned or -managed higher education institution:  
A family-owned higher education institution is one that is governed and/or managed by a 
dominant family coalition whose intention is to shape the university according to a 
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distinct family vision in a manner that is potentially sustainable across successive familial 
generations. 
 
Next discussed is socioemotional theory, a dominant theoretical framework of the family 
firm literature that may provide further clarity on the family-owned enterprise. The theory may 
be thought of as expanding on Chua et al. (1999) definitional work. It further clarifies the 
reasoning behind organizational decision-making behaviors and fleshes out the major 
characteristics of the family firm, which a definition alone cannot accomplish.  
Socioemotional Wealth Theory 
First introduced by Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007), socioemotional (SEW) theory has gained 
widespread acceptance in the family firm literature as a theoretical framework to understand why 
families own and remain involved in firm management. The theory’s legitimacy is anchored in 
both anecdotal research and empirical data on the ownership venture across many industries, 
e.g., manufacturing, trade and service (Berrone et al., 2010; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; 
Stockmans et al., 2010). 
The socioemotional wealth of family firms is akin to the earlier discussed concept of 
Habbershon and Williams’s (1999) familiness. Therefore, SEW may be also understood as a 
firm’s nonfinancial utilities/endowments created by the family’s managerial involvement in firm 
activities. However, the two concepts may be differentiated with respect to how they are 
discussed in the literature. While both may be understood as products of familial involvement, 
and even characteristics of a firm that families desire, SEW is specifically discussed as primary 
criteria that families reference when making organizational decisions. In this way, SEW theory is 
conceptually anchored in the behavioral agency model (BAM) found in the management field. 
This model theorizes that management make decisions on the basis of implications to losing or 
gaining affective (nonfinancial) endowments. The protection/enhancement of these utilities, 
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otherwise known as SEW in the family firm literature, is a more important goal for DFCs than 
any consideration of economic gain (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2000; Wiseman & Gomez Mejia, 
1998). In other words, family owners frame problems and make decisions in terms of assessing 
how their actions will affect their stock of socioemotional endowment. When there is a threat to 
that endowment, the family is willing to make decisions that are not driven by an economic 
logic, and in fact the family would be willing to put the firm at risk if this is what it would take to 
preserve that endowment (Berrone et al., 2012). 
The same cannot be said of nonfamily commercial firms where profitmaking may be 
considered a more important goal than anything else. While nonfamily (for-profit) firms tend to 
give primary considerations to maximizing profit and performance, the leadership at family for-
profit firms behave in distinctive ways seeking primarily to satisfy their affective needs through 
the preservation of socioemotional wealth. Thus, it is on this decision-making premise that 
family firms may be differentiated from their nonfamily counterparts (Berrone et al., 2010; 
DeTienne & Chirico, 2013; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007).  
SEW abound and come in a variety of forms. Governance arrangements by which DFCs 
maximize their influence in decision-making is one example (Jones, Makri & Gómez-Mejía, 
2008). Others take the shape of emotional attachments held among work personnel and directed 
at the firm; social capital, or firm relationships built on trust, respect, and reciprocity; and 
governance mechanisms that safeguard the perpetuation of the family dynasty.  
Berrone et al. (2012) take stock of these utilities and organize them according to five 
interrelated dimensions. Each dimension corresponds to the letters in the acronym FIBER. 
Respectively, they are family influence, identification of family members with the firm, binding 
social ties, emotional attachment of family members, and renewal of family bonds through 
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dynastic succession. These are described below and may be further understood as the set of 
fundamental traits that inhere in all family firms.  
 
Family influence. This dimension refers to the family’s ability to exercise influence—also their 
intent, values and vision—as part of their strong ownership position in organizations. According 
to several scholars (Berrone et al., 2012; Schulze et al., 2003), this position is derived from the 
ascribed status of being a family member of the DFC. Typically, family members control most, if 
not all, of the top management positions (TMPs) within a firm (Tagiuri & Davis, 1996). This 
includes seats on the board and those at the executive level, e.g., Chief Executive Officer (CEO), 
vice president, and Chief Financial Officer (CFO). There are also cases where a single family 
member occupies multiple TMPs.   
Within these types of governance arrangements, family influence is cemented and family 
members are given a positional advantage in the decision-making hierarchy (Ashwin et al., 2015; 
Davis, 1983; Habbershon & Williams, 1999; Hall et al., 2001; Jones et al., 2008; Kraiczy et al., 
2015; Tagiuri & Davis, 1996). Further, the DFC continues to have a strong central position in 
management through hiring activities favoring family involvement (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006; 
Cambreleng, 1969; Lansberg, 1983; Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 2013; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2001; 
Schulze et al., 2003; Tagiuri & Davis, 1996). According to Bertrand and Schoar (2006), business 
founders tend to hire and promote from within kinship networks rather than look to more 
competent and professional nonfamily candidates. A trust issue seems to play a large role in such 
decisions (Fukyama, 1995). Simply, the family gives more credibility to family over nonfamily 
candidates. Also, family firm hiring is sensitive to the pressures that extended family members 
place on the family. Relatives, brothers, and sisters of the family who do not have formal 
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positions feel entitled to company profits and positions (Lansberg, 1983), and may not hesitate to 
make this known.  
 
Identification with firm. This SEW dimension refers to the psychological connection established 
between the DFC and the firm. It also refers to the shared identity between the DFC and the firm. 
The firm is a reflection of the DFC and vice versa, for good or bad. In this way, the firm is 
perceived as an extension of the family’s reputation (Berrone et al., 2012; Craig & Dibrell, 2006; 
Dyer & Whetten, 2006; Klein et al., 2005; Vardaman & Gondo, 2014; Westhead et al., 2001). 
The shared identity compels the DFC to “be more emotionally invested in the firm than non-
family members should be at family or non-family firms” (Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 2013, p. 
342). The outcome of such emotional investment is greater loyalty to and involvement in the 
firm among family members. Further, the integrative identity is reported to have a positive (as 
well as perhaps negative) impact on firm activities, the social relationships that are external and 
internal to the firm, and the services and products offered by the firm (Berrone et al., 2012).   
 
Binding social ties. The dimension of ‘bonding social ties’ captures the stock of relational capital 
at the family firm. Located within and external to the firm, they include relationships among 
work personnel and those between the firm and the community. Socioemotional wealth theory 
takes a positive view of these relationships. It likens the family firm culture to what Coleman 
(1990) refers to as closed networks where relationships operate within a culture of trust, fairness, 
and reciprocity. Both family and nonfamily members (internal and external to the firm) are 
integrative to this culture and share in the affective outcomes of trust, loyalty and interpersonal 
solidarity (Cennamo et al., 2012).  
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Further, many scholars suggest that family firms pursue the welfare of the community 
and pay special attention to pressing issues in society, such as “poverty, environmental 
degradation, and social justice” (Cennamo et al., 2012, p.22), in addition to treating nonfamily 
personnel with care and fairness. Often, these social investments are made even in the absence of 
economic gains (e.g., Brickson; 2005; Berrone et al., 2010). For example, family firms may 
invest in services that minimize toxic emissions at a significant expense to their profit margins 
(Berrone et al., 2010). 
 
Emotional attachment. ‘Emotional attachment’ refers to the emotional profiles that family 
members in a firm shape in relation to each other (Berrone et al., 2012). These profiles manifest 
as either positive projections such as pride or love, or in negative forms such as disappointment, 
frustration, or anger. Negative forms may lead to persistent family-based conflict and may make 
kin relations dysfunctional. To many scholars (e.g., Benedict, 1968; Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 
2012; Breton‐Miller et al., 2004; Davis, 1983; Lansberg, 1983; Tagiuri & Davis, 1996), the intra-
familial emotions found in family firms is a distinctive trait of family firms and a product of the 
intersection of two systems that operate in the same space. On the one hand is the family value 
system constituting the shared experiences, history, convictions, values, and cultural norms of 
the family, and on the other hand is the business value system comprising the norms shaping 
ethical and sound business practices. Typically, in family firms it is difficult to distinguish where 
family values end and where business values begin. The intra-familial emotions of a firm tend to 
spill over into the business interactions, practices and dealings, and even come to affect 
organizational decision-making (Baron, 2008). This creates all sorts of challenges and even 
opportunities with implications to not just the family but to nonfamily personnel and the overall 
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performance of the firm. When familial emotions are positive, firm activities may thrive. 
However, firm activities may suffer at the hands of a dysfunctional family unit that has every 
intention to maintain emotional dissonance. This means, for example, that family members may 
not want to reconcile when in a familial dispute even if reconciliation is the only course to ensure 
the proper functioning of the firm. For example, family members may not attend board meetings 
because they hold a grudge against other family members. This means that there might not be 
quorum to pass votes and make decisions that are critical to ensuring the proper functioning of 
the organization. Thus, the need to preserve emotional dissonance among family members may 
disrupt business practices and performance.  
 
Renewal through dynastic succession. Transgenerational succession corresponds to the last 
FIBER dimension. It refers to the formal and/or informal mechanisms by which family influence 
in firm activities and other SEW are passed on to successive generations. It is also the most 
important and widely discussed SEW dimension in the family firm literature (e.g., Ayres, 1990; 
Beckhard & Dyer, 1983; Benedict, 1968; Casson, 1999; Churchill & Hatten, 1987; Handler, 
1994; Tagiuri & Davis, 1996; Wang et al. 2004; Ward 1987; Zellweger et al., 2012). As 
mentioned, it is the single defining criteria that makes a family-owned firm family-owned.  
 
In sum, DFCs aim to enhance their firm’s affective utilities, which may be organized 
according to the five FIBER dimensions described above. Further, these utilities may be 
understood to define the family firm. They may be understood as the firm’s core characteristics. 
Family firms are thus organizations possessing a concentration of authority and decision-making 
power in a family unit; a shared identity with the family controlling the firm; relational capital as 
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a product of family-based managerial involvement; family-based emotions that may hurt or 
benefit firm activities; and organizational protocols, informal and/or formal, that facilitate 
dynastic succession.  
The five dimensions of SEW lend to another consideration. It is apparent that some SEW 
can have a beneficial impact on firm activities and performance. Clear examples are 
‘identification with firm’ and ‘binding social ties.’ For example, family members, by having a 
shared identity with the firm, are understood to work harder than nonfamily members to fashion 
a positive reputation of their firm, which reflects back on them. This may translate to boosting 
firm performance, making sure that employees are satisfied, and addressing community issues—
all for the sake of building firm and family reputation. Also, relationships built on trust and 
reciprocity may lead to high company morale, a welcoming work environment, and ultimately 
higher firm performance in the absence of organizational conflict. Less clear examples are 
‘emotional attachment,’ ‘family influence,’ and ‘renewal.’ As mentioned, emotional attachment, 
when positive, may positively impact firm activities. The positive intra-familial emotions may 
shape a positive firm culture. Renewal, or transgenerational success, may also have a positive 
impact. In the case where families value ethical behavior and practice, their firms may benefit in 
the long run from passing on these values to successive generations.  
In contrast, the protection and/or enhancement of some SEW have clear negative 
implications. The pursuit and concentration of family influence, for example, may be viewed, by 
employees and external stakeholders, as opportunistic and only satisfying the egos and affective 
needs of the family system. At some firms, the concentration of family influence may be a threat 
to sharing management responsibilities and collaborative decision-making. The same logic may 
also extend to the SEW dimension of ‘renewal through dynastic succession.’ By preserving a 
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dominant position in the firm, over time, the family may be understood as suppressing employee 
advancement and creating a culture where nonfamily members may have limited opportunities to 
become firm leaders and managers. The two dimensions of ‘family influence’ and ‘renewal’ are 
clear examples of what may be understood as family-centric/opportunistic SEW.  
Thus, SEW is not a monolithic group of utilities. They are complicated by the varied 
nature of their impact on firm activities and performance. There is a variance within FIBER, with 
some being thought of as family-opportunistic and others family-altruistic.  Interestingly, the 
literature further complicates the understanding of SEW by taking both positive and negative 
views of SEW even regarding the same dimensions. Provided below is a discussion of the two 
diverging perspectives. 
The Positive View of SEW 
One strand of literature maintains a favorable position on all the socioemotional wealth 
(SEW) dimensions. Many scholars (e.g., Berrone et al., 2010; Berrone et al., 2012; Cennamo et 
al., 2012; Cruz et al., 2014; Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 2013; Kellermanns et al., 2012; Miller & 
Breton‐Miller, 2014; Tagiuri & Davis, 1996; Vardaman & Gondo, 2014; Zientara, 2017) view 
SEW, and its protection and/or enhancement by the family, as ultimately benefitting the firm. 
This is because the enhancement of SEW is linked to satisfying stakeholders’ expectations 
through what may be referred to as pro-stakeholder engagement. To families, demonstrating their 
capabilities as effective firm managers (to society) is essential to remaining in power and 
protecting other SEW in perpetuity.  
This is especially the case for family firms listed publicly on the stock exchange. The 
families of these firms own their firms by possessing the requisite percentage of shares to 
influence decision-making (in line with the components-of-involvement definition). However, 
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they are not the only shareholders with decision-making power. There are also shareholders in 
nonfamily constituents who may care more about generating profits and returns than meeting the 
affective needs of the managing family. When firm performance is low, these shareholders may 
take steps to wrest control of the firm from the family. The possibility of this outcome drives 
family members to keep shareholders “happy,” by generating high firm profits and shareholder 
returns. It is a necessary strategy to justify the family’s ability to lead the firm and remain 
dominant in firm activities.  
Shareholders are not the only group that the family takes into account when 
protecting/enhancing SEW. According to the literature, the family also appeals to the interests of 
many other groups including lenders, suppliers, firm employees, and the local community 
(Brickson; 2005; Berrone et al., 2010; Lyman, 1991). Pro-stakeholder engagement with these 
groups is part of what Cennamo et al. (2012) describe as the “generational investment strategy” 
of the family firm, referring to the need of the family to cultivate a positive reputation through 
philanthropic giving (Stavrou et al., 2007), performing goodwill acts in the community, and 
providing greater job security to employees (Block, 2010; Stavrou et al., 2007). These social and 
reputational investments are part of a strategic agenda to protecting and enhancing SEW, 
especially the dimension of family influence and renewal.  
 Examples of “generational investment strategy” may be found in a number of studies. For 
example, Deephouse and Jaskiewicz (2013) draw on SEW theory to show differences between 
family and nonfamily firms with respect to the reputational investments they make. They find 
that families of family firms seek a “favourable corporate reputation for its contribution to 
socioemotional wealth” (p.352), among which family influence and generational succession are 
important goals (Vardaman & Gondo, 2014). Another example of generational investment 
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strategy comes from Berrone et al. (2010) who compare family and nonfamily firms with respect 
to their environmental performance. They show that family firms pursue (costly) strategies that 
minimize environmentally toxic emissions while nonfamily businesses invest less money in 
similar efforts. This is because the families of family firms, compared with the leadership of 
nonfamily firms, are more emotionally invested in protecting the firm’s image that is perceived 
by the family to directly reflect back on the family. Even in compliance, family firms are shown 
to respond with “beyond compliance practices to normative pressures (even if normative 
institutions don’t have strong coercive mechanisms) because the protection of socioemotional 
capital may be more closely tied to the normative component of institutional forces” (Berrone et 
al., 2012, p.104). Further examples of the positive implications of SEW on firm activities may be 
found elsewhere (e.g., Dyer & Whetten, 2006; Vardaman & Gondo, 2014; Westhead et al., 
2001).  
The Negative View of SEW 
Another line of discussion in the literature takes a different perspective. This discourse 
does not claim that the family engages stakeholders proactively when pursuing socioemotional 
wealth (e.g., Beckhard & Dyer, 1983; Berrone et al., 2010; Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 2013; 
Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2010; Kellermanns et al., 2012; Miller & Breton‐
Miller, 2014; Stockmans et al., 2010; Taguiri and Davis, 1996; Zientara, 2017). In Stockmans et 
al. (2010), for example, nonfamily shareholders (in family firms listed on the stock exchange) or 
lenders are described as stakeholders who perceive SEW protection/enhancement activities as 
threatening firm performance, and ultimately their financial holdings. They illustrate this with a 
hypothetical situation. A lender, whose primary interest is in recouping the expense of a loan 
through interest payments, has to find alternative methods of securing the borrowed amount 
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outside of conventional repayment strategies. This is because the borrower is a family firm that 
prioritizes the preservation of SEW over realizing high firm profits that in part would be used 
toward paying back the loan.  
Gomez-Mejia et al. (2010) discuss another example of how families augment SEW at the 
expense of firm performance. According to them, families are unwilling to invest in growth and 
diversification opportunities that may boost firm performance in the long run. This is because 
growth and diversification, which may require the sharing of decision-making with other firms, 
is perceived as threatening the socioemotional wealth dimension of family influence.  
SEW protection activities are a source of concern and conflict for the nonfamily 
employees of the firm as well. According to Zientara (2017), nonfamily employees are on the 
receiving end of what are referred to as “business practice contradictions,” or normative 
contradictions as accorded by Lansberg (1983). This concept refers to the conflict between the 
family’s need to preserve SEW, especially family influence over day-to-day operations 
(Chrisman et al., 2012; Vardaman & Gondo, 2014), and the fair practices that typically (or rather 
ought to) inhere in the business system. In other words, normative contradictions describe the 
violation of fair business practices by unprofessional familial expectations and entitlement 
behaviors (Athanassiou et al., 2002; Lansberg, 1983; Zientara, 2017). In such a context, a family 
may circumvent formal hiring policies, if any even exist, and honor blood ties in hiring 
decisions. Hiring family members over outside members is more important to increasing family 
influence.  
The following are additional examples of normative contradictions that have an 
adversarial impact on employees: preferential family treatment in training, hiring, and promotion 
activities (Berrone et al., 2010; Burkart et al. 2003; Debicki et al., 2016; Gersick et al., 1997; 
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Jaskiewicz et al., 2013; Miller & Breton‐Miller, 2014; Ward, 1987; Zientara, 2017); the 
scapegoating of nonfamily members in order to divert negative public attention from families 
who have a poor reputation (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001); ad hoc human resources policies and an 
organizational culture that resists professionalization (De Kok et al., 2006; Vardaman & Gondo, 
2014); incompetence in management (Mehrotra et al., 2011; Miller & Breton‐Miller, 2014); a 
higher pay scale for family members (Zientara, 2017); undemocratic decision-making 
mechanisms and processes (Zientara, 2017); and an environment that stifles creativity and 
innovation (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Miller & Breton‐Miller, 2014; Zientara, 2017).  
In sum, there are both positive and negative views of SEW (Figure 1.0). Depending on 
the view, the protection and enhancement of SEW either becomes opportunistic for the family 
(family-centric) or altruistic for nonfamily stakeholders.  
 
Figure 1.0 Dual Nature/Continuum of Socioemotional Wealth Outcomes 
Altruistic (for stakeholders) Opportunistic (for family) 
Family influence 
Identity with firm 
Binding social ties 
Emotional attachment  
Renewal 
Family influence 
Identity with firm 
Binding social ties 
Emotional attachment  
Renewal 
 
Despite being contentiously situated in the family firm literature, socioemotional theory 
has broad support from many scholars in the family firm literature. It is an appropriate theoretical 
lens to describe dominant family coalition decision-making behaviors in many industries, e.g., 
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manufacturing, trade and service (Berrone et al., 2010; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Stockmans et 
al., 2010). Its effectiveness as a theory mainly comes from its applicability to differentiate the 
decision-making intent and behaviors between family-based and nonfamily managers (those at 
nonfamily businesses). In other words, SEW theory is effective in uniquely situating the family-
owned venture as an organization worth studying separately (Berrone et al., 2012).  
Private Higher Education and Family Ownership 
The concept and practice of family-ownership extends to the industry of higher 
education. The emergence of family-owned higher education institutions on the world stage is 
not considerably unique. Their growth in numbers is part of a broader trend discussed by several 
leading scholars in the field of higher education. This trend concerns the explosive growth of 
private sectors globally at the turn of the twenty-first century. According to Altbach (1999) and 
Levy (2018), a combination of factors led to this growth, but namely two interrelated factors: the 
rising demand for higher education and the limited capacity, financially and physically, of public 
higher education sectors around the world to meet this demand. Private actors in higher 
education delivery were increasingly called on to expand higher education capacity where 
governments were financially encumbered. Notably, explosive private sector growth has been 
witnessed in Korea, India, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, and many other countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia.  As Levy notes, historically 
these regions left no room for private interests including those related to higher education 
delivery with private higher education existing nominally. That, however, has changed. 
According to Levy (2018), private higher education rose to 28 percent of the global 
enrollment by 2000, with no indication of stopping. By 2010, enrollment in the private sector 
globally has been recorded to be around 56 million, accounting for 32.9 percent of total global 
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enrollment. The rise in private enrollment has led to higher education systems around the world 
dominated by private institutions in some of the aforementioned countries and regions (e.g., parts 
of Latin America and Korea, Japan, Philippines, Indonesia, and India). And even in countries 
with historically strong public sectors, such as in China and Vietnam and countries in sub-
Saharan Africa, private growth has been substantial (Altbach, 2016; Levy, 2018).  
Many types of private institutions have come to constitute the present global higher 
education landscape. These include faith-based institutions founded and operated by religious 
organizations and groups, for-profit institutions, and nonprofit institutions. Within the latter two 
of these categories, family-ownership is possible. Families or individuals have established 
universities and colleges around the world within favorable economic and political 
circumstances and where governments allow for their involvement in higher education delivery. 
Family-owned or -managed higher education institutions, while distinctive, may be understood 
as just another type of institution as those operated by religious groups, powerful boards of 
trustees, or large companies (as in the case of Korea). Thus, the emergence of family-owned 
institutions, as mentioned earlier, is part of the explosive global growth of private institutions 
that are of several types. They are inevitably part of the private sector of institutions and may be 
considered a subset of the general landscape.  
In this way, family-owned institutions typify many of the major characteristics defining 
the private sector. These characteristics relate to funding mechanisms, relationship with the 
government, role in society, mission, and academic focus and research, to name a few (Altbach 
et al., 2020; Levy, 2018). For example, family-owned or -managed higher education institutions, 
like other private types, do not rely on government funding to sustain operations. Rather, they 
rely on tuition payments as a significant source of revenue. Of course, other revenue streams 
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exist in the forms of research grants, donations, and direct government assistance. However, 
these revenue streams for the most part are marginal globally. The exception is philanthropic 
giving and market-based investing in the US and UK where private institutions amass significant 
wealth through these avenues.  
Also, both FOMHEIs and nonfamily institutions operate under the same system of 
government controls (distinctions are more along the public-private divide). In some countries, 
government controls in the private sector are as strict as in the public sector. According to 
Altbach (2016), most notable examples are Korea and Japan and government agencies in these 
countries have the power to impose limits on enrolments, tuition, numbers of teaching staff, 
salaries and the like. Another area where family-owned higher education institutions resemble 
nonfamily counterparts is academic offerings. The private sector landscape globally and in 
general focus on offering programs and courses that have market relevance. Most private 
institutions (excluding perhaps the US) act as gatekeepers to skills-based careers in the market, 
the most popular being IT, medicine, engineering, and law. FOMHEIs are no exception and in 
general follow the same pattern of targeting the same population of students and offering 
programs with a professional focus.  
Prototypical Higher Education Characteristics 
FOMHEIs may also share characteristics with the entire higher education landscape 
including both public and private institutions. This is because private institutions share “common 
roots” with public counterparts as explained by Levy (2018). Common roots may include 
governance structures, organizational culture, academic mission, and position in society as 
organizations performing a public good. These characteristics, among others, present FOMHEIs 
as being inevitably part of the post-secondary education systems in which they may be found. 
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FOMHEIs by identity are higher education institutions possessing both unique private sector 
characteristics as well as what we may refer to as prototypical academic characteristics found 
across public and private sectors.  
Such characteristics have long been identified and established by higher education 
literature. Further, many of these properties sufficiently situate higher education institutions 
(including FOMHEIs) as unique organizations relative to those in other industries. The 
uniqueness of higher education is discussed by many scholars (e.g., Birnbaum, 1988; Cohen & 
March, 1986; Clark, 1984; Kerr, 2001; Teferra, 2014) and include an ambiguity in missional 
objectives; a politically-charged decision-making climate, in part shaped by the plurality of 
competing interests held by different stakeholders; and the imperative of shared governance, the 
presence (or pressures to employ) democratic/consultive approaches to decision-making. A 
discussion of each of these is provided below.  
Missional Ambiguity, Competing Interests, and Stakeholder Diversity 
According to Cohen and March (1986), two of the foremost scholars on organizational 
theory, the university does not know what it is doing. The university is what they refer to as an 
“organized anarchy” within which members have confusion about the nature and mission of the 
enterprise. In large part, this confusion is connected to the duality of the university’s mission. On 
the one hand, a university is a business with the utilitarian agendas of profit-making and 
enhancing reputational wealth. The business aspect of a university is certainly very important. A 
university is able to remain financially viable through long-term strategic financial planning. 
And a university uses profits to enhance its reputation, nationally and internationally, by building 
new facilities, hiring in-demand faculty, and recruiting top students. All of these activities 
require funding.   
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On the other hand, a university fulfills a cultural purpose. It is a marketplace of ideas 
where knowledge creation and transmission go hand-in-hand with an academic mission to serve 
society (Newman et al., 1996; Tierney, 1994). Birnbaum (2004) states: “academic institutions are 
those that give priority to education as an end in itself and are deeply rooted in a culture that 
prizes academic freedom, critical discourse, creativity, and liberal learning” (p.8). Gutmann 
(1999) furthers this understanding by linking the university and its services to benefitting society 
through what she refers to as “conscious social reproduction.” This concept refers to educational 
goals that drive critical thinking and moral considerations in society, meaning the examination of 
unethical practices in society through the lens of critical teaching, discourse, dialogue and 
research.   
This duality—utilitarian and cultural—has been long discussed in the literature, from 
Cohen and March (1974) to Corson (1996), and in more recent works (e.g., Slaughter & 
Rhoades, 2011). Across all of these contributions, a major throughline is that the missional 
ambiguity of higher education leads to operational inconsistencies and uncertainty. 
Foregrounded is the question of who is in control of university affairs with different stakeholders 
each having different missional orientations. Some may care more about the bottom dollar while 
others prioritize transforming society. The answer, of course, is not clear.  
Two stakeholder groups, as actors with strong influence over the direction of the 
university, are foregrounded in literature. On the one hand, university authority rests in the hands 
of the administration. Administrative staff possess what Corson (1996) refers to as 
‘administrative authority,’ or decision-making power or influence connected to occupying higher 
positions in the organizational hierarchy (Bolman & Deal, 2017). Members of the administration, 
and their decision-making chain, represent the utilitarian (business) dimension of higher 
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education. They are concerned primarily with strategic organizational planning leading to long-
range financial and operational viability, not to mention higher rankings nationally and globally.  
 Institutional authority, however, is not entirely concentrated in the administration. 
Administrative staff must consider their institutional authority or influence in relation to the 
authority of another group. According to Corson (1996), the faculty also wield decision-making 
power and possess what is referred to as ‘professional authority,’ or the authority tied to 
safeguarding and advancing the academic mission. Unlike the administration, the faculty are 
concerned with an entirely different set of institutional priorities with implications to driving 
knowledge creation and dissemination. The uniqueness of higher education is that this 
professional authority exists in large concentrations in the university, more so than any other 
business. According to Julius et al. (1999), this is the “first [differentiating] characteristic of 
academic organizations” (p.114) relative to those in other industries. 
Often these two decision-making chains—one possessing administrative authority and 
the other, professional authority—intersect at decision-making crossroads related to various 
university matters, circumstances, and policies. The collision of these two authoritative bodies 
are especially pronounced in times of financial exigency, institutional budget planning, 
allocating resources to support different programs and initiatives, setting faculty and staff 
salaries, and creating academic programs, just to name a few. Rarely do faculty and 
administrative staff “see eye to eye” in these areas and especially within a context of scarce 
resources.  
Some scholars (e.g., Corson, 1996) even explain that the administrative and professional 
spheres of authority in higher education operate in constant tension. This is because they are 
driven by “enduring differences in values, beliefs, information, interests, and perceptions of 
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reality” (Bolman & Deal, 2017, p.188). In fact, Morey and Piderit (2006) argue that the 
divergence of interests and priorities between faculty and staff is widening. They claim that 
faculty are more autonomous than ever and operate from individualistic belief systems that 
oftentimes work against institutionally espoused convictions that are typically defined by the 
administration. The increasing autonomy of faculty may also be explained by what Zemsky 
(2013) refers to as “academic ratcheting,” describing the increasing discretionary time used by 
faculty to pursue professional and personal goals. These goals are academic in nature (e.g., 
producing scholarship), and often unrelated to institutional priorities established by management 
who may be more concerned about using institutional resources to support capital campaigns and 
the building of visually appealing, costly facilities. Thus, the faculty and the administration may 
clash around diverging priorities and the resources required to support these priorities.  
Inter-stakeholder conflict is not limited to the two groups of the faculty and 
administration. Universities have many moving parts as Kerr (2001) explains and attracts 
different stakeholders who, driven by varying expectations and needs, may exert pressures 
related to the significance they attach to different organizational objectives. In part, this is 
because universities, regardless of their private or public status, are regarded as a public trust that 
performs a public good, which is interpreted differently by different stakeholders. Having such a 
societal role has signaled many different types of stakeholders including the public to claim a 
right on the university’s direction. In addition to faculty and the administration, other key 
stakeholder groups include students, and their parents, as consumers who pay a premium for 
educational quality; alumni whose donations symbolize their philanthropic legacy and come with 
narrowly-defined restrictions related to how they want their money spent; and accreditation 
agencies and government bodies whose standards and regulations restrict what the university and 
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its constituting members can and cannot do (Altbach, 2016; Altbach et al., 2017; Austin & Jones, 
2015; Cohen, 1998; Hazelkorn, 2015). For public universities globally, government controls 
around how and for what purpose they can spend money may be stricter on the basis of receiving 
public funding. However, governments controls in many countries including Korea and Japan are 
equally strict in the private sector and reach into nearly all facets of institutional affairs. Both 
public and private universities and colleges are controlled by statist and rational planning.   
All the stakeholder groups discussed above politicize decision-making and pull higher 
education in different directions based on the investments they make and the returns they seek. 
Indeed, as Eckel (2000) argues, universities are best understood as “arenas for dissent and 
debate” (p.16) and through what he refers to as the ‘interest-group struggle’ framework, a lens 
capturing the conflict, posturing and negotiations of stakeholders during organizational decision-
making. Interests and priorities are pitted against one another creating confusion and disorder 
about missional goals. While all stakeholder groups are perhaps equally frustrated, the political 
climate of organizational decision-making in higher education has been especially trying for 
university leadership. Presidents of universities are typically described as feeling helpless and 
not having clarity on any single institutional direction (Baliles, 1997).  
Complexity of Organizational Structure and Culture 
Many scholars (e.g., Altbach, 2016; Birnbaum, 1988; Keenan, 2015) make a point of the 
growing complexity and size of the university in recent decades. Universities are continuously 
expanding programs and creating new courses, departments and schools, not to mention hiring 
new staff and faculty. According to Altbach (2016), these changes coincide and are a result of 
the rising demand for higher education and the emergence of new fields, the most popular being 
informatics, management, international trade, biomedical sciences, and computer science. This 
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demand has signaled the need for higher education institutions to build out their programs and 
hire staff and secure resources to support the programs. The logic of mass higher education has 
introduced significant structural changes in the university (Altbach, 2016). 
 These changes have several implications to the decision-making culture. The accretion of 
new programs, courses, departments, centers, institutes, and schools have disrupted centralized 
decision-making structures and modalities. Within the modern university there may be found 
multiple loci of power wielded by the different stakeholders (i.e., faculty, staff, and accreditation 
agencies) siloed within and regulating the growing number of services and academic and 
administrative units.  
Unfortunately, it is more typical than not that different stakeholder groups rarely 
coordinate. Rather, they operate autonomously according to localized (unit-specific) specialized 
rules, responsibilities and approaches, as well as values, perspectives, and customs that conflict 
with the dominant university culture. This phenomenon has been referred to as “loose-coupling,” 
meaning that organizations operate less as a rational whole and more as an assemblage of 
loosely-coupled units that have their own organizational cultures (Cohen et al., 1972; Weick, 
1976). Weick (1976) even compares the university to an octopus whose arms behave as 
autonomous units in the absence of solidarity, rational planning, and a coordinated direction.  
 The phenomenon of loose-coupling is not limited to describing the configuration of and 
interaction among different stakeholder groups. It is also applied to describing the fragmented 
culture within the same stakeholder group. For example, Hill (1996) explains that the members 
of the faculty body share little in common with each other because of having different 
disciplinary foci and attaching different levels of significance to the scholarship of peers in other 
departments and schools. Faculty are siloed within their own fields of study, and typically not 
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interested in the research of peer faculty. Thus, coordination across disciplines is an elusive 
concept. The administration has also been described as having little uniformity. According to 
Zemsky and Massy’s (1990) concept of ‘administrative lattice,” the administration has grown to 
“incorporate ever more elaborate and intricate linkages within itself,” –further fragmenting and 
bureaucratizing the organizational environment.   
Ultimately, loose-coupling across and within academic and administrative units, across 
and within stakeholder groups, preclude institutional coherence (Deal & Celotti, 1980), referring 
to the convergence of goals among university stakeholders. Dean and Celotti (1980) further 
suggest that the disjointed organizational culture frustrates authority and the decisions they 
make. They claim that loose-coupling undercuts the centrality of leadership. This perspective is 
shared by Weick (1976) who argues that centralized authority is an incredible challenge in 
education.  
Shared Governance and a Legacy of Faculty Empowerment  
 Finally, universities compared with other organizations may be distinguished by their 
(stronger) espousal of shared governance in decision-making. Shared governance refers to the set 
of practices guiding the culture of collaborative decision-making among key stakeholders 
(American Federation of Teachers, n.d.). First catching on in the nursing industry, it is a collegial 
model of governance centralizing the principles of partnership, equity, accountability, and 
ownership (Swihart, 2006).  
In the context of higher education, shared governance has become synonymous with 
faculty empowerment and representation in organizational decision-making (Nadler et al., 2010). 
Further, it is regarded as an antecedent to upholding the academic mission, as argued by leading 
scholars in the field (Gutmann, 1999; Kerr, 1970; Newman et al., 1996; Rhoades, 2005; Tierney, 
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1994). They discuss shared governance as an essential and inherent factor to promoting faculty 
decision-making involvement that in turn is generative to the free exercise of knowledge 
production and dissemination. 
Faculty are thus important and necessary actors who facilitate the academic mission. 
Given this reputed and professional status, their input is constantly sought by administrative 
decision-makers in higher education. In fact, many scholars in higher education argue that higher 
education institutions effectively function on the basis of faculty input (e.g., Birnbaum, 1988; 
Bloom & Rosovsky, 2001; Burgan, 1988; Minor, 2004; Teferra, 2014). In other words, 
institutional success, which can be defined as the ability to advance organizational goals related 
to the academic mandate, depends on leadership decisions supported (and driven) by non-
leadership constituencies such as faculty.  
The American case is notably exemplary for embodying the spirit of faculty 
empowerment in decision-making. Shaping American higher education governance is a variety 
of safeguards and modalities that “protect the interest of faculty in university decision making” 
(Minor, 2004). These include task-force groups, town-hall meetings, academic senates, unions, 
and committees, to name a few (Minor, 2004). A deeply embedded democratic consciousness 
manifests in a system of “checks and balances” that recognizes faculty input, among those of 
other constituencies including students, lay boards, etc. And as mentioned earlier, broad 
representation in decision-making is integral and generative to not only organizational decision-
making, but also institutional effectiveness (Birnbaum, 1988; Brubacher & Rudy,1997; Heaney, 
2010; Hirsch & Weber, 2001; Kerr, 2001). In this way, the American system of higher education 
has come to represent the gold standard of upholding the merits of academic freedom and 
research (Brubacher & Rudy, 1997; Ehrenberg, 2004; Hirsch & Weber, 2001; Shattock; 2014). 
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The American system of faculty-centered or shared governance, which has its roots in 
Europe (notably the Homboldtian model), has become widely accepted globally (Anderson, 
2004; Dobbins and Knill, 2009; Scott, 2002). American higher education (and European) 
governance has become referential systems and is emulated by many countries in Asia, Latin 
America, and Africa. Shared governance (and in its absence faculty-driven pressures related to 
employing it) has become the (global) norm in higher education (Legon et al., 2013). Faculty 
globally have become familiar with the need for shared governance.  
However, faculty autonomy may be absent or suppressed in some parts of the world. The 
sharing of governance may be found to lesser degrees in some regions, many of which are 
developing and have yet to transition to mass/universal student enrollment, not to mention have 
exposure to the academic demands of global competition and knowledge exchange. Sociocultural 
values and customs too may play a part in suppressing shared governance. And, of course, we 
must not ignore the threat to faculty power and autonomy coming from the emergence of new 
realities. According to Altbach (2016) and Hirsch and Weber (2001), new circumstances threaten 
traditional patterns of faculty autonomy and decision-making power, to some degree even in the 
research university. These include the massification of higher education, bureaucratization of 
universities, the strengthening of accountability measures and government controls, the hiring of 
nontraditional faculty (e.g., part-time, clinical), and the global wave of new managerialism 
principles favoring top-down, centralized approaches to governance and management.  
However, these realities, while threatening faculty autonomy, do not mean the absence of 
faculty voice. In many institutional settings where faculty autonomy is suppressed, faculty are 
known to defend their right to fair representation, especially when it comes to decision-making 
matters of academic import. Faculty are not afraid to express their disapproval of top-down 
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approaches that marginalize academic agency and/or decision-making influence. In this way, the 
university is different from the corporate world because conformity to authority is not mandatory 
(Teferra (2014). Faculty “should fear neither intimidation nor harassment, nor, even worse, 
firing, by their institutions for their non-conformist ideals, values, perspectives, positions, 
beliefs, and statements. The requisite prerogative—academic freedom—is not that compatible 
with the principles of business and corporate regimes” (Teferra, 2014, p.2).   
Problematizing Socioemotional Wealth Theory  
The characteristics outlined above contribute to differentiating the higher education 
organizational/governance context from other business settings. Understandably, some of the 
characteristics like ‘competing interests’ and ‘fragmented decision-making’ may be found 
shaping the governance culture in other industries. However, the organizational context of higher 
education may be understood as presenting these characteristics to a stronger degree.  
The consideration of these characteristics in FOMHEIs is quite intriguing. This is 
because FOMHEIs seemingly possess other governance-related traits that may impact and 
interact with the academic culture. As discussed earlier, these traits relate to the familiness 
character of the institution and are derived from the family’s managerial involvement. Thus, as 
Altbach et al. (2020) explain, FOMHEIs are sites possessing both governance processes and 
modalities that are universal to academia as well as family-based decision-making behaviors 
explained by socioemotional theory. The clashing of these two governance systems is what 
undergirds key questions raised in this study. Do families in higher education management, like 
their counterparts in commercial business settings, make organizational decisions by primarily 
referencing SEW criteria? Do they pursue SEW as a primary/ultimate goal when making 
organizational decisions? Or, do the demands of the academic culture result in other decision-
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making behaviors? More pointedly, to what extent do families involved in higher education 
management satisfy the assumptions of socioemotional theory?  
As mentioned, socioemotional theory states that families owning businesses make 
organizational decisions primarily based on the prospect of losing or gaining socioemotional 
wealth. The pursuit of SEW is prioritized relative to all other business-related interests—even 
those including making a profit. However, the proposition of this study is that family leaders 
may behave differently in higher education whose organizational context is shaped by unique 
governance factors not found (or found to a lesser degree) in nonacademic organizational 
settings.  
Thus, the family-owned or -managed higher education institution is a good match for 
what some scholars (e.g., Cavaye, 1996; Crabtree & Miller, 1999; Løkke & Sørensen, 2014) 
refer to as theory testing. Theory testing may be understood as a “theoretical research path” in 
which the findings derived from the application of a particular theory to a non-tested case study 
“becomes instrumental to the theoretical contribution” (Crabtree & Miller, 1999, p.66). Theory 
testing is generative to producing new findings that diverge from those catalogued in the existing 
literature. Is the original theory correct? Does the original theory fit other circumstances? Are 
there additional categories or relationships to be observed? These are some of the questions that 
theory testing can address according to Crabtree and Miller (1999). Thus, not only does theory 
testing identify gaps in the set of logical arguments advanced by a particular theoretical 
framework, but also it is a methodological approach employed to generate new knowledge from 
the application of theory under unexplored conditions. There is a need to “test explanatory theory 
by evaluating it in different contexts” (Crabtree & Miller, 1999, p.7), with the aim of modifying, 
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challenging, or confirming the theoretical premises vis-à-vis new realities (Cavaye, 1996; Løkke 
& Sørensen, 2014). 
In this study, there is a need for testing the assumptions of socioemotional wealth theory 
in the never-explored context of higher education where family-ownership abounds. There is a 
need to examine how the family system operates in the organizational context of higher 
education, within the realities of fragmented decision-making; interests plurality; and the 
presence (or pressures to employ) democratic governance structures and modalities. The 
expectation is that the demands of these realities, representing the academic culture, lie in tension 
with the pursuit of family-opportunistic socioemotional wealth. As mentioned earlier, this type of 
SEW refers mainly to those that ignore the needs of other stakeholder groups, concentrate too 
much power in the family unit, and satisfy the affective needs of the family unit. In the context of 
higher education, the enhancement of such opportunistic SEW may have a suppressing effect on 
optimal levels of academic functioning by restricting the autonomy and decision-making power 
of nonfamily stakeholder groups (especially the faculty) that support the academic mission. 
Further, such SEW may shape an organizational culture inconsistent with the values, convictions 
and vision of the academic community. For example, the enhancement of family influence in the 
form of centralized governance structures favoring family managerial involvement may be 
challenged by faculty who espouse democratic and inclusive governance structures and 
modalities. 
Thus, the family unit of a FOMHEI, in recognition of the negative implications of SEW 
on academic performance, may not act in selfish ways, but make organizational decisions with 
sensitivity to the needs and demands of the academic culture. Said differently, the organizational 
culture of traditional higher education settings may possess unique conditions that induce a 
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universal set of behaviors among all leadership, family-based or not and regardless of sector. The 
families of FOMHEIs and nonfamily-based higher education leadership in both the public and 
(nonprofit) private sectors may behave similarly with respect to organizational decision-
making—driven by the same goal of appealing to the needs of the academic mission and the 
academic community.  
At the heart of the assumption that families in higher education management act similarly 
to the leadership in nonfamily universities and colleges is that no single group in higher 
education, including the leadership, controls the decision-making process. Power is not affixed to 
one group. This inference is much in line with Foucault (1975) who discusses power as a 
relational construct that may be exercised by all members in society. The power or influence to 
affect the actions, thoughts and feelings of others, not to mention the outcomes of organizational 
objectives, circulates among multiple stakeholders and across loosely-coupled departments and 
schools. In higher education, the circulation and exercise of power by multiple stakeholder 
groups is in part facilitated by legitimatized avenues of democratic participation. As mentioned, 
these include academic senates, committees, unions, townhall meetings, and other types of 
representative decision-making or consultive bodies. They allow varying university constituents 
to come together and flex their decision-making power or influence in relation to one another.   
 Not accounting for these power relations is a major limitation of socioemotional wealth 
theory. SEW theory assumes that the family unit protects and enhances SEW from a position of 
significant, if not absolute, power (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). In other words, SEW theory 
describes family decision-making behaviors and purposes without sufficient theorizing on how 
decisions are made in relation to the power of other groups. 
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 This is evident in the negative view of SEW. As explained, this view of SEW links the 
family-based activities of protecting and enhancing SEW to the outcomes of significant firm 
costs. These costs mostly relate to normative contradictions (the violation of fair business 
practices by familial expectations and activities) that have an adversarial impact on the 
organizational culture, nonfamily employees, firm performance, nonfamily shareholders, and 
other external stakeholder groups (e.g., vendors and banks). Such outcomes are discussed as a 
matter of fact—without consideration and theorizing of the power-based tension that my exist 
between family and nonfamily stakeholders.  
In the corporate world, which is the focus of the family firm literature, perhaps such 
theorizing is not needed. Teferra (2014) explains that employee conformity to authority is a 
matter of culture in the business world. Such conformity certainly suggests the absence of 
power-based tension and conflict between families and nonfamily personnel. However, this logic 
is not well suited to explain the contentious relationships that may exist between leadership and 
non-leadership in the higher education governance culture. As explained earlier, all stakeholder 
groups, especially the faculty, operate from personal convictions and according to local customs 
(within various academic and administrative units) that may work against the dominant 
university culture established by the leadership. Thus, relationships in higher education (more 
than in the corporate sector) are contentious by nature and families may have to consider their 
decision-making power in relation to those of nonfamily groups. 
The logic of SEW is also problematized in higher education according to the positive 
view of SEW, but for a different reason. This reason has little do with the absence of theorizing 
the power-based conflict that may exist between family and nonfamily stakeholders. In fact, 
while not explicit, the positive view of SEW assumes that power-based conflict affects family 
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decision-making behaviors. This is evident in the primary thrust of the positive view: Families 
are understood to satisfy their affective needs by first satisfying the expectations of other 
stakeholders who have the power to wrest control of the firm from the family and/or damage the 
reputation of the firm. As explained earlier, the continued leadership of the family firm by family 
members is predicated on keeping nonfamily stakeholders happy. This is because unhappy 
stakeholders in the form of shareholders, employees, lenders, and the community will question 
the motives and ability of families to lead their firms. The further understanding is that such 
skepticism damages the reputation of the firm, which has implications to firm survival. For 
families, firm survival is crucially important because it allows them to remain in a position of 
power and accumulate SEW in perpetuity.  
In the business setting, this reasoning makes sense. This is because the accumulation of 
SEW, regardless of type, by the family does not create organizational challenges as long as the 
firm is turning a profit. It is not too unreasonable to argue that stakeholders in business 
organizations mostly care about the “bottom line.” High profits translate into higher salaries and 
returns, potentially leaving employees, shareholders, and vendors happy. Nonfamily stakeholders 
may not question the leadership, and its capability to lead the firm, as long as the firm continues 
to perform financially. In fact, nonfamily constituents may commend the leadership regardless of 
how they manage the firm. They may not care about the decision-making process or how many 
family members occupy key leadership positions.  
However, the above reasoning may fall apart in the organizational context of higher 
education. This is mainly because the accumulation of SEW by the family is not mutually 
exclusive to what nonfamily stakeholders may desire. In other words, satisfying both the 
family’s affective needs, which include centralizing governance and monopolizing the decision-
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making process, and the demands of the academic culture, which include opening decision-
making to all constituents, is an illogical task. In higher education, university constituents, 
especially the faculty, may care more about the process of decision-making and management 
than any outcome such as the university turning a profit. They may care more about what is 
called “procedural justice,” or “the perceived fairness of the processes through which 
organizational decisions are made” (Birnbaum, 2004, p.12). Thus, the pursuit of family-
opportunistic SEW, such as family influence through centralized governance structures, becomes 
an inherent contradiction. In other words, there is little rationality to theorizing that families in 
higher education enhance family influence when this very SEW dimension may marginalize 
faculty agency who may retaliate. Increasing family influence may mean the violation of fair and 
democratic decision-making practices.   
The limitations discussed above leave a couple of central questions unanswered. How do 
families, with their ascribed power and espousal of centralized systems of governance, navigate 
an institutional field defined by competing interest coalitions, the loose-coupling of units, and 
pressures to open up decision-making? Further, how do families in higher education 
management, specifically in the nonprofit sector where the academic mandate is strong, make 
decisions where local governance conditions place limits on their ascribed authority?  
To address these questions, this study turns to consider another theoretical framework 
alongside SEW theory. This framework is stakeholder theory and its application to the 
organizational context of FOMHEIs may reconcile the limitations of SEW theory discussed 
above. My understanding is that stakeholder theory, together with SEW theory, may be used to 
better understand how families make organizational decisions with sensitivity to the academic 
operating environment—which may be considerably different from the business setting. As 
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discussed, the major differences relate to the relationships among stakeholders, competing 
interests, pressures to democratize decision-making, and the organizational configuration of and 
interaction among different units.  
Stakeholder Theory—A Better Fit? 
According to Freeman (1984), the concept of ‘stakeholder’ first appeared in the 
management literature as a proxy for individuals buying, selling, and holding stocks in a 
company. Stakeholders are powerful actors whose involvement in and support of management 
were essential for the long-term survival of a company. Since this early appearance, the concept 
of stakeholder evolved into a comprehensive theoretical framework incorporating key themes 
and principles from a number of subfields: corporate planning, systems theory, corporate social 
responsibility, and organizational theory (Freeman, 1984; Freeman & McVea, 2001).   
Within this expansive framework, ‘stakeholder’ has become a more inclusive construct. It 
has come to mean “all the groups and individuals that can affect, or are affected by, the 
accomplishments of [an] organization’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984, p.25). Further, stakeholder 
theory espouses the idea that the actual success of firms depends on valuing the legitimacy of 
different stakeholder groups and the interests and goals they represent (Freeman, 1984), which 
can be in conflict (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman & McVea, 2001). Having support from 
a broad stakeholder base and satisfying the varying expectations of different groups 
simultaneously is part of an integrated strategic approach to organizational decision-making. In 
other words, stakeholder theory espouses a model of governance where “successful strategies 
integrate the perspectives of all stakeholders rather than offsetting one against another” (Freeman 
& McVea, 2001, p.15). These understandings relate the general idea of stakeholder theory. 
Together, they conceive organizations as a “constellation of cooperative and competitive 
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interests” (Donaldson & Preston, 1995, p.66) that succeed and survive on the support of their 
constitutive units and actors. 
The above understandings give credence to stakeholder theory as an appropriate 
framework to explain patterns of organizational decision-making in higher education, for several 
reasons. Foremost is the precedent set by existing literature. While much of the literature on 
stakeholder theory has centered on the commercial context (Chapleo & Simms, 2010), there is a 
small and perhaps growing body of scholarship applying stakeholder theory to understand 
management strategies and processes, and identify the most salient stakeholders, in the context 
of higher education (e.g., Alves et al., 2010; Avci et al., 2015; Chapleo & Simms, 2010; 
Jongbloed et al., 2008; Marić, 2013; Wagner et al., 2008). This strand of literature identifies 
several stakeholder groups including board members, administrators, non-leadership staff, 
faculty, students, and oversight bodies such as the government and accreditation agencies. Albeit 
having different research foci and modalities (e.g. case studies, e-learning platforms, and the 
university-environment relationship), all of the studies in this subfield agree that various 
stakeholders within and around universities come to influence organizational processes and 
institution-wide initiatives. Further, they underscore the importance of broad stakeholder 
involvement in decision-making if institutional projects and strategies are to succeed. Finally, 
these stakeholder groups are understood to perform a critical role by holding higher education 
accountable to its mission of knowledge production and serving the public. 
While having precedence in research justifies the use of stakeholder theory in higher 
education, the more convincing reason is, as discussed earlier, the theory’s capacity to reconcile 
the limitations of SEW theory in the FOMHEI governance context. Stakeholder theory fills a 
conceptual gap created by SEW theory’s failure to fully account for the demands of the unique 
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governance culture of higher education. The specifics of how stakeholder theory fills this gap are 
discussed below.  
Power, Competition, and Conflict 
Unlike SEW theory, stakeholder theorists discuss power as an intrinsic feature of 
organizational conflict and decision-making. According to Freeman (1984) organizational issues 
arise frequently in corporations. They also give way to rife political posturing (Brummer, 1991; 
Freeman, 1984) where economic and political stakes, not to mention power bases, must be 
addressed in an integrated fashion by leadership (p.197). Further, these power-based conflicts 
among organizational members increase at critical junctures of crisis that threaten firm survival. 
A crisis may take many forms: financial exigency; disagreements among employees in pursuit of 
private career goals; and traditional proxy fights among shareholders where control over 
corporate affairs becomes a major preoccupation. For this latter situation, “wresting control of 
the business to alter managerial policies and change managerial personnel” (Freeman, 1984, 
p.206) are classic examples of corporate conflict. Even non-shareholder constituents such as 
directors are described to stake a claim to control the organizations they work for (Freeman, 
1984). 
Power is also discussed in connection with the resources organizational actors possess. In 
this view, stakeholders are understood to have power when they have at their disposal resources 
“to make an event actually happen” (Freeman, 1984, p.60). Resources can be anything that gives 
stakeholders a positional advantage including knowledge or financial wealth. Freeman’s 
argument is that the possession of these resources gives stakeholders power to control other 
stakeholders who are resource-dependent. According to stakeholder theory, the type of resource 
matters and has implications to what kind of power stakeholders can possess. Forms of power 
54 
 
include voting power, economic power, and political power. For example, the customers of one 
firm may come to have ‘economic power’ as decision-making agents in the market. Their 
decision to substitute one product with another in the purchases they make can affect service 
providers and the strategies they develop to sell their products. Simply, customers are regarded 
as having power because they signal changes to the market strategies of firms. However, the 
balance of power does not always favor one group. There may be situations where the power 
base of costumers contracts, especially when demand for a service outstrips supply. In this 
scenario, service providers have some influence in terms of product placement, supply and 
branding.  
The shrinking and expansion of power among stakeholders suggests that power, or the 
ability to make an event happen, is dynamic and moves among organizational actors depending 
on the type and level of resources they possess. In this way, the managers or leadership of a firm 
“are not the only rightful locus of corporate control and governance” (Donaldson & Preston, 
1995, p.67). Managers must act with sensitivity to other firm constituents who can also exercise 
power that in turn influence firm activities and objectives.  
 The decision-making power of stakeholders can be understood in an alternative way, as 
more relationally and through the decision-making approaches of the management. On the one 
hand, management is understood to have power when other stakeholder groups are amenable to 
leadership direction and can work well with the management. Stakeholder that are open to 
direction are labeled by Freeman (1984) as having “cooperative potential.” For firms with high 
levels of cooperative potential, stakeholder theorists encourage the leadership to take an 
aggressive position with respect to changing firm directions, making organizational decisions, 
and changing firm values. In other words, they have the power to use top-down approaches to 
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induce desired behaviors in firm constituents. Making decisions unilaterally becomes an easy 
endeavor because the management of a firm may be understood as having more power than other 
stakeholder groups.  
On the other hand, however, the power base of leadership shrinks when the firm has 
stakeholders that threaten/challenge dominant organizational values and practices. These 
stakeholders are understood to have what is referred to as “competitive threat” (Freeman, 1984). 
When a firm has significant competitive threat, or many stakeholders with different aspirations 
and expectations, stakeholder theory argues that the best possible action by leadership is taking a 
defensive position. This means that managers are encouraged to grant these stakeholder groups 
more autonomy in driving firm governance transactions and processes (Freeman, 1984). The 
leadership essentially act as facilitators of and take a back seat in decision-making.  
There are also cases where stakeholder groups have both cooperative potential and 
competitive threat. According to Freeman (1984), these groups “[have] a strong[er] ability to 
influence the outcome of a particular situation” (Freeman, 1984, p.142). This is likely because 
the leadership does not know exactly how these stakeholder groups will react in different 
situations. Leadership is thus encouraged to break down “adversarial barriers” and create 
enabling structures that allow for open discussion and consultation, as a way to pinpoint issues 
and take stock of how other stakeholders feel. Management is encouraged to promote a culture of 
autonomy, self-respect, and actualization (Brummer, 1991), as well as illuminate marginal voices 
that increasingly seek representation (Freeman, 1984).  
All of the above understandings of power resonate with the expectation of how power 
may manifest relationally in higher education. As mentioned, no single group in higher 
education, including the leadership, is understood by the higher education literature to control the 
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decision-making process. Rather, the power to affect the actions, thoughts and feelings of others, 
not to mention the outcomes of organizational objectives, circulates among multiple 
stakeholders. Among which, faculty perhaps have the greatest potential to challenge, and 
support, leadership with respect to achieving organizational objectives. The expectation is that 
family leaders in FOMHEIs may find themselves adopting collegial-based management 
strategies because of stakeholders like faculty who may possess high levels of both cooperative 
potential and competitive threat.  
Complexity and Disjointedness in Decision-Making  
Different from SEW theory, stakeholder theory also accounts for organizational 
complexity. Freeman (1984) describes the modern-day organization as a complex assemblage 
constitutive of myriad groups, sectors, and divisions that operate within their own microcosms of 
differentiated work, values, ethics, and practices. Further, governance/management responsibility 
and decision-making are understood by stakeholder theorists to be fragmented, decentralized, 
and compartmentalized across these cultural subsets. This view of the modern-day corporation is 
strikingly similar to how the literature portrays the higher education organizational/governance 
culture. Both are discussed as a fragmented landscape of loosely-coupled units and actors 
operating within their own specialized and professionalized work/academic domains.  
Constituent Participation in Governance 
As mentioned earlier, a stakeholder management approach calls for an integrated 
approach to strategic decision-making promoting broad stakeholder engagement (Freeman & 
McVea, 2001). Successful strategies integrate the perspectives of all stakeholders rather than 
offsetting one against another (Freeman & McVea, 2001). This proposition does not naively 
suggest that all stakeholder voices should be surfaced or that all stakeholders will benefit from 
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the outcome of a collaborative decision-making process (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman 
& McVea, 2001). Rather, the point being made here is that stakeholder interests convergence as 
part of organizational decision-making shares common roots with the concept of shared 
governance.   
According to some stakeholder theorists (e.g., Brummer, 1991; Freeman, 1984; Freeman 
& McVea, 2001), the idea of corporate governance has come to mean employee participation in 
governance. This is because collective decision-making is increasingly viewed as a prerequisite 
to achieve organizational objectives, whether this means entry into new markets, product 
development, the implementation of new programs, or in general firm survival. In other words, 
top management must garner the support of internal constituents, from all levels of the firm 
(Freeman, 1984), if the firm is to succeed. Internal constituents must be convinced of firm 
objectives and approaches through governance practices that “routinely surface their concerns” 
(Freeman, 1984, p.73). And only in this way, with the support of internal members, may any 
organizational (leadership) decision have the legitimacy needed to move the firm forward 
without significant organizational conflict.  
An integrated approach to governance is also espoused by stakeholder theorists because 
the inclusion of other groups in decision-making leads to better accountability. Brummer (1991) 
is clear on this matter. He talks about accountability (by top management to its stakeholders) as 
part of a “collegial model” where responsibilities are shared and entrusted to other stakeholder 
groups. Further, the sharing of responsibilities, and the act of trusting others to carry them out, 
becomes generative and essential to moving the firm in a singular strategic direction. 
Relationships built on trust and over time have a positive effect on keeping members accountable 
to organizational objectives. 
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Indeed, Freeman (1984), Freeman and McVea (2001), and Brummer (1991), in their 
espousal of a collegial approach to management, resonate with the higher education literature on 
its position on shared governance. Both emphasize broad stakeholder representation in decision-
making and support the idea that organizational success depends on the support of internal 
stakeholders. As mentioned earlier, broad stakeholder engagement in decision-making has 
significant implications to institutional effectiveness in higher education (Birnbaum, 1988; 
Brubacher & Rudy,1997; Heaney, 2010; Hirsch & Weber, 2001; Kerr, 2001). 
Social Obligation and Environmental Cognizance    
Finally, stakeholder theory makes sense to investigate the FOMHEI organization context 
because it accounts for environmental pressures and changes common in higher education. 
According to Freeman and McVea (2001), the stakeholder approach to management gives 
consideration to “unprecedented levels of environmental turbulence and change” (p.3).  Having 
to manage environmental instability, as an inherent operational challenge for leadership, is a 
major assumption of the theory. In part grounded in systems theory (Ackoff & Churchman, 
1947; Katz & Kahn, 1966), stakeholder theory views corporations as operating within and 
interacting with a complex open system where change is immanent and where outside influences 
have an effect on corporations and the constituents of the corporation.  ‘Change’ may take any 
shape or form: the emergence of new stakeholders, the development of new technologies, shifts 
in market demand, increases in interest and inflation rates, the introduction of new government 
sanctions and standards, and the emergence of new clientele (Freeman, 1984). All of these 
factors define and contribute to the idea that firms deal with change and external turbulence.  
Likewise, higher education institutions are understood to frequently deal with 
environmental turbulence and outside pressures. The landscape of higher education is constantly 
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evolving in step with and pressured by myriad shifting environmental circumstances: 
intensifying government accountability, new accreditation standards, market trends, decreasing 
public funding (nearly everywhere in the world), and stiff competition, to name a few. 
Increasingly, colleges and universities must negotiate these disruptive forces as they engage in 
what Hazelkorn (2015) refers to as the ‘reputation race’, where attracting students, achieving 
success, and surviving also means receiving positive marks in ranking tables. Reputation and 
performance have become even more critical in the new accountability regime (Altbach, 2016; 
Austin & Jones, 2015; Cohen, 1998; Hazelkorn, 2015; Hines, McGuinness, 2005) where 
government monitoring and steering of higher education activities have increased. The 
government and other external oversight bodies are mainly concerned with improving education 
quality and aligning institutional priorities with the needs and demands of the economy and 
society. Such is the case even in the UK where historical patterns of allowing institutional 
autonomy are abandoned to keep higher education more accountable. The UK faces the prospect 
of increasing state intervention (Austin & Jones, 2015; Shattock, 2008). Many countries in Asia 
too—such as China, the Philippines and Korea—face similar circumstances. As Marić (2013) 
claims, “universities everywhere are being forced to carefully reconsider their role in the society 
and to evaluate the relationships with their various constitutions, stakeholder, communities” 
(p.220). Also insightful is Jongbloed et al. (2008) who contends that “new forms of market-
based, customer accountability” bear on higher education and demand that universities and 
colleges act in socially acceptable ways.  
In sum, stakeholder theory—and its capacity to account for power-based relations, 
fragmented decision-making, shared governance, and external pressures—is well suited to 
understand the complexities of the higher education organizational environment. Importantly, it 
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may reconcile the limitations of SEW theory when applied to the FOMHEI organizational 
context. As explained though, stakeholder theory is not being applied to replace SEW theory in 
describing DFC decision-making behaviors in higher education. The dismissal of SEW theory is 
neither prudent nor possible. This is because SEW theory is perhaps well suited to identifying the 
family-based governance characteristics of all family-owned ventures, regardless of industry. In 
other words, every family-owned venture has family-based characteristics that can only be 
explained by SEW theory. Thus, the application of stakeholder theory compliments the lens of 
SEW theory. This study expects to rely on both theoretical frames to explain family decision-
making behaviors in higher education. As also mentioned, the novelty of this approach, relative 
to the theorizing of SEW theory, is two-fold: (1) in the need to consider another theory alongside 
SEW theory and (2) in the argument that SEW is not the primary criteria that families in higher 












CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY  
Introduction 
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate and profile the decision-making 
behaviors and intent of families involved in higher education ownership or management. The 
study’s thrust comes from the assumption that families involved in nonprofit higher education 
ownership or management may behave differently from the normative decision-making patterns 
espoused in the family-owned business literature. They may reference other criteria besides 
socioemotional wealth when framing problems and making decisions. In other words, decision-
making may not be entirely based on whether or not there is a real or perceived risk to losing 
socioemotional wealth, or the nonfinancial endowments of family firms (Berrone et al., 2012). 
Rather, families in the nonprofit higher education context may negotiate decision-making with 
additional sensitivity to the realities of the academic governance culture. My assumption is that 
these realities, which will be clarified, place expectations and pressures on families to behave in 
socially acceptable ways—effectively restricting their ability to satisfy their affective needs.  
The above assumption prompts the following primary research question: How does the 
owner family at one nonprofit FOMHEI negotiate organizational decision-making where 
inherent governance realities may place limits on the ascribed decision-making authority of 
the family? This question is supported by three secondary questions:  
a. What prototypical characteristics of (private nonprofit) higher education may be found at 
a nonprofit FOMHEI? 
b. What family-based characteristics may be found at a nonprofit FOMHEI? 





To address these questions, this study employed a case study design in the 
methodological tradition of Yin (2003). There are several reasons why Yin makes sense. 
Foremost, he provides sufficient reasoning to pursue a case study in relation to the research 
question of this study. While experiments, histories and case studies may all address ‘how’ 
questions (Yin, 2003), the case study method becomes preferred when the phenomenon under 
investigation is (1) nonhistorical (2) and occurring in real world contexts/situations, (3) and the 
researcher has little control over the phenomenon being studied. These conditions are met in this 
study. This study seeks to develop in-depth understandings of family decision-making behaviors, 
as they are happening in the natural environment of the higher education organizational context. 
Furthermore, Yin’s case study design is salient to studying processes and events, rather than 
people, the latter of which is typically associated with other approaches (e.g., Stake, 1995). There 
is thus a natural alignment between Yin and this study’s focus on the process of organizational 
decision-making in higher education.  
The case study design is well suited for another reason. According to Yin (2003), case 
studies may be employed when testing established theory in new contexts. Extending theory into 
new contexts accomplishes what Yin refers to as “analytic generalization” (p.23), or taking 
previously developed theory as a “template with which to compare the results of [a] case study” 
(p.33). This reasoning is consistent with the goal of this study, which is to problematize SEW 
theory, a widely accepted theoretical framework in the family firm literature, in the context of 
higher education. Higher education is perfectly situated for such an investigation because it 
possesses unique organizational properties perhaps not found (or found to a lesser extent) in 
commercial industries. Thus, applying SEW theory in higher education may challenge the family 
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firm literature and the espoused understanding that families primarily reference SEW when 
making decisions.   
Yin (2003) is further relevant because this study not only aims to test theory in a new 
research environment, but also offers a rival theoretical explanation. According to Yin, a rival 
theory may be used, together with the theory being tested, to explain the results of the study 
more clearly. In this study, the rival theory/explanation is stakeholder theory. It is being applied 
as a potentially more appropriate (or dominant) framework for investigating decision-making 
behaviors at family-owned or -managed universities. As mentioned though, the expectation is 
that family decision-making behaviors will be made clearer by the application of both 
stakeholder theory and SEW theory. Stakeholder theory is expected to capture the politics and 
openness of decision-making in higher education while SEW theory is expected to capture the 
family dimensions of the FOMHEI.   
Using Yin (2003) as a guide, this study primarily manifests in its research design “realist” 
perspectives/assumptions on knowledge (ways of knowing) and the world (reality). This means 
that the methods of this study manifest the following core assumptions/principles: working from 
established theory and a priori reasoning to guide research; understanding that an objective 
reality exists and that research can capture this reality; and emphasizing rigor in data collection 
(relying on multiple evidentiary sources), analysis, and interpretation.  
However, it is unreasonable to aver that these assumptions are the only principles guiding 
this study. This is because this study is a qualitative inquiry. All forms of qualitative inquiry 
include opportunities to co-create knowledge. Qualitative researchers, perhaps even some with 
quantitative leanings, should not “[view] [themselves] as a potential contaminant, something to 
be separated out, neutralized, minimized, standardized, and controlled” (Fine et al., 2000, p.169). 
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Whether they like it or not, the mere involvement of researchers in data planning, collection, and 
analysis shapes the production of findings. This is because researchers, barring random sampling 
procedures, have some level of control in determining the sample, interview participants, and 
which areas of the interview transcripts to focus on. Further, researchers make their subjectivities 
known when interpreting and discussing the findings. In this way the researcher’s subjectivity is 
very much a part of the research process.  
Researcher subjectivity is especially a part of this study. Being a member of a family that 
runs a university, I cannot avoid discussing the findings according to my worldview of 
FOMHEIs. I must, as Fine et al. (2000) speculate, “[interrogate] in [the] writings who [I am] as 
[I] coproduce[s]” the narrative of findings. Thus, this study also manifests in its methods 
principles associated with the post-positivist paradigm. This worldview builds on the positivist 
paradigm, but with caveats. Notably, this worldview espouses the understanding that reality can 
only be estimated through research—not fully captured. Further, the estimation of reality is 
based on multiple, inherently biased perspectives of research participants, as well as to some 
extent shaped by the subjectivities of the researcher (Creswell, 1998). In other words, the 
subjectivity of the researcher is not discounted when interpreting reality according to the post-
positivist paradigm.  
While this study has post-positivist leanings, and allows for the critical interpretation of 
reality, there is a clear reason why it does not commit to more constructivist/interpretive 
worldviews. Indeed, understanding reality through multiple, inherently biased perspectives 
reflects the qualities of the constructivist paradigm. According to Creswell (2009), a 
constructivist approach to inquiry attempts to understand reality as peoples’ lived experiences, as 
they construct them through their subjective lens. This is consistent with qualitative inquiry, 
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especially when involving data collection through interviews. Essentially, the researcher is 
basing his/her interpretation of reality on the socially-constructed experiences of interview 
participants. However, the alignment between constructivism and this study stops here. There is 
clear reason why Yin’s (2003) realist approach makes sense as opposed to other case study 
approaches advanced by scholars with constructivist leanings (e.g., Stake, 2000). This reason has 
already been explicated earlier. There is a natural alignment between Yin’s methodological work 
and this study with respect to the objective of theory testing and beginning research from a priori 
reasoning. However, Stake’s (2000) approach to case study design is less about approaching 
inquiry on the basis of theory than about relying on the “intuition and impression” of the 
researcher, and emerging new theoretical understandings in relation to the data. Stake’s approach 
to inquiry for the most part represents all constructivist/interpretivist research. Constructivists 
seem to agree with Stake who contends that research “cannot be charted in advance” (cited in 
Stake, 1998, p. 22). This is inconsistent with this study. This is also inconsistent with Yin who 
places considerable emphasis on preparing a “detailed design at the outset of the research” (Yin, 
2003), with of course room to make small adjustments to the plan as needed.  
The remainder of this chapter focuses on the more technical aspects of this study’s 
research design. Design choices were made to ensure “methodological congruence” (Morse & 
Richards, 2002) with the assumptions just discussed, the theoretical premises outlined in the 
literature review, and this study’s research question. There was a specific focus on making sure 
that all of the central components of Yin’s (2003) case study design—a study’s questions; its 
(theoretical) propositions, if any; its unit(s) of analysis; the logic linking the data to the 




Sampling Procedure  
According to Yin (2003), a critical case sampling approach may be combined with a 
single case study design when the purpose of the study lies in testing a well-formulated theory. 
The underlying assumption is that a single case should meet all of the conditions for testing a 
theory and its propositions. This is consistent with Patton (1990) who explains that single critical 
cases are useful to render “logical generalizations,” or generalizations to (established) theory. 
These critical cases can stand on their own given the “weight of evidence produced.”  
Indeed, Yin (2003) and Patton (1990) justify the selection of a single case vis-à-vis the 
aim of this study: to problematize the theory of SEW in the context of higher education. 
Importantly, the selection of a single institution is expected to meet all the conditions for testing 
SEW theory. These conditions are two-fold. The institution should first be shown to typify the 
family-based traits of family-owned businesses. Also, the institution should satisfy the 
definitional articulation of being a family-owned or -managed institution. This definition was 
proposed earlier in the literature review: A family-owned higher education institution is one that 
is governed and/or managed by a dominant family coalition whose intention is to shape the 
university according to a distinct family vision in a manner that is potentially sustainable across 
successive familial generations. The second condition to meet concerns the prototypical 
organizational characteristics of higher education also outlined in the literature review. These 
mainly include missional ambiguity, power relations, organizational complexity, loose-coupling, 
an emphasis on the academic mission, and faculty empowerment in decision-making. Ensuring 
that these characteristics, as well those defining a family firm, exist in the single case is crucially 
important to the purpose of theory testing. In other words, SEW theory must be problematized in 
67 
 
an institutional environment where the propositions of SEW theory are placed in tension with the 
unique governance properties of higher education.  
The identification of such an institution (a family university possessing higher education 
governance characteristics) provides little incentive to look at additional case examples. This 
assumption is justified whether they are similar or different. While investigating similar 
institutions becomes repetitive, and prone to produce findings in saturation, the latter is irrelevant 
with the understanding that theory testing makes sense only when all of the conditions needed to 
test theory are preserved in a research site. The application of such criteria excludes all 
nonfamily institutions and FOMHEIs where the academic mandate is weak. For-profit FOMHEIs 
therefore may not be eligible. This is because they may lack some of the unique governance 
traits associated with supporting the academic mission. Further, looking at multiple cases is 
unneeded because of the study’s focus on analytical generalization, not statistical generalization 
that emphasizes discerning and accounting for differences across multiple research sites (Yin, 
2003).  
One other reason for choosing a single case study design bears mentioning. According to 
Patton (1990), looking for a critical case is appropriate where “resources may limit evaluation to 
the study of only a single site. Since this study is self-funded, with the site of data collection 
overseas (most FOHMEIs are found outside of the U.S.), there are indeed resource constraints.  
These constraints must be balanced with the consideration of conducting a robust study. 
Spending three weeks at a single site and interviewing ten participants, not to mention spending 




Listed below are the criteria defining the target population (list of eligible institutions), 
used to identify this study’s individual case. These criteria are separated out by national and 
institutional levels.  
National Level. 
 
1. Fully accredited  
2. “Good” reputation (demonstrated by media artifacts and/or national and/or 
international ranking[s]) 
3. Nonprofit status 





1. Large size (based on size of staff and student enrollment) 
2. Presence of an academic senate or similar faculty body that is not just 
advisory in capacity, but functional 
3. Governance mechanisms providing opportunities for shared decision-making 
among multiple university constituents  
4. Comprehensive programming offering bachelor, master and doctoral level 
studies spread across multiple schools 
5. A mission statement aligned with academic goals (teaching, producing 
research, transforming society, etc.) 
Familial characteristics 
6. Members of family directly and managerially involved in operations and 
organizational decision-making 
7. Family members at a minimum either occupy the board chair position and/or 
president position 
8. Multiple family members employed in key positions  
9. Must be open to or have a family-based succession plan  
 
In addition to these criteria, the target population was further narrowed by several other 
conditions related to the researcher. The researcher was limited to investigating FOMHEIs 
located in Anglophone countries. This includes countries where English is spoken co-officially. 
Conducting interviews in languages other than English would be a major obstacle for the 
researcher who has fluency only in English. Also, the individual case was selected from a 
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shortlist of institutions identified through the researcher’s professional network at Boston 
College. The researcher has some knowledge, on the basis of anecdotal evidence (Altbach et al. 
2020), on each of the institutions in the list.  
The anecdotal evidence suggested a clear candidate. The institution chosen for this study 
is based in India, which hereafter is referred to as Grand Hall University (GHU). Importantly, 
this institution satisfies all of the above sampling criteria including those related to the 
researcher. It is a large FOMHEI located in five different cities and having comprehensive 
programming (91 programs) spanning multiple schools/disciplines (seven) and departments 
(over 40). These programs are offered to upwards of 20,000 students and supported by nearly 
3000 staff and faculty. This is a significant presence of staff and faculty based in many different 
programs. Certainly, the large size of the university, and diverse staff and faculty, gives some 
clue as to the potential presence of conflicting and competing interests with respect to 
organizational goals. Answering the secondary research questions of this study will prove 
whether GHU indeed has this characteristic.   
Further, GHU has a good reputation, proxied in this study by rankings, both domestic and 
international. In 2018, the National Institutional Ranking Framework of India’s Ministry of 
Human Resource Development (MHRD) places GHU in the top 50 universities in India. This is 
quite exceptional considering that India has upwards of 700 universities. Also, GHU is ranked in 
the top ten among India’s private universities established after 2000. Several of GHU’s programs 
are also nationally ranked as top-tier programs by various magazines, e.g., Business Today and 
Outlook India. Further, GHU received recognition as performing among the list of top 250 
universities in Asia and the top 110 in BRICS (acronym for the association of five major 
emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) by QS World 
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University rankings in 2018. Finally, GHU commands the status of “deemed university.” This 
status signifies many things. The understanding most salient to the focus of this study concerns 
educational quality and academic priority. According to the University Grants Commission 
(UGC), the status of deemed university is granted to select institutions that demonstrate 
excellence in educational quality and high standards relating to the academic mission.  
With an emphasis on academic quality and a commitment to advancing the academic 
mission, GHU may place a premium on faculty representation in organizational decision-
making. This reasoning is consistent with the literature that describes faculty input as a 
cornerstone of knowledge production and institutional success (Birnbaum, 1988). Further, 
anecdotal evidence (Altbach et al., 2020) suggests that GHU is a site where decision-making is 
transparent, inclusive, and mediated by a system of checks and balances. Later chapters in this 
dissertation will make clearer GHU’s governance culture; but a quick glance at the website 
reveals the presence of multiple committees and councils, at leadership levels, with strong 
representation of faculty as well as working professionals from society.  
Finally, GHU meets the definition of a family-owned or -managed higher education 
institution. It is family-managed with members of the DFC directly involved in managing 
university affairs. Dr. Prem (pseudonym), the founder of GHU, occupies the chair/president 
position of the parent organization/Trust controlling GHU and other educational organizations. 
His role at GHU is Chancellor. As Chancellor, he may not be directly involved in managing the 
day-to-day operations of the university; however, he likely oversees (indirectly) many aspects by 
university affairs given his dominant position in the parent organization.  
Second generation family members are also involved professionally and across all of the 
institutions of the Trust. At GHU, the title of Pro-chancellor is held by the eldest daughter, Dr. 
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Aabha (pseudonym). As Pro-chancellor, she perhaps has more direct involvement in managing 
GHU than her father. It is unclear whether the younger daughter, Dr. Nishita (pseudonym), has a 
role at GHU. However, she is the Pro-chancellor at another institution affiliated to the Grand 
Hall Trust. Both daughters have positions on the Managing Committee of the Trust and seem to 
provide broad support for all of the affiliated educational organizations. One of these daughters, 
likely the eldest, may succeed Dr. Prem as the president of the parent organization.  
As a FOMHEI, GHU also employs other family members including those through 
marriage. Such is the case for the husband of Dr. Aabha. He is the Dean of one of the Faculties at 
GHU, as well as director of one of the institutes. Other family members sit on the Managing 
Committee of the Trust. There are five family members in the committee of eleven.  
In sum, the characteristics of GHU cut across both family and higher education 
dimensions. Importantly, their intersection should provide a space for novel research in line with 
this study’s focus. GHU, as a critical single case, preserves all of the conditions for theory 
testing.    
Interview Participants  
The higher education literature identifies many university stakeholders including the 
government, faculty, students, the board, alumni and other donors, the administration (leadership 
and non-leadership), and accreditation agencies. This is not an exhaustive list. Among these 
stakeholder groups, four are a focus of this study: the board or Managing Committee (where 
there is a concentration of family members); administration (family and nonfamily); faculty 
(family and nonfamily); and the government/accreditation agencies/society. To note, interview 
participants were not recruited from the last group. This was because of time constraints and not 
knowing how to connect to government or accreditation agency officials in India. However, I 
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investigated how this stakeholder group impacts organizational decision-making indirectly, by 
asking interview participants questions related to the influence that external actors have on 
decision-making.  Also, interview participants were not recruited from the population of students 
at Grand Hall University. While the higher education literature identifies them as a stakeholder 
group who can impact decision-making, I found that at GHU students are not members of key 
decision-making bodies and thus do not have direct representation in organizational decision-
making. Rather, they participate in decision-making through providing their feedback at the 
departmental level mostly related to courses, programs, and internships.  
In this study, I selected interview participants who have direct participation in decision-
making through their membership on key decision-making bodies, such as the Academic Council 
or Board of Management (these bodies will be described in later chapters). The interview 
participants selected for this study, and their membership to key decision-making bodies 
(referred to as governing authorities), are shown in Table 1.0 below. There are four family 
members and six nonfamily members, as also shown.  
Table 1.0 Interview Participants 






Degree(s) Years at 
GHU  
Dr. Prem President of 
Trust, Chancellor 
of GHU 
Family Founder Chair, MC 
 
PhD >40 yrs 
  


























       
Dr. 
Aarav 

















       
Dr. 
Vihaan 













       
Dr. Aditi Vice-chancellor Nonfamily 
administrati
on 




PhD  >20 yrs  








nonfamily BoM, PmB, 
BoUD  
PhD >20 yrs 
       
Dr. Keya Director of an 
institute; Deputy 
Director of a 
center 





       
Dr. 
Prisha 










of a department 
in one of GHU’s 
institutes 
Faculty nonfamily AC, BoS 
 
 
PhD >10 yrs 




Professor N/A nonfamily N/A PhD N/A 
*MC: Managing Committee, BoM: Board of Management, AC: Academic Council, PmB: 
Planning and Monitoring Board, BoUD: Board of University Development, FC: Finance 
Committee, UsB: University Sports Board, BoE: Board of Examination, BoS: Board of Studies 
**This interview participant does not work at GHU 
Source: Author 
 
It is important to point out that one of the interview participants (in this study, referred to 
as Dr. Danielle) does not work at Grand Hall University. Dr. Danielle’s involvement was 
serendipitous and secured by suggestion of a member of my dissertation committee. Dr. Danielle 
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spent significant time at Grand Hall University as a visiting scholar and was able to offer some 
insights into GHU’s governance structure as an outside informant.  
The following criteria was used to define the target population from which the interview 
participants shown in Table 1.0 were chosen (not applicable to Dr. Danielle). As shown, each 
interview participant has met the particular selection criteria specific to his or her stakeholder 
group. To note, I was only able to recruit board members with a family status (ascribed to them 
either at birth or through marriage). I believe that this does not pose a significant problem as the 
board, referred to as the Managing Committee, may be considered a family-based stakeholder 
group. I explain why this is in later chapters.  
Board.  
(1) Participants must be a member of the family, either by birth or through marriage; and 
(2) Participants must have direct involvement in managing or working in GHU for more 
than one year. Here, length, arbitrarily defined, may control for inexperienced 
members who may not have a sufficient level of familiarity with the organizational 
culture of the university. Thus, their responses may diverge from and be less-
informed by reality.   
Faculty (family and nonfamily). 
(1) Primarily members of leadership-level committees and councils are pursued as 
interview participants. These include the Academic Council, Board of Management, 
and other influential bodies identified through university documents and 
interviewing; and 
(2) Interview participants will have worked at GHU for more than a year.  
The administration (family and nonfamily). 
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(1) Any administrative staff working in managerial/leadership roles. These units concern, 
but are not limited to, finance, student affairs, and compliance; and 
(2) Interview participants will have worked for more than a year. 
With these criteria, I selected interview participants using the approaches of purposive, 
criterion-based sampling and snowball sampling. Purposive sampling refers to a nonprobability 
sampling method where interview participants are selected based on specified characteristics and 
with consideration to the objective of a study (Patton, 1990). In this study, the sampling 
procedure is criterion-based because of the need to select interview participants having a direct 
role in organizational decision-making. This strategy is consistent with Patton (1990) who 
discusses purposive sampling as a way to produce “information-rich cases from which one can 
learn a great deal about issues of central importance to the purpose of the inquiry” (p.230).  
Complimenting this sampling strategy was snowball sampling. Interview participants 
were asked to identify further candidates based on “hunches, working hypotheses, and educated 
guesses [that] direct the investigator’s attention to certain data and then to refining and/or 
verifying one’s hunches” (Meriam, 1988, p.123). This strategy was expected to maximize the 
likelihood of identifying interview participants with expert and tacit knowledge on 
organizational decision-making, and participating stakeholders, within GHU.  
Data Collection 
According to Yin (2003), data collection should follow a detailed and carefully 
formulated plan. Yin refers to this plan as the case study protocol, a roadmap of preparatory steps 
outlining conditions that researchers need to meet when collecting data. The case study protocol 
includes field procedures, guidelines for gaining access to research participants, an estimate of 
resources required for travel and lodging, and documents such as the interview protocol—all 
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details to ensure a smooth data collection process. Importantly, having a case study protocol 
increases the reliability of the study, by keeping the researcher accountable to measuring the 
phenomenon he/she intends to measure (Yin, 2003).  
The protocol is also useful as a planning tool to think about several principles that 
researchers ought to follow when collecting data for case studies. At the forefront is the principle 
of addressing possible gaps in validity. According to Yin (2003), some concerns about validity 
may be addressed by relying on multiple sources of data to measure the same phenomenon. 
These include documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant 
observation, and physical artifacts. Having multiple evidentiary sources is essential to compare 
and cross-check perspectives. Also, the multi-modal approach to data collection increases the 
chance to develop converging lines of inquiry regarding a single phenomenon. Data convergence 
across multiple sources is otherwise known as ‘triangulation’ of data (or structural corroboration) 
and contributes to a more convincing (and valid) argument when discussing findings (Patton, 
1999). Consistent with Yin and Patton (1990), I planned to use three evidentiary sources to 
collect data. These are explained further below. 
 Developing the protocol also opened up the opportunity to think of ways to honor Yin 
(2003) who espouses the strategy of using theory and literature to guide data collection. This 
alignment contributes to the overall methodological congruence of the study. Some key 
strategies used in this study are developing interview questions based on the theoretical 
assumptions underpinning the study and interviewing individuals who meet predetermined 
criteria developed from theory. These approaches are further explained below together with more 




As mentioned, GHU was chosen among a shortlist of eligible institutions. I became 
familiar with these institutions through my professional network at Boston College and on the 
basis of anecdotal evidence (i.e., Altbach et al., 2020). With the help of faculty at Boston 
College, I made contact with Dr. Aabha, Pro-Chancellor of GHU, and inquired about the 
possibility of conducting research at her university. She accepted the proposition and, together 
with another member of GHU, worked with me to arrange the initial interviews.  
Interviews 
Rich and descriptive data were collected from interviews with ten participants. This 
includes prearranged interviews and interviews secured on an ad-hoc basis through snowball 
sampling. All interview participants were asked the same core set of questions developed as part 
of the case study protocol. The questions were formulated on the basis of the two theoretical 
frameworks of this study. In this way, the interviews follow what Merton et al. (1990) describe 
as a focused interview format where questions are predetermined (typically by theory) and 
consistent with the focus of a study. Some of the questions changed according to stakeholder 
group. For example, faculty were asked specific question related to the academic culture while 
staff administrative leadership were asked questions concerning, for example, finance and human 
resources. Further, there were a number of occasions across all the interviews where I asked 
conversational or probing questions. These questions were aimed at clarifying and expanding on 
points of particular interest that were brought up during the course of the interviews. Follow-up 
questions were also asked via email once I analyzed the data and found that several portions of 
the transcripts needed further clarification.  
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Focused interviews typically last an hour in length (Yin, 2003). However, some 
interviews of this study extended pass the hour mark because of additional Q & A.  Each 
interview was summarized, along with researcher observations, comments and notes, into 
interview memos. Miles and Huberman (1994) refer to these memos as a contact summary form. 
This form is a one-page document that provide researchers with a space to “pause and ponder” 
about the “main concepts, themes, issues, and questions” as they relate to “larger theoretical, 
methodological and substantive issues” (p.124) emerging from each interview. According to 
Merriam (1988), “data that have been analyzed while being collected are both parsimonious and 
[illuminative]” (p.124). Meriam further explains that contact summary forms allow the 
researcher to go beyond the role of mechanistic data collection and into the territory of critical 
thinking. Further, this step is crucial to remain focused and avoid getting lost in the details (Miles 
& Huberman, 1994). They provide a means to process the data during the data collection phase, 
which has benefits to organizing what may be an overwhelming influx of data. Finally, contact 
summary sheets may be useful when revisiting the protocol to revise questions when necessary 
and approaching new interview participants. Each interview was tape recorded (with participant 
consent) and prepared for coding by transcribing to text.  
Documentation 
 Yin (2003) contends that documentation has a crucial role to play in conducting case 
studies. Documents are used to corroborate (or offer different perspectives in relation to) data 
collected and highlighted from other sources. They also provide general background information 
on the research context and interview participants. For this study, several types of documents 
were used: written material by the founder of Grand Hall University, university documents, 
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anonymous online reviews of Grand Hall University from an established career website, and 
media from news outlets, to name a few.   
 Consistent with Yin (2003), specific times were allotted to collecting these documents. In 
a first phase, publicly available documents were collected in advance of the research site visit. 
These documents may be found on GHU’s website and via a Google search. A focus was on 
sourcing such documents as news articles, organizational charts, and other university documents 
pertinent to this dissertation. In a second phase, I was able to obtain additional university 
documents, some of which are private and containing sensitive information, from interview 
participants.  
Direct Observation 
 I originally planned to collect data through direct observation by assuming the role of 
what Creswell (2009) refers to as “complete observer-researcher.” This designation refers to 
investigating a phenomenon strictly as an observer (Creswell, 2009). This means attending 
decision-making meetings and other on-campus events without participating. However, I was not 
able to attend any campus events or meetings, because of the timing of my visit. For example, I 
was invited by the Pro-chancellor to observe a meeting involving GHU’s institute directors, but I 
could not go because the meeting took place on the day I was scheduled to fly back to the US. 
This is unfortunate as I planned on using observation data to corroborate data from interviews 
and documentation. However, I was able to take some field notes as I walked the campus 
grounds. These notes were useful especially as I wrote chapter 5 of this dissertation, the 
background chapter for GHU.  
In sum, this study used interviews and documentation as a way to develop converging 
lines of inquiry on the topic of organizational decision-making at GHU. Each of these methods 
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of data collection have their weaknesses and strengths. For example, retrieving data through 
documentation may be efficient (less time-consuming), but less insightful. The researcher is 
unable to draw data beyond the contents provided in these documents. On the other hand, 
interviews give researchers a chance to draw richer data that may be further fleshed out through 
probing questions and looked at from varying perspectives. Interviews however suffer from bias. 
Bias may creep in as a result of many factors: poorly constructed questions, the researcher’s 
presence and potential influence on responses, and interviewee subjectivities (Creswell, 2009; 
Yin, 2003). Yin (2003) observes, however, that this form of bias may be minimized by 
triangulating data. Therefore, the two evidentiary sources used in this study is expected to 
complement and reconcile the limitations of each other. 
Case Study Database 
All of the data collected across the two evidentiary sources were organized into a “case 
study database” (Yin, 2003). This means that interview transcripts, recordings, and field notes 
were organized into easily retrievable units of storage (on the computer). This database also 
includes contact summary forms, other types of reflective memos, and what are referred to 
precontact summary sheets. These summary sheets include background information on each 
interview participant. They were instrumental in the early stages of preparing for interviews and 
figuring out the best possible approach to connect with interview participants.  
In addition to being able to efficiently retrieve, manage, and organize documents, there 
are other benefits in having the case study database. According to Yin (2003), it is the foundation 
for maintaining a clear chain of evidence (p.105). The database bridges the gap created between 
what a researcher professes to do and what findings are produced. In other words, having a 
database should help clarify how the researcher moved from point A (methodology) to point B 
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(findings). Thus, other researchers will be able to reference the database, especially the reflective 
memos, to understand the process and thinking behind the production of findings. In this way, 
replicating the study becomes easier. The database allows other researchers to, as Yin puts it, 
“[trace] the evidentiary process backwards” (p.105). The database therefore addresses some 
concerns related to the reliability of the study.  
Having a database also ensured the confidentiality of data. The database is a one-stop 
digital resource to which access is secured with encryption and granted solely to the researcher. 
This minimized any potential risk of exposure of data associated with having disorganized files 
scattered across and stored in different storage mediums.  
Data Analysis 
Inductive data analysis, referring to “bottom-up” strategies used to establish patterns, 
categories and themes, is the typical domain of qualitative inquiry (Creswell, 1998). This study 
used such a grounded approach to coding and analysis as a way of “working through multiple 
levels of abstraction” (Creswell, 1998, p.43) that may only emerge when working with the data 
first. However, a deductive approach to analysis was also used in this study.  
The deductive approach used is ‘Directed Content Analysis.’ According to Hsieh and 
Shannon (2005), “the goal of a directed approach to content analysis is to validate or extend 
conceptually a theoretical framework or theory” (p.1281) to a dataset. Zhang and Wildemuth 
(2016) agree and explain that Directed Content Analysis is appropriate when the purpose of a 
study is about confirming or testing theory. Importantly, this approach provides a way to focus 
the early stages of analysis on the aim of making predictions about the phenomena under 
investigation consistent with or against the theoretical propositions of the study. This is 
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consistent with Yin (2003) who discusses guiding analysis with the theoretical assumptions that 
began the study.  
Directed Content Analysis encourages the determination of an initial coding scheme 
based on theory (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Thus, a provisional start list of thematic codes was 
created. Yin (2003) refers to this process as “making a matrix of categories.” Consistent with 
Yin, many methodological scholars discuss this step (e.g., Meriam, 1988; Miles & Huberman, 
1994) as forming the basis of a framework through which data will be tested against the 
theoretical propositions of the study. As Meriam (1988) states, these categories “should reflect 
the purpose of the research” (p.136). More specifically, such an approach is useful for coding 
and analysis without straying from the research focus (Saldaña, 2009) (in this case theory 
testing), and maintaining “methodological congruence” (Morse & Richards, 2002) between the 
theory guiding the research and the analysis that takes shape. Further, such an approach forces 
researchers “not to pursue everything” and “wind up with data too diffuse and inappropriate” 
(Merriam, 1988, p.). In other words, researchers may use these categories as a way of identifying 
data most relevant to the objective of theory testing.   
For this study, the initial thematic codes were generated as two separate sets, one 
according to SEW theory and the other according to stakeholder theory. The thematic codes 
related to SEW theory, for example, correspond to each of the SEW dimensions of Berrone et al. 
(2012): family influence, identification of family members with the firm, binding social ties, 
emotional attachment of family members, and renewal of family bonds through dynastic 
succession. Codes were also developed within these categories as data were analyzed. For 
example, under ‘renewal’, I organized data into several subcategories such as ‘process’, ‘benefits 
and need’, and ‘challenges’, to name a few.  
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Another set of codes was also developed based on the higher education literature. Codes 
in this set correspond to the prototypical governance characteristics of higher education outlined 
in the literature review: power, competition and conflict; complexity and disjointedness in 
decision-making; constituent participation in governance; and social obligation and 
environmental cognizance. Further codes were developed within categories.  
The three sets of codes were applied in a first reading of all the data including those from 
interview logs and documents. Codes were applied using Nvivo, a qualitative data analysis 
computer program. As expected, most of the data were captured by these initial coding schemes. 
However, some data did not neatly fit into the initial coding schemes, such as those related to 
India’s culture and its impact on university affairs. For these data, new codes were created using 
a more conventual approach to content analysis involving inductive coding. This second step 
alleviated any concerns about the deterministic nature of Directed Content Analysis. These 
concerns are about force-fitting all the data into predetermined theoretical categories (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967; Miles & Huberman, 1994). Importantly, emphasis is placed on “mining the data” 
to understand what they suggest or reveal (Smagorinsky, 2008). This step involved being open to 
the emergence of context-based codes as they relate to phenomena associated with the research 
site.  
With this in mind, the unbracketed data (data with no initial coding) were read again. A 
particular focus was on “jotting down notes, comments, and inquiries” (Meriam, 1988) in 
reflective memos that inform new codes. These new codes were then organized either under the 
initial coding schemes as subcategory codes or as entirely new codes. Interestingly, I did not find 
the need to develop many new codes.  
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Once coding saturation was reached (or when new codes stopped emerging), the analysis 
moved into a higher-level orientation to data processing. Codes in this phase were reviewed, 
revised, connected, and categorized into more meaningful representations of information 
according to Miles and Huberman’s (1994) pattern coding scheme. The aim will be on 
discerning recurring regularities (patterns) in the data. This process may also be referred to as 
meta-coding (Miles & Huberman, 1994) and refers to chunking the data into smaller conceptual 
units (categories) cutting across all data sources. It was also in this step that data sources were 
assessed for internal consistency (the absence or presence of contradictory perspectives within 
one source) and as corroborating or contradicting other data sources. The connecting and 
chunking of data led to deeper understandings, and the emergence of themes, that were used to 
discuss the findings. Figure 1.1 below illustrates the process of connecting codes and emerging 
themes. It is an adaptation of Saldaña’s (2009) code-to-theme model. As shown, findings or 
themes are suggested by connections (dotted lines) made among related codes (e.g., codes related 
to shared governance). Codes are denoted by the orange rounded rectangles with each rectangle 
representing a single code. The two grey circles at the very bottom represent the different data 




Figure 1.1 Code-to-theme Model 
Source: Author 
 
While Miles and Huberman (1994) and Saldaña (2009) supply the strategy for parsing 
data and emerging themes, Yin (2003) provides the overall framework within which theory 
testing occurred. Specifically, Yin’s approach, what is referred to as “rival explanations as 
patterns,” structures the discernment of patterns to address and reconcile two theoretical 
frameworks. This approach provides a way to test one theory in relation to another (rival 
explanation) and ask the question of which theory has more salience to explaining the 
phenomenon under study. In another way of putting it, the rival explanations as patterns 







considering multiple theories. In this study’s case, the expectation is that owner families in 
higher education do not conform to normative decision-making patterns found in the family firm 
literature. The expectation is that SEW theory is challenged in the higher education governance 
culture. The further expectation is that family decision-making behaviors may be better 
understood through the application of a rival explanation, which in this study is stakeholder 
theory. The understanding is that all leadership in higher education, whether family-based or not, 
must make decisions with primary sensitivity to the needs and demands of the academic mission 
and those stakeholders supporting the mission. Further, the goal of protecting certain SEW, such 
as family influence, does not make sense in an environment where stakeholders, especially 
faculty, are skeptical of concentrated power/authority/influence in any single group. According 
to Yin (2003), the matching of data to any of the theoretical propositions, rival or not, would be 
evidence for concluding that one of the theories is appropriate to explaining the phenomenon. 













Figure 1.2 Analysis Process 
 
Source: Author 
Confidentiality and Risk 
Some comments on confidentiality (and risk) associated with this study are warranted. 
Data collection proceeded in full accordance with the ethical and legal obligations widely 
accepted by the scientific research community. Specifically, I aimed to safeguard the privacy and 
confidentiality of all research participants according to Boston College’s Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) protocols. Every effort was made to gather information on the basis of reciprocity 
and trust, beginning with the mutual signing of a consent form. Further, every effort was made to 
represent interview participants, and the data they provided, as accurately as possible in the 
presentation and discussion of findings. Also, interview participants had an opportunity to review 
their interview transcripts before data were analyzed.  
The findings were anonymized to the fullest extent possible. Unique identifiers 
(pseudonyms) were used to protect the identities of research site and interview participants.  
Second Cycle Coding (connecting codes such as 'competitive threat' and 'inclusive decision-making')
Rival explanations as patterns Pattern coding
First Cycle Coding (appying codes such as 'specialized functions', 'renewal,' and 'competitive threat')
Deductive (applying both sets of 
theoretical coding schemes) Inductive
Determination of Initial Codes (determining codes such as 'specialized functions', 'renewal,' and 
'competitive threat')
SEW theory Stakeholder theory Higher education literature
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However, not all aspects of this study are completely anonymized. There are certain types of 
information that warrant presenting. This information includes those related to leadership 
position titles and job descriptions. The presentation of this information is necessary to discuss 
organizational decision-making at GHU in detail. Also, complete anonymity with respect to 
position titles may limit the analysis. Of course, there is some risk associated with presenting 
such information. Having familiarity with GHU’s organizational structure, GHU employees 
could in principle easily match position titles with the names of interview participants. This risk 
has been explained to and acknowledged by interview participants when they signed consent 
forms. For the most part though, this risk only pertains to top management positions (i.e., 
Chancellor, Pro-chancellor, and Vice-chancellor). The titles of interview participants at lower 
levels of the organizational hierarchy have been fully anonymized (e.g., using Dean instead of 
Dean of Law).  
It is also important to point out that there is a small possibility that people outside of 
GHU would be able to identify the identity of GHU based on the presentation of certain 
interview data such as those related to the history of GHU and the personal experiences of 
interview participants, some who are public figures. This risk, however, may only pertain to the 
readers of this dissertation based in India who may have more familiarity with Indian 
institutions, and the story of GHU, than readers in other parts of the world. Furthermore, even in 
the case where someone would be able to identify the identity of GHU, the risk is minimum 
because this dissertation does not present findings of a highly sensitive nature. The findings 





CHAPTER 4: INDIA’S HIGHER EDUCATION SYSTEM  
Introduction 
An overview of India’s higher education system is provided in this chapter. Importantly, 
this chapter contextualizes India’s universities as ultimately conforming to the regulatory 
patterns and pressures of India’s higher education system. 
Overview of Higher Education in India 
In India, there are upwards of 50,000 institutions (799 universities, 38,498 colleges and 
11,923 stand-alone institutions) as of 2015 (Ministry of Human Resources Development, 2016b). 
These institutions capture an estimated total enrollment of 34.6 million students, about 24.5 
percent of the college-age group (18-23 years).  
A significant share of universities and colleges are privately managed. Shah (2015) 
estimates that around 300 universities and two-thirds of colleges are private, constituting two-
thirds of India’s entire higher education system and capturing the majority of enrollment in the 
country. India’s large (and growing) private sector is a result of several factors including 
improvements at lower levels of education, rising living standards, a public sector that does not 
adequately provide the skills demanded by the market, and shortages in public sector seats. 
Among these, the combination of growing higher education demand, limited public sector 
capacity, and constrained public spending has tipped the balance in favor of policy focusing on 
cost recovery solutions in higher education delivery. Thus, policy beginning in the 1980s called 
for greater private sector involvement (Agarwal, 2009). This shifting political stance, which 
espouses the private financing of higher education (financial investments from the private sector, 
namely household contributions), may be understood as the primary driver of private sector 
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growth, and the growth of India’s higher education system overall. This growth has culminated 
in the proliferation of self-financing institutions.  
It is important to note that while private sector growth has been on the rise, the number of 
private self-financing, degree-granting institutions is still relatively low compared to degree-
granting public institutions and private colleges with an affiliated (or dependent) status. 
Affiliated status is designated for colleges that award degrees and provide programming under 
the regulatory supervision of India’s public universities (private universities are barred from 
affiliating colleges). These colleges cannot offer degrees independently, but through their parent 
university, and must determine tuition fees, admission standards, and hiring policies in 
accordance with the policies and regulations established by their parent university. As Agarwal 
(2009) notes, private colleges affiliated to public universities have been the main source of 
private sector growth up until self-financing institutions appeared on the scene.  
Institution Types and Numbers 
There are different types of public and private institutions in India. Public institutions are 
mainly three types. Central universities are established by an act of parliament whereas state 
universities are established by state legislature. There are also public colleges, which like private 
colleges, are affiliated to either state or central universities. Including both public and private 
types, there were 18,064 affiliated colleges operating as of 2006. Also, within the public sector 
there are institutions knowns as Institutions of National Importance (INIs). Simply, INIs are elite 
public institutions that have a special government status for their significant contribution toward 
developing highly-skilled graduates within a specified state or region. As of 2017, 91 INIs may 
be found operating in India and they include the Indian Institutes of Technology and the National 
Institutes of Technology (Trines, 2018). 
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Private institutions are mainly two types. There are private universities established under 
the state mechanism (state legislature) and private colleges. As mentioned, the latter, are 
affiliated to public universities. At the university level, there are 282 private institutions as of 
2017 constituting diverse types including comprehensive research universities and specialized 
schools (Trines, 2018). Also, within the private sector, there are institutions designated as grant-
in-aid private institutions, mostly colleges and some universities set up by the government 
(Agarwal, 2009). These institutions have a precarious identity given their private-public 
financing mechanism (further explained later). Prior to the 1980s, when the government assumed 
primary responsibility for financing higher education, their numbers rose quickly (Agarwal, 
2009). Nearly one-third of all colleges were private aided colleges (Agarwal, 2009). 
Across the main institutional categories describe above further institutional types may be 
discerned. There is a special category of institutions called deemed-to-be-universities, which 
may be privately or publicly controlled. According to Shah (2015), deemed status confers 
recognition on an institution for its academic excellence and vital role in the higher education 
sector. The University Grants Commission (UGC), which is the apex statutory body regulating 
and monitoring higher education in India, grants these institutions significant procedural 
autonomy to self-determine courses, syllabi, admission policies, and fees. However, this does not 
mean that deemed-to-be institutions have complete freedom to do as they please. They are held 
accountable to stringent operating and academic standards (Shah, 2015). Their strict monitoring 
is explained further below. Both public and private institutions may be conferred the deemed 
status, but the majority of deemed universities are private and deliver programs at the 
undergraduate level. Currently, there are 124 deemed universities (University Grants 
Commission, n.d.). As mentioned, the case example of this study is a deemed-to-be institution.  
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There are also stand-alone institutions (SAIs) across both public and private sectors. 
These institutions are considered universities but unlike deemed universities cannot grant 
degrees. However, they may grant their own diplomas. Diplomas denote basic knowledge in key 
technical and professional areas and usually are awarded to students who complete shorter 
duration programs. Currently, there are upwards of 11,000 SAIs operating in India constituting a 
diverse group including polytechnics, nursing schools, and business schools. 
There are also autonomous colleges, also public and private. Unlike affiliated colleges, 
these institutions have autonomy to self-determine institutional policies, tuition fees, and 
admission criteria. They also can issue their own academic transcripts and provisional degree 
certificates.  However, they are similar to affiliated colleges in that they cannot offer final 
degrees on their own. The status of autonomous college is conferred by the UGC and, as of 2019, 
there were 708 autonomous colleges operating in India (University Grants Commission, 2019a).  
Admissions, Access, and Equity 
It is difficult to generalize the admissions system found in India’s higher education 
system. As explained by Trines (2018), admission requirements not only vary from institution to 
institution, but also depends on the jurisdiction, program of study, and relevant statutory body. 
Generally, though, students are required to take an entrance exam or multiple entrance exams. 
Entrance exams are either national, state, or specific to the institution depending on type of 
institution and where the institution is located. Students are also generally required to have a 
Higher Secondary Certificate (HSC) (or an equivalent credential) which they receive upon 
passing state board exams. It is also typical that universities require a minimum grade point 
average. Admission requirements can be relaxed, and even open as in the case of open 
universities, or highly selective and competitive in the case of prestigious institutions such as the 
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Indian Institutes of Technology (ITTs). Candidates applying to ITTs must sit for multiple exams. 
Students who score high markings on the initial Joint Entrance Examination (JEE) Main, a 
nationwide test conducted by the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE), must also take 
the JEE Advanced.   
On account of stringent admission requirements, student access is understandably more 
restricted at ITTs and other prestigious institutions than those with more relaxed or open 
enrollment policies. This is not a unique phenomenon of Indian higher education, but 
circumstances that may be found globally. Access is also uneven with respect to other factors. 
Regional disparities (where universities are densely populated in urban areas), gender 
differences, inter-religious group disparities, income-level disparities, and inter-caste disparities 
(female students are less represented in higher education in India) all factor into the uneven 
distribution of student access in India’s higher education system (Agarwal, 2009).  
There have been gradual efforts by the government to address these disparities as they 
relate to student access for some time now, since the Ninth Plan (1997-2002) as noted by 
Agarwal (2009). The Ninth Plan is the ninth economic development Five-Year Plan (FYPs). 
FYPs have been developed and implemented since 1951 to coordinate India’s economic growth. 
Currently, India is in its Thirteenth Plan (2018-2023).  
A focus of these plans has been promoting equity in access for India’s underrepresented 
groups, namely Scheduled Castes (SC)/Schedules Tribes (ST) candidates, female students, and 
candidates with disabilities and/or coming from minority groups. Among these groups, there is a 
special focus on promoting equity in access for SC and ST candidates (and Other Backward 
Classes [OBCs]) as a means to correct systemic historic injustices enacted on these groups 
hitherto 1950. These groups, as historically disadvantaged groups, thus are eligible for a variety 
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financial aid schemes (Planning Commission, 2013) and are admitted to institutions based on 
India’s reservation system, India’s version of affirmative action. Quotas have been established 
for these groups and many universities, both public and private, have been admitting students 
from these groups in accordance with nationally-determined percentages (15 percent for SCs and 
7.5 percent for STs, and for universities located in certain jurisdictions, 27 percent for OBCs) 
(Agarwal, 2009). Deemed-to-be institutions, such as Grand Hall University, must comply with 
these government prescriptions. 
Funding 
Different funding mechanisms may be found across the varied institution types in India. 
A key difference in financing may be discerned between government-funded institutions and 
self-financing institutions. The latter group, as explained earlier, is growing in numbers, and now 
the majority.   
Government-Funded 
The category of government-funded institutions includes public universities (central 
universities, state universities, and institutions of national importance), public SAIs, public 
colleges, and grant-in-aid private institutions. As mentioned, grant-in-aid institutions are special 
institutions. While their identity may be obscured by their categorical designation as a private 
type, they operate mostly on the largess of public resources.  
Depending on type, the above institutions are established and funded by different 
government bodies. For example, central universities are founded and funded by the federal or 
central government, mostly with University Grants Commission grants. According to (Trines, 
2018), tuition fees at most central universities are nominal and do not constitute a significant 
revenue source. State universities, on the other hand, receive funding from their states (and 
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sometimes the central government, also with UGC monies) (Shah, 2015). The vast majority of 
institutions is funded at the state level.  
Public financing may also be found at grant-in-aid or government-aided private 
institutions. These institutions are considered publicized with their operating budget, mostly 
recurrent costs such as teachers’ salaries, covered by government funding. In some cases, grant-
in-aid institutions receive funding for capital expenses. The only major difference between grant-
in-aid institutions and public institutions is related to upfront costs used to establish these 
institutions (Agarwal, 2009). While the government (either federal or state) assumes 
responsibility for financing initial funding for public institutions, the costs related to founding 
grant-in-aid institutions are covered by private investors.  
Funding mechanisms may be further differentiated within the public/grant-in-aid 
categories by education field. Depending on the type of educational offering and institution, 
funding may be traced to different government agencies. For example, central technical 
institutions are funded by the Department of Higher Education, Ministry of Human Resources 
Development. However, state technical universities and colleges are funded by the department of 
technical education at the state level (and the All India Council for Technical Education 
[AICTE], a statutory body providing accreditation for institutions focusing on technical 
education). Likewise, central medical universities are funded by the Ministry of Health whereas 
their state counterparts are funded by the Department of Health. Table 1.1 provides an overview 
of some of the funding agencies in India and their institutional targets. 
Table 1.1 Funding by Institution Type 
Type of Institution  Funding Agency (source of funding) 
Central technical institutions including IITs, 
IIMs, NITs, IITs, USER and Others 
Department of Higher education, Ministry of 




Central Universities, majority of colleges 
affiliated to Delhig University, colleges 
affiliated to Allahabad University and 
Banaras Hindu University 
UGC  
  
Central medical institutions including AIIMS Ministry of Health 
  
Central agriculture universities   Indian Council of Agricultural Research 
(ICAR) 
  
Deemed universities (publicly controlled) UGC, plan assistance, or concerned 
government 
  
State universities  Department of Higher Education (state 
government) 
Source: Agarwal, 2009 
 
Self-Financing  
The category of self-financing institutions refers to financially independent universities 
and colleges (independent from both state and central government funding sources). These 
institutions include private colleges, private SAIs, private universities founded as nonprofit 
entities (i.e., operated by philanthropic societies, religious groups), and within this category 
private universities with a deemed status such as Grand Hall University. These institutions are 
not eligible for public funding and are expected to self-generate revenue to cover all institutional 
expenses.   
Trends in Funding 
As mentioned, India’s gross enrollment ratio (GER) hovers around 24.5 percent, meaning 
a vast majority of the college-age population (18-24) are not attending college. Increasing access 
to this population is a high priority and a focus of India’s Five-Year Plans and more specifically 
new initiatives called draft National Education Policy (NEP) and EQUIP (Education Quality 
Upgradation and Inclusion Programme). For example, the Twelfth Plan (2012-2017), outlines 
strategies (e.g., financial aid schemes, establishment of Model Colleges in areas with low 
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enrollment, and academic reforms) aimed to increase enrollment by about 30 percent of the total  
student enrollment (34.6 million students) (Mohmad & Ali, 2018), and EQUIP and NEP aim to 
increase enrollment by nearly 50% (by 2035 according to NEP and by 2024 according to 
EQUIP).  
While historically the government has tackled the problem of student access head on and 
at times increased funding at both the central and state levels (Agarwal, 2009), public budget 
constraints, as well as uneven funding across the higher education system, has prompted India to 
reconsider their financing strategy. Agarwal (2009) states that higher education in India is 
severely underfunded and focused on only two-thirds of the entire higher education system with 
central universities receiving 65 percent of UGC funding as of the late 2000s. This is despite 
modest increases to higher education in the areas of medicine, agriculture and technical 
education, funding according to economic growth strategies (e.g., the 11th Five Year Plan).  
Public funding constraints has prompted India to embrace a financing framework 
espousing the increased involvement of private actors in the delivery of higher education. Thus, 
higher education growth post-1980s has been largely a result of private sector investments. 
Private sector investments namely refer to the implementation of cost recovery solutions (e.g., 
charging high tuition at private institutions and offering more and more self-financing courses at 
both private and public institutions) and the founding of self-financing institutions by private 
actors.  
Interestingly, as Altbach et al. (2020) note, the increase of private actors involved in 
higher education delivery in India is a result of individuals and families founding and running 
their own institutions. With such players on the rise and private institutions absorbing demand, 
Agarwal (2009) notes that the level of household contributions to covering higher education 
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costs has become equal to public funding as of the mid-2000s. Today, cost-recovery as a 
financing strategy has become the funding norm.  
External Governance 
The foremost regulatory body in India is the University Grants Commission (UGC). It 
was established in 1956 and modelled on the UGC of the United Kingdom. Acting with the 
Ministry of Human Resources Development and on behalf of the central government, its role is 
to determine and enforce system-wide standards across India’s higher education system, though 
establishing central universities and conferring “deemed status” on institutions of repute 
constitute its primary focus. These standards relate to a broad spectrum of areas in higher 
education including institutional status and recognition, lecture hours, degree conferment, 
teacher salaries, minimum qualifications for faculty, pay scales, admission, tuition and fees, and 
academic quality. Related to its monitoring function, the UGC also disburses funds to 
universities (with some colleges receiving development grants) on behalf of the central 
government. Those institutions in compliance are eligible to receive additional grants from the 
UGC.  
Supporting and some even acting as statutory equals to the UGC in enforcing standards 
(and providing funding) are a long list of other federal level ministries, state departments, and 
professional councils (both at the state and national levels). These statutory bodies enforce 
discipline-specific standards and provide accreditation/recognition for different types of 
institutions (state and private institutions, and one-fifth of affiliated colleges) across both the 
public and private sectors. Specifically, they are responsible for the recognition of courses, 
promotion of professional institutions, regulation of course syllabi, and provision of grants and 
other awards to various fields of education. Each council/ministry/state department has its own 
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set of rules and mandates for the concerned category of institutions (Shah, 2015). Some of these 
statutory bodies along with their primary role are listed in Table 1.2 below. 
 
Table 1.2 India’s Statutory Bodies and their Functions 
Name  Main role Overlaps with the role of: 
UGC Funding, recognition of 
institutions and degree titles, 
maitaining overall standards 
Other professional councils 
and the Distance Education 
Council  
   
Distance Education Council  Funding, maintaing stndards 
of open education 
Other professional councils 
and the UGC 
   
All India Council for 
Technical Education 
(AICTE) 
Approval for technica 
institutions and limited 
funding role for quality 
improvement 
UGC, Distance Educaiton 
Council, and various other 
bodies 
   
Council of Architects  Registration of architects and 
recongition of institutions for 
education in achitecture and 
town planning  
AICTE 
   
Dental Council of India  Recommend to the central 
government for approval of 
dental colleges  
Ministry of Health 
   
Indian Nursing Council Accepts qualifications 
awarded by univeristies 
within and outside India  
22 state nursing councils with 
different Acts have 
registering powers 
Source: Agarwal, 2009 
 
The statutory bodies listed in Table 1.2 mostly operate within areas falling outside of the 
scope of direct UGC monitoring and steering, but overlap may also be found. For example, the 
All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE) scope of operations (e.g., approving 
technical institutions and funding for quality improvement) may overlap with the UGC, Distance 
Education Council (DEC), Pharmacy Council of India (PCI), and state councils for technical 
education. This overlap results in confusion. Pressures to conform to different and often 
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overlapping standards enforced by multiple oversight mechanisms have created compliance-
related stress for all institution types in India.  
Adding to this stress is another layer of regulation coming in the form of accreditation 
relating to academic quality of programs, research, and teaching. In India, the UGC requires all 
institution types, barring technical institutions, to seek and receive an accredited status. 
Depending on institution type and program offerings, institutions seek accreditation from either 
the National Assessment and Accreditation Council (NAAC), National Board of Accreditation 
(NBA), or Accreditation Board (AB). While the NAAC may be understood as an arm of the 
UGC and covering the widest remit of institution types (central, state, private, deemed-to-be, 
INIs, and colleges), the NBA and AB provide recognition for specific disciplines, respectively 
technical/professional programs (e.g., engineering, architecture, and technology) and agriculture 
programs.  
The above regulatory mechanisms in the form of accreditation and other forms have 
raised skepticism, if not outright criticism, of government monitoring. According to Agarwal 
(2009), leaders of all institution types in India believe that excessive standardization, monitoring, 
and regulation limit their ability to innovate.  
Private Sector Regulation 
As with public institutions, private universities and colleges are subject to steering and 
scrutiny enforced by the UGC as well state-level departments and professional councils. Private 
sector regulation, however, has been somewhat inconsistent and fragmented. In some areas of 
university affairs, private institutions operate with more restrictions than their public 
counterparts. For example, the UGC does not allow private universities the power to affiliate 
colleges or operate beyond designated territorial jurisdictions and outside of state borders 
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(Trines, 2018). However, governmental prescriptions regulating private higher education is 
looser in other areas. Private institutions (especially those without a grant-in-aid and affiliated 
statuses) than their public counterparts enjoy greater freedoms around determining institution-
level policies, tuition and fees related to ancillary services (e.g., library, transport, canteen, 
library, text books, mark sheets, caution deposits, degree certificates, hall tickets, and association 
fees). 
Looser regulatory controls in the private sector has been both advantageous and 
disadvantageous. On the one hand, loose regulations have led to capacity building by 
incentivizing the increased involvement of private actors in higher education delivery. Capacity 
building is essential to meet nationally-determined targets of increasing student access. On the 
other hand, however, loose regulations have become a factor contributing to a negative 
reputation of India’s private sector. Inadequacies in the regulatory framework has led to the 
proliferation of suspect institutions involved in profiteering and malpractice (Agarwal, 2009). 
Corruption has come to characterize much of the private sector of India.  
Corruption comes in many forms in Indian higher education (perhaps not so differently as 
what we find in other parts of the world). For example, private institutions have been known to 
charge exorbitant fees for various services (e.g., library, transport, canteen), create fictitious 
salaries for posts that do not exist, collect donations through dummy foundations, and recruit 
students on the basis of family wealth rather than merit. In general, private actors in India have 
been known to enter higher education delivery to make a profit. 
Corruption has been prevalent despite the government’s efforts to curb it. The 
government has especially focused on regulating fees across the private sector. However, efforts 
to clamp down on malpractice in this area have been met with opposition at the institutional 
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level. Agarwal (2009) notes that many private actors do not recognize the UGC as a legitimate 
authority, and that these institutions claim their independence from government oversight on the 
basis that they do not receive UGC funding.  
Deemed-Status Regulation 
The focus of this study is on examining organizational decision-making, and the various 
governance-related factors that limit family agency, at a private deemed-to-be institution. 
Therefore, this chapter now focuses on explaining those regulatory requirements and pressures 
with direct implications to the operations of deemed institutions including Grand Hall 
University.   
Private deemed institutions, like other private types, have autonomy to varying degrees in 
determining institutional policy, courses, programs, syllabi, and fee levels. In fact, deemed 
universities of considerable repute retain full autonomy in these areas according to a new graded 
autonomy system (Trines, 2018). However, having procedural autonomy does not mean that 
these institutions can do whatever they want. Given their elite status, they are held to higher 
accountability standards and norms of operation, and are expected to follow these norms as they 
play a vital role in the higher education sector and for society (Shah, 2015; University Grants 
Commission, 2019b). They are subject to stricter oversight in key areas including governance, 
management, and financing and are expected to operate in a manner in accordance with the 
“ideals of the concept of a University” (University Grants Commission, 2019b). Thus, they must 
follow strict regulatory protocols and standards, which as explained are fragmented and even 
absent for the general landscape of private institutions. Private deemed institutions are much 
more like central universities and fall under the direct jurisdiction of the UGC. The UGC 
determines and enforces strict eligibility criteria for institutions seeking deemed status and 
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universities currently operating with a deemed status. For the former group, those seeking 
deemed status, universities are eligible only after demonstrating (a) 20 years of operating; (b) 
having at the time of application the highest grade of accreditation by the National Assessment 
and Accreditation Council (NAAC), and (c) at least a Cumulative Grade Point Average (CGPA) 
of 3.26 for three consecutive years (University Grants Commission, 2019b). Further, they must 
figure in the top-50 ranks in the ‘specific category’ or in top-100 ranks in the ‘overall 
category’ in the National Institute Ranking Framework’s (NIRF) list (University Grants 
Commission, 2019). 
For already established deemed universities, continued conferment of status is 
dependent on passing yearly assessments conducted by the UGC. These assessments pertain 
to examining whether the institutions are abiding by the rules, regulations and directives set 
forth by the UGC. Scrutiny covers many areas including academic infrastructure (deemed 
institutions should have at a minimum five post-graduate departments with a minimum of six 
faculty members per department [Shah, 2015]); teacher training requirements; teacher-student 
ratios; admission standards; and performance through various measures (e.g., a minimum of 
50 percent of graduating students must secure access to employment or self-employment or 
pursue higher education).  
Listing and describing all of these rules and regulations goes beyond the scope of this 
chapter. Two areas pertaining to this study’s focus—decision-making and governance—is 
further described below.  
Governance, Management and Financing 
The UGC is particularly explicit in defining the patterns of governance, management, and 
financing required of deemed universities. The UGC determines what decision-making/advisory 
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bodies to form, what responsibilities these bodies should assume, the composition of these 
bodies, what key positions the university should have, the powers of these key positions, 
appointment terms, yearly meeting schedules among the various bodies, and how revenue should 
be managed. Some of these determinations are described in detail below.  
For example, the UGC states that deemed universities should have as their highest 
governing body what is called the Board of Management (BoM), which may be understood as 
the Indian version of America’s board of trustees. The institution’s vice-chancellor, who is the 
executive head of the university (in the US, this would be the president), chairs the Board of 
Management constituting 10 to 15 members chosen from diverse stakeholder groups. These 
members include the faculty, key decision-makers such as the pro-chancellor, and ex-officio 
members from the government and the community of scholars outside of the institution. Further, 
the UGC requires that BoM meetings be held mandatorily four times a year with every member 
having one vote regarding decision-making matters of institutional importance. The term for 
members of the BoM, barring ex-officio members, is three years with eligibility for re-
appointment.  
The UGC also states that deemed universities have an Academic Council. This is India’s 
version of the America’s academic senate. According to UGC regulations, the academic council 
shall be the apex decision-making body for all matters relating to academic affairs. Similar to the 
BoM, the UGC mandates broad stakeholder representation on the academic council. Further 
details about the composition of the academic council is provided in the following chapter. One-
third of the total number of members form a quorum and each member has a vote on decision-
making matters with majority rule. 
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Other governing bodies are also required by the UGC. These include the Planning and 
Monitoring Board, Finance Committee, and the Board of Studies (BoS). While having different 
responsibilities, these bodies support the BoM and Academic Council regarding the decisions 
they make. Performing a critical role among these is the BoS. As an advisory body in each of the 
‘faculties’ at deemed institutions (a faculty may be understood as what in American university 
are called ‘schools’), the primary function of the BoS includes making recommendation to the 
academic council regarding new programs, courses, rules, and regulations regarding minimum 
qualifications in admissions, and advising on matters referred to by the academic council. More 
details about the function of the BoS are provided in the following chapter.  
Finally, in the area of governance, the UGC provides explicit guidelines regarding the 
responsbilties, powers, reporting structure, and tenure of key positions including the chancellor, 
pro-chancellor, vice-chancellor, finance officer, deans, and heads of departments. These 
positions are described in detail in the following chapter.  
The financing of deemed institutions is another university facet monitored and steered by 
the government. Funds, accounts and properties are closely monitored (on a yearly basis and at 
the discretion of the UGC) to ensure compliance to established financing practices. These 
include the strict stewardship of revenue for the purposes of the institution, seeking approval for 
fee levels, the creation and maintenance of what is referred to as the Corpus Fund (this fund acts 
as an assurance to the UGC that the management of the institution will fulfil its commitment to 
provide quality education and research [Shah, 2015] and is a permanent fund kept for the basic 
expenditures needed for the administration and survival of the organization, sort of like 
endowment), the separation of funds between the accounts of the institutions and sponsoring 




As mentioned, the government reviews the operations of deemed universities annually to 
assess their compliance with regulations. The government may also gather information about 
institutional activities through other channels. For example, staff or faculty may file complaints 
directly. Violations of UGC rules are treated with disciplinary action. The UGC has an ascribed 
right to launch a thorough enquiry into the concerned university (University Grants Commission, 
2019).  
Disciplinary actions include ordering the institution to withhold admission for a certain 
period of time, revoking the awarding of grant monies for institutions (Shah, 2015); barring the 
institution from developing programming and courses; reducing the intake capacity of students; 
academic retrenchment of courses and programs; removing key leadership (e.g., vice chancellor); 
and advertising on the UGC website (and other media outlets) the status of sanctioned 
institutions (Shah, 2015). In extreme cases, the government may even repeal deemed status 
and/or co-opt the sanctioned institution’s buildings, land, and other resources. According to Shah 
(2015), such intervention methods may result in a tremendous loss to owners.  
Conclusion 
This chapter situates India’s institutions, including deemed institutions, as inevitably 
conforming to the regulatory environment in where they operate. The regulatory environment is 
complex and multilayered with numerous government and professional bodies monitoring and 
steering the activities of institutions. Pressures to conform to different and often overlapping 
standards enforced by multiple oversight mechanisms have created compliance-related stress for 





CHAPTER 5: GRAND HALL UNIVERSITY  
Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of Grand Hall University (GU). In addition to 
describing GHU’s mission, history, size, and academic offerings, the primary focus of this 
chapter is on mapping GHU’s organizational structure and profiling key decision-making bodies 
as well as key stakeholders that have been identified by interview participants as influencing 
major academic and administrative decisions.  
Vision and Mission Statements 
The Vision of Grand Hall University is the promotion of international understanding 
through quality education. This vision is broken down into several missional objectives. They 
include inculcating a spirit of 'Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam' (the world is one family) in students, 
faculty and staff; contributing towards knowledge generation and dissemination, promoting 
ethical and value-based learning; fostering the spirit of national development; inculcating cross 
cultural sensitization; developing global competencies among students; nurturing creativity and 
encouraging entrepreneurship; enhancing employability and contributing to human resource 
development; promoting health and wellness amongst students, staff and the community; 
instilling sensitivity among the youth towards the community and environments; and producing 
thought-provoking leaders for society.  
A Brief History 
Grand Hall University began as not a university, but in the early 1970s as a small 
organization providing intercultural activities to international students struggling to adapt to the 
unfamiliar environment of studying in a foreign country. The person behind the organization is 
Dr. Prem, who at that time was professor at a public university in India. His vision for Grand 
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Hall began when he discerned the sobering reality within which foreign students faced incredible 
difficulties relating to their capacity to adapt to the foreign circumstances of India. University 
support services were virtually nonexistent and foreign students were left isolated, defeated, and 
some in poor health.  
These circumstances deeply impacted Dr. Prem and shaped his resolve to help foreign 
students. Initially, he created opportunities for foreign and domestic students to interact and learn 
from one another, culturally through activities, eating, and dance. These, however, were not 
enough. He observed that foreign students, particularly from other parts of Asia and the Gulf 
countries, still suffered in the course of their studies, particularly in the classroom. They just 
could not learn at the same pace and level as their domestic counterparts given their diverse and 
different cultural and speaking backgrounds.  
Thus, as a next step, Dr. Prem founded an English language center, the first of its kind in 
India that would remove the language barrier for foreign students preparing to enroll in college-
level programs and courses offered in English. International students would enroll in an English 
language course to improve their speaking and writing ability in advance of the university 
courses they would take in their programs.  
While humble in scope and scale, these first initiatives gave birth to a multitude of other 
initiatives demanding greater resources and time. It was not long before Dr. Prem began 
founding educational institutes, some in higher education and others at lower levels that 
promoted learning and intercultural inclusiveness. The very first of his institutes in higher 
education offered programs in law, management, computer studies, and the field of Arts and 
Commerce. Dr. Prem, at times on the recommendation of senior members of the organization 
and friends, founded a different institute nearly every year.  
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Dr. Prem’s organization reached a milestone when three of his institutes received the 
status of deemed university from the UGC in 2002. As mentioned, this status is conferred to 
institutions meeting stringent requirements around academic quality and research (Kumar, 2018). 
For Dr. Prem, having this status meant freedom to improve the quality of his institutes, which 
were previously affiliated to a public university. Many government controls were liberated 
allowing the newly formed deemed university to take control and ownership of its academic 
direction and operations. This meant that GHU had autonomy to design programs, courses, and 
even academic and admission standards.  
Current picture 
Today, Grand Hall University is a conglomerate of an organization with institutes and 
campuses located across India. GHU provides a wide and varied range of academic programs 
housed across nine campuses and more than 30 institutes, many of which are nationally ranked. 
These institutes offer undergraduate, master, and doctoral degrees and diplomas in such fields as 
law, management, health and biological science, humanities and social science, information 
technology, engineering design, media, and telecommunications. In any given year, these 
programs are offered to over 20,000 students who not only come from across India, but from 
upwards of 85 foreign countries.  
During my site visit, I was provided lodging to stay at one of the campuses and visited a 
few others in the same city including the main campus. I was impressed by the scale of the 
campuses, especially the site where I took up residence for the three weeks of my visit. This site, 
isolated from the downtown district, looks over a valley and a reservoir operated by the 
university. I enjoyed staying there and walked the grounds daily. There was much to see, from 
students bustling about to the picturesque backdrop of the hills surrounding the campus grounds. 
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I also visited the main campus on a number of occasions. Located in the heart of the city, I found 
the culture there stimulating and vibrant. I even had a chance to talk with some students who 
shared positive stories about student life and their learning experience. 
Governing Bodies 
The organizational structure of Grand Hall University (GHU) follows the typical 
governance/management patterns prescribed by the University Grant Commission (UGC) (see 
University Grants Commission, 2019b). This means that decision-making is expected to be 
facilitated on and by different decision-making bodies required by the UGC. These governing 
bodies are referred to as ‘governing authorities’ by the UGC and include several different types 
having varying responsibilities across academic and administrative areas. Importantly, these 
authorities act as enabling structures for different stakeholders to participate in organizational 
decision-making.  
Key among these governing bodies, as identified by interview participants, include the 
Managing Committee, the Board of Management, the Academic Council, and the Board of 
Studies. These authorities may be understood as influencing and facilitating key organizational 
decisions at GHU. At GHU, there are a host of other governing bodies, some consultive in nature 
such as advisory or standing committees, that also influence organizational decision-making. 
These include such committees concerned with institutional fees, admissions, examinations, and 
anti-ragging (bullying and harassment). As needed and where relevant when addressing the 
research questions of this dissertation, these committees are highlighted as part of organizational 
decision-making at GHU. 
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The Trust and the Managing Committee 
At the very top of the organizational hierarchy is the Trust or Society that manages Grand 
Hall University. Simply, a Trust may be understood as the parent body of GHU. In the case of 
Grand Hall (GH) Trust, GHU is not the only organization under its control. There are a number 
of other education or education-related organizations affiliated to it. These include nursery, 
primary, and secondary schools; museums; and centers such as those focusing on health and 
sports.  
The members of the Trust sit on a governing decision-making body referred to as the 
Managing Committee. The Managing Committee performs high-level functions such as framing 
and approving institutional policy for the various organizations under its purview; ensuring the 
compliance of all organizational activities to institutional and government regulations and goals; 
establishing the vision of the organization; reviewing, and at times approving, the decisions of 
governing bodies under it; approving budgets and the fee structure; and approving the 
appointments for senior officers and faculty. According to Angom (2015), the Managing 
Committee “takes important decisions in terms of policymaking and executive functions of the 
university” (p.47). These executive functions encompass administrative services centralized by 
the Trust. Administrative services include the Human Resources and Legal Department, Finance 
Department, IT Department, Projects Department, Estates Department, and Purchase 
Department.  
At GHU, the managing committee is chaired by Dr. Prem who is the President of GH 
Trust and Chancellor of GHU. There are ten other members, some appointed from within the GH 
organization and others from outside the organization. While members appointed from within 
Grand Hall are all related to the founder, members recruited from society are nonfamily and 
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include luminaries in industry, education, law, and finance. Provided below in Table 1.3 is a list 
of all Managing Committee members, as of 2018-19. Also noted are their professional 
designations where information is available and for family members their familial relation to the 
founder.  
Table 1.3 Managing Committee, as of 2018-19, Total Members 11 
Name Title  Family Status 
Dr. Prem Chair and President and 
founder of GHU  
Founding family member 
   
Dr. Aabha Principal Director of GH Trust, 
Pro-Chancellor of GHU  
Daughter of founder   
   
Mrs. Prem Member Wife of founder 
   
Dr. Nishita Member, Pro-Chancellor of 
another educational 
organization belonging to the 
family but outside of GH Trust 
Daughter of the founder 
   
Dr. Aarav Member, Dean Son-in-law of founder and 
husband of Dr. Aabha 
   
Dr.  Vice President of GH Trust Nonfamily member 
   
Dr. Member Nonfamily member 
   
Mrs. Member Nonfamily member 
   
Dr. Member Nonfamily member 
   
Mr. Member Nonfamily member 
   
Mr. Member Nonfamily member 
Source: Author 
Board of Management (BoM) 
The Board of Management (BoM) is the highest executive authority of Grand Hall 
University and oversees and supervises all university activities while ensuring their alignment to 
the institutional vision and mission (Angom, 2015). According to the University Grants 
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Commission (UGC), the BoM has full autonomy to exercise academic and administrative 
responsibilities independent from the influence of the Managing Committee. These 
responsibilities are broad and include such powers as monitoring and reviewing the annual 
budgets, giving final approval related to academic decisions, reviewing new appointments, and 
conferring degrees and diplomas. As outlined in GHU’s Human Resources manual, some of 
these responsibilities are shared with the Managing Committee such as filling new positions.  
The UGC also stipulates that organizational decisions made by the BoM (mostly related 
to academics), while final, should not infringe upon the powers of the respective authorities 
within the university. Thus, many university matters of importance are to be discussed in 
consideration of the concerns, advice and recommendations of other authoritative bodies 
including the Academic Council and the numerous advisory/standing committees found at Grand 
Hall University.   
GHU’s BoM is chaired by Dr. Aditi, the Vice-chancellor of the university, and includes 
ten other members (plus nonmember secretary), as of 2018-19. The composition of 
representation on the BoM is predetermined by the UGC. Provided below in Table 1.4 is a list of 
the members, as of 2018-19. Also listed are their professional designations where information is 
available and for family members their familial relation to the founder (denoted by **).   
Table 1.4 Board of Management, as of 2018-19, Total Members 12  
UGC Categories BoM Members  
Vice-Chancellor Dr. Aditi, Chair 
  
Pro Vice-Chancellor (where applicable) Vacant 
  
Two Deans of Faculty Dr. Prisha, Dean 
Dr. R., Dean 
  
Three eminent academics Professor  
Dr. Kalinda, Senior administrator 
Former Vice Chancellor of another  
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     university 
  
One representative of the central 




Two teachers of the Institution Deemed to 
be University, one each from among the 





Nominees of the Sponsoring body, not 
exceeding Four in number 
Dr. Aabha**, Principal Director & Pro-  
     Chancellor 
Dr. Aarav**, Dean  
Dr. Nishita, Pro-Chancellor of other  
     university* 
Mr. B, Industrial  
     Engineering 
  
The Registrar, who shall be ex officio 
Secretary of the Board of Management 
Registrar 
 





According to the University Grants Commission (UGC), the Academic Council in 
deemed universities is responsible for the maintenance, coordination, and execution of standards 
of teaching, research and training; approval of syllabi; coordination and promotion of research  
activities; hiring of academic personnel; program and course development; evaluation and  
improvement of standards; and evaluation of departments and their offerings. In sum, the  
Academic Council focuses on overseeing, managing, and approving all academic activities of the  
university (Angom, 2015). The Academic Council has autonomy to make many decisions on its 
own; however, it typically works in consultation with the BoM on deciding on academic matters 
(University Grants Commission, 2019).  
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GHU’s Academic Council is chaired by Dr. Aditi, the Vice-chancellor of the university, 
and includes 32 other members (plus nonmember secretary). Provided below in Table 1.5 is a list 
of the members as of 2018-19. Also noted are their professional designations where information 
is available and for family members their familial relation to the founder (denoted by **). 
Table 1.5 Academic Council, as of 2018-19, Total Members 41  
UGC categories  GHU Members  
Vice Chancellor Dr. Aditi, Chair 
  
Pro Vice-Chancellor (where applicable) Vacant 
  
Dean(s) of Faculties Dr. Aarav*, Dean  

































Two Associate Professors from the 










Three persons from amongst educationists of 
repute or persons from any other field related 




Professor & Dean 
 
  
Three persons who are not teachers, co-opted 
by the Academic Council for their specialized 
knowledge 
Chairman, engineering company 
Executive Vice President, recruiting & talent  
     management firm  
  
The Registrar, who shall be ex officio the 





Board of Studies  
The Board of Studies is an advisory body operating within each faculty. The primary 
objective of the Board of Studies is to formulate and examine course content, curricula and 
syllabi, and make modifications and improvements in consideration of institutional needs, 
academic trends, and government regulations.  
Each board of studies is chaired by a dean of the faculty and includes all of the professors 
of the faculty, two associate professors of the faculty, two assistant professors of the faculty, and 
two persons external to Grand Hall University recruited for their subject matter expertise. 
External members could be from higher education or industry.    
Hierarchy of Governing Authorities 
The governing bodies described above have been identified across interviews as key 
actors in organizational decision-making at GHU. Figure 1.3 below provides a simplified 







hierarchy with the Managing Committee occupying the top-most level. While not discussed in 
this chapter, there are other deliberative bodies. One of these is the Program Review Committee. 
Its purpose and function, and how it contributes to decision-making at GHU, will be discussed in 
later chapters.   
 




Profiles of Key Positions 
To understand the governance of GHU, it is also important to profile the key positions 
who are members of the above governing authorities and involved in decision-making. Key 
positions include the Chancellor, Pro-chancellor, Vice-chancellor, deans of faculty, department 
directors, and department heads. These positions may be understood to represent the different 
stakeholder groups within the university. For example, the Chancellor and Pro-chancellor, as 











of trustees. In the case of most family-owned or managed universities, boards are controlled by 
the family (Altbach et al., 2020). Thus, the Chancellor and Pro-chancellor also represent the 
interests of the family. There is also the administration of the university, which is another 
stakeholder group highlighted by the higher education literature. At GHU, this group is 
represented by the Vice-chancellor together with her staff. Finally, the deans of faculty, 
department directors, and department heads, who may have administrative responsibilities in 
addition to academic responsibilities, primarily represent the interests of the faculty stakeholder 
group. All these positions, from the Chancellor at the very top level to the department head, have 
a role in the governance and decision-making of GHU. While some of these actors have 
authority to make decisions without seeking approval, most of these actors convene on the 
various governing authorities of the university to discuss and decide on important institutional 
affairs together. As university stakeholders, they implement decisions of and are accountable to 
the governing authorities. These positions are further profiled below.  
Chancellor. In India, the Chancellor is a term used to call a non-executive head of the 
university with ascribed duties that rarely crossover into the day-to-day operations of the 
university. In public universities, this would be the governor. In private universities, the 
Chancellor is typically the president of the parent organization managing the university. 
According to UGC regulations, the Chancellor of deemed universities (and perhaps all types of 
universities in India) is entrusted with several responsibilities ranging from more ceremonial 
duties such as presiding over university convocations to matters that indirectly impact 
organizational functioning, such as nominating senior officers. The Chancellor also has power to 
convene the Managing Committee. The Chancellor is appointed by the sponsoring body (Trust or 
Society) and is limited to holding the office for a term of 5 years with eligibility for 
reappointment for one more term. 
Pro-chancellor. The UGC clarifies that the role of Pro-chancellor is limited “to carrying 
out the tasks assigned to the Chancellor” when not available. The Pro-chancellor, if so appointed, 
shall hold office for a period co-terminus with that of the Chancellor. As in the case of the 
Chancellor, this positions too is a nonexecutive position of the university.  
Principal Director. The Principal Director is the executive head as well as principal 
administrative officer of the Trust or Society. According to the Constitution of Grand Hall Trust, 
the duties of the Principal Director are broadly defined as those performed on behalf of the 
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Managing Committee and in consultation with the President. In the case of Grand Hall Trust, the 
Principal Director is also the Pro-chancellor. It is unclear whether this is common across all 
universities in India.  
Vice-Chancellor. The Vice-chancellor is the chief executive officer of the university. In 
the US, this would be the president of a university. The responsibilities related to this position 
encompass the development of academic programs and general administration for the entire 
operations of the university. By virtue of the appointment, the Vice-chancellor chairs, and has 
power to convene, the governing bodies of the university including the Board of Management, 
the Board of University Development, Planning and Monitoring Board, the Board of 
Examination, and Academic Council. The Vice-chancellor is also responsible for the overall 
compliance of the university to state and federal statutes and ordinances. According to Angom 
(2015), the vice-chancellor acts as a bridge between the academic and administrative functions of 
the university with academic function typically centralized by the sponsoring body (the Trust or 
Society). The UGC states that the Vice-chancellor is appointed by the Chancellor and serves for 
five years with elibiglity for reappointment for one more term.  
Dean of Academics and Administration. The Dean of Academics and Administration is 
a senior level administrator primarily focused on ensuring a robust academic environment and 
responsible for framing, overseeing, coordinating, and improving the academic processes of the 
university. Part of her role is to ensure quality assurance of academic deliverables and coordinate 
necessary levels of resources to support sustained and efficient academic processes. To this end, 
the Dean of Academics and Administration assists the Principal Director in the management of 
the service providing departments of the university (e.g., human resources, purchasing, finance). 
These departments, as mentioned earlier, may be understood as part of the Trust and centralizing 
operational, legal, financial and human resources processes for GHU. While the Dean of 
Academics and Administration reports to the Principal Director, interview data suggests that she 
also reports to the Vice-chancellor. In this way, she occupies a somewhat interesting position that 
on the one hand is part of the Trust (her profile is featured as part of the leadership of the Trust) 
and on the other hand part of GHU (interviews reveal that she reports to the Vice-chancellor in 
addition the Pro-chancellor).  
Dean of Faculty. The dean of faculty is responsible for the overall supervision, 
management, accountability, and coordination of all the institutes under him or her. Specific 
responsibilities may include academic planning and auditing programs, recruitment and 
development of faculty, implementation of academic policies, enforcement of academic 
standards in undergraduate and graduate programs, and preparation of budgets. Deans of faculty 
are typically ex-officio members of several top-level governing bodies in the university (e.g., 
Academic Council, Board of Examination, etc.). Deans typically report to both the Vice-
chancellor and the Pro-chancellor.  
Director. The director at Grand Hall University oversees and directs academics and 
operations at the institute, college, or center level. Responsibilities include setting up and running 
the various programs and services offered by the school or center and designing strategic goals 
consistent with institutional objectives. Directors report to deans of faculty.  
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Head of Academic Department. Each academic department has a head managing 
administrative and academic affairs. The head of department is appointed by the Vice-chancellor 
from among respective department faculty. According to the UGC, the term of department heads 
are three years with elibility for reappointment for one more term, but not for two consecutive 
terms. 
Head/Director of Centers. GHU has various centers, some at the institution level and 
others within faculties, that support institutional activities or provide non-academic services to 
the university community.  
Interview Participants 
All interview participants of this study (except for one who does not work at GHU) hold 
a minimum of one of the positions outlined above and are members of one or more of the 
‘governing authorities’ described in this chapter. The list of Interview participants is shown again 
here, in Table 1.6.  
Table 1.6 Interview Participants 






Degree(s) Years at 
GHU  
Dr. Prem President of 
Trust, Chancellor 
of GHU 
Family Founder Chair, MC 
 
PhD >40 yrs 
  


























       
Dr. 
Aarav 















       
Dr. 
Vihaan 















       
Dr. Aditi Vice-chancellor Nonfamily 
administrati
on 




PhD  >20 yrs  








nonfamily BoM, PmB, 
BoUD  
PhD >20 yrs 
       
Dr. Keya Director of an 
institute; Deputy 
Director of a 
center 





       
Dr. 
Prisha 










of a department 
in one of GHU’s 
institutes 
Faculty nonfamily AC, BoS 
 
 
PhD >10 yrs 




Professor N/A nonfamily N/A PhD N/A 
*MC: Managing Committee, BoM: Board of Management, AC: Academic Council, PmB: 
Planning and Monitoring Board, BoUD: Board of University Development, FC: Finance 
Committee, UsB: University Sports Board, BoE: Board of Examination, BoS: Board of Studies 
**This interview participant does not work at GHU 
Source: Author 
 
It is important to understand where these interview participants are situated in the 
organizational hierarchy. Such an understanding sets the proper stage to investigate the formal 
(and where possible informal) relational dimensions of the interview participants, and where 
power (influence to affect decisions) is concentrated—or how power circulates within the 
organizational structure. Figure 1.4 below provides a simplified overview of the official 
reporting/organizational structure at GHU with a focus on illuminating the positional hierarchy 
of interview participants and the stakeholder groups to which they belong. As shown, the figure 
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is divided into four sections (GH Trust, GHU, GHU Faculties/Institutes/Departments, and 
Administration and Support Services) and positions are color-coded to denote type of 
stakeholder group. All of GHU’s family members are coded ‘yellow’ and occupy positions 
spread throughout the organizational structure and at all levels of the reporting hierarchy. Dr. 
Aarav, for example, is coded yellow, but he represents the faculty stakeholder group as shown. 
On the other hand, several of the interview participants may be found concentrated within the 
organizational space of GHU Faculties/Institutes/Department. This group is coded ‘green’ and 
represents the faculty body of GHU. Finally, there are interview participants representing the 
Nonfamily Administration stakeholder group. They are coded ‘orange’.  
 
Figure 1.4 Simplified Organizational Chart 
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This chapter presented information in four important areas: the history of Grand Hall 
University (GHU); the key governing authorities influencing decision-making at GHU; the key 
positions representing and accountable to these authorities (clarified in findings chapter); and 
background information about the interview participants. Importantly, the interview participants, 
by virtue of the organizational positions they occupy and the governing authorities they sit on, 
were presented as representing different stakeholder groups at GHU. Further, the governing 
bodies of Managing Committee, Board of the Management, Academic Council, and Board of 
Studies are understood as enabling structures for broad stakeholder engagement in decision-
making. Another important point is that the governing bodies themselves have a relational 
component and facilitate decision-making cooperatively and according to a formal reporting 
hierarchy and process. The relational dimension of GHU’s governing authorities will be further 



















As explained, the purpose of this dissertation is theory testing. I also explained that it is 
crucially important to ensure that certain criteria be met for the purpose of theory testing. These 
criteria pertain to two sets of characteristics that were assumed to exist at GHU. In other words, 
Grand Hall University was chosen as a research site because it perceivably typifies certain 
characteristics. One set of characteristics relate to the prototypical higher education 
characteristics I identified using the higher education literature (i.e., Birnbaum, 2004; Cohen & 
March, 1986; Gutmann, 1999; Newman et al., 1996). According to these scholars, traditional 
(nonprofit) universities have the following characteristics: complexity of organizational structure 
and culture; the presence of multiple stakeholders with competing interests and needs; missional 
ambiguity; organizational conflict; strong accountability to the government and society; and the 
need for and practice of shared governance.  
However, I made a few assumptions about the presence of these characteristics at GHU. 
For example, I inferred that GHU may be a site where different stakeholders have a diversity of 
needs and interests based on the size of the university that employs up to 3000 staff and faculty. I 
also assumed that shared governance exists based on anecdotal evidence (i.e., Altbach et al., 
2020). These assumptions need to be substantiated. Thus, this chapter answers one of the 
secondary research questions to confirm that GHU typifies prototypical higher education 
governance characteristics. I first begin with presenting quotes from interviews and documents 
that suggest GHU to have organizational complexity. It is important to keep in mind that the 
quotes from these sources should not be treated as evidence. This is especially true for interviews 
where interview participants may be understood as sharing their opinions and thoughts according 
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to their subjective interpretation of reality. Thus, regarding the data presented in this chapter (as 
well as the remaining findings chapters), we must keep an open mind that what is being 
presented is a reality according to what the interview participants either want to share or come to 
believe in. I will discuss the limitation of this in further detail in the discussions chapter.  
Organizational Complexity 
In this dissertation, I defined organizational complexity as encompassing several 
characteristics. Universities are complex because they are large in size and have a disjointed 
governance culture in which diverse units do not operate as a rationale whole, but as an 
assemblage of subcultures. Interviews and documents suggest that Grand Hall University has a 
complex organizational structure. This finding is supported by data organized into three codes: 
‘large size,’ ‘diversity of units,’ and ‘specialized functions.’ To note, I discuss ‘large size’ and 
‘diversity of units’ as related themes under one section.  
Large Size and Diversity 
Universities are continuously expanding programs and creating new courses, departments 
and schools, not to mention hiring new staff and faculty. GHU is no different. It is a large 
organization with over 30 institutes spread across 11 different physical locations. In the 
following quote from written information provided by Dr. Prem, Dr. Prem recounts the story of 
GHU’s evolution and growth by the accretion of new institutes and centers.  
The nineties saw the establishment of no fewer than 14 institutions: Institute of Mass 
Communication (1990), [the first museum] (1990), the secondary school (1991), Institute 
of International Business (1992), Institute of Management Studies for Defense Personnel 
(1993), Centre for Management and Human Resource Development (1993), [the sports 
center] (1994), Institute of Telecom Management (1996), Centre of Health Care (1997), 
the high school (1997)... (written information by Dr. Prem) 
 
Grand Hall University added an institute or center, sometimes two, every year. Growth was the 
mode by which GHU evolved. Furthermore, the accretion of institutes and centers required the 
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creation of support units that would perform the administrative function of maintaining 
infrastructure and coordinating resources. Thus, administrative departments, too, were created as 
Dr. Kalinda (senior administrator) and Dr. Vihaan (head of an administrative office) explains: 
Dr. Kalinda: For example, we need to hire people. So there is an HR department. There is  
a finance department. We need to procure equipment, there is a purchase department. We  
need to maintain our infrastructure. There is an estates department. So they're all service  
providing departments of the university.  
 
Dr. Vihaan: We just had campuses outside [of our city], but there was no central office  
for them to send their concerns to. And that's when [Dr. Aabha] thought it apt to start off- 
campus department so that each and every director from the five campuses, which I  
mentioned is outside [of our city], can shoot their mails or complaints or concerns to my  
office and then we can give them interest. 
 
The accretion of new institutes, centers, and departments has led to a diversity of institutes, 
centers, and departments found at GHU.  
Specialized Functions 
Different academic and administrative units at universities do not operate as a rational 
whole, but according to local customs, policies, and pressures found within the units. This 
phenomenon has been referred to as “loose-coupling” (Cohen et al., 1972; Weick, 1976). Data 
suggests that GHU is no exception to having units with organizational differences with respect to 
customs, policies, and pressures, as Dr. Prisha (Dean) explains in her interview. She states: 
Each institute and other faculty [have] its own history and later it was brought under the 
university…[Grand Hall University’s] institutes have their own unique code of adhering  
to policies and standards which are laid down with the consensus by the university, but  
they also have a periphery and certain qualities, certain characteristics and persona,  
personality, which is very unique to each institute...You would see the law institute being  
very formal, students being dressed in uniform, and students being highly visible  
everywhere. Management Institute being a post graduate institute, having more of a  
serious character, so each one has its own way of doing it...When it comes to people  
management, day-to-day activities, the way we organize our student bodies, the way we  
organize our day-to-day academic delivery, each institute has its own unique way of  
doing it...For example, liberal arts has no annual examination or semester examination.  
It's all short assessments or no assessment in some cases, whereas the design institute has  
a different way of examining. The board of examination rules have laid down the  
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framework within the university of objectivity, transparency, fairness and adherence to  
procedures. 
 
Dr. Kiaan (Professor) and Dr. Aabha (Pro-chancellor) echo Dr. Prisha’s observation. 
They say the following when responding to a question about uniformity across GHU.   
Dr. Kiaan: They [institutes] are all different. Because there is some reason, because we  
all say, "No, there is a government and there is accreditation bodies." Their [other  
institutes] accreditation bodies might be different than my accreditation bodies. Their  
protocol might be different. Their policies might be different. Everybody's discipline is  
different. Everybody's accreditation bodies are different.  
 
Dr. Aabha: Because they, for example, the law school may be governed by their statutory 
body which is the bar council of India and their expectations…Oh I'll give you another 
example. The school of liberal arts. The school of liberal arts has a totally different  
pedagogy. They have a very small class size. They teach differently and their evaluation  
system is totally different from what a conventional business school [might look like].  
They want continuous evaluation and so on…As I said we [family and other top  
leadership] have given academic autonomy, but certainly the university lays down  
policies, which then get percolated down. The broader framework is construed by the  
university, but at an institution yes, they do frame their own policies of operational  
governance. 
 
The key takeaway from these quotes is that organizational differences among units (in this case 
GHU’s institutes) may be found along several dimensions: history, influences from stakeholders 
such as the government and accreditation bodies, and according to the needs and requirements of 
academic offerings. These needs and requirements may be internal and related to class size or 
teaching pedagogy as Dr. Aabha explains, or external and related to government and 
accreditation pressures as Dr. Kiaan suggests. Further, Dr. Aabha points out policies established 
by the university become modified or as she puts it “construed” at the institute level. On this 
point, Dr. Prem says the same.  
Each of [Grand Hall] units is given complete autonomy...Directors are free to evolve  
micro policies, appoint faculty and staff and take all the appropriate decision to ensure 




We may thus infer that there are considerable differences across the 40 plus institutes at 
GHU with respect to the policies they have and enforce. These differences give each institute a 
unique organizational character where no two institutes are likely the same. I wrap this section 
up with another quote from written information provided by Dr. Prem. Dr. Prem insightfully 
captures the reality of loose-coupling at GHU and the complexity of the university’s 
organizational structure.     
I would propose that [Grand Hall] University’s response to developments in the field  
of management was an almost inevitable outcome of the natural process of progressive 
differentiation. As Spencer suggested, organisms must grow and become progressively  
more complex. The differentiation is accompanied by changes in the function of the  
original organism, with specialist functions being performed by unique structures. In  
diversifying into different units, [GHU] was merely acknowledging the fact that functions  
were changing and that new structures were necessary to address these hitherto non- 
existent functions. (written information by Dr. Prem) 
 
Indeed, GHU’s growth into a progressively complex organization conforms to our understanding 
of the organizational reality found at the prototypical nonprofit university. Both GHU and the 
prototypical university, as described by the literature, are complex organizations with loosely-
coupled units operating according to localized norms.   
Missional Ambiguity, Competing Interests, Organizational Conflict, and Stakeholder 
Diversity 
According to literature, universities are pulled in different directions by stakeholder 
groups having different ideas and views on a variety of matters relating to academics, 
administration, and organizational success (Bolman & Deal, 2017). These differences are 
understood to animate lively discussions among stakeholders and even cause agency conflict 
(Eckel, 2000). Grand Hall University is no exception to having stakeholder groups with different 
views and interests. Further, these differences are reported by interview participants to often 
result in disagreements among faculty, staff, and top management. These findings are supported 
by data organized into three codes: ‘stakeholder diversity,’ ‘competing interests,’ and 
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‘organizational dissent.’ To note, I discuss ‘competing interests’ and ‘organizational dissent’ as 
related themes under one section. 
Stakeholder Diversity 
As discussed in the literature review, stakeholder groups are defined as such because they 
have a stake in the direction of the university. They exert pressures related to the significance 
they attach to different organizational objectives. For example, the government enforces rules 
and regulations because it has an interest in ensuring educational quality at universities that are 
perceived as providing societal externalities. Similarly, students demand a quality education 
because of the perceived private benefits that they receive, in the form of job security and higher 
wages after graduating.  
Grand Hall University is no exception to having different stakeholder groups that 
presumably have differing needs, opinions, and interests. Interview participants have identified 
several stakeholder groups, of which one is the government. In chapter 4, we learned that 
deemed universities, such as GHU, are held to higher academic standards and norms of 
operation, and are expected to follow these norms as they play a vital role in the higher education 
sector and for society (Shah, 2015; University Grants Commission, 2019b). All of the interview 
participants corroborate this and share further that the government takes steps to ensure that rules 
are followed. The following are several quotes from Dr. Aabha (Pro-chancellor), Dr. Vihaan 
(head of an administrative office), and Dr. Prisha (Dean) who all confirm this to be the case. 
Dr. Aabha: Like for example, faculty to student ratio is decided by them [government], or 
the kind of salaries that [at Grand Hall University]...So, University Grants Commission 
does lay policies, as I said what kind of faculty-student ratio every program should have 
or make up policies, and the universities are expected to follow them. 
 
Dr. Vihaan: By government obviously the university grants commission, that's what I 
mean by government. The Ministry of Human Resource Development, MHRD, UGC 
[University Grants Commission], then we have AICTE [All India Council for Technical 
130 
 
Education], so these three or four also influence our decision-making progress, because 
we finally, even if out of [the institution], we have to definitely keep them [rules and 
regulations]...We have to obviously follow their standards...So NAAC [National 
Assessment and Accreditation Council], UGC, they actually send people here to check. 
We have visits once in three years, if I'm not wrong, to check whether everything is going 
on well... 
 
Dr. Prisha. In Managing Committee, we have people from the government, we have 
people from [professionalized] and specialized bodies…yea, either nominated by the 
ministry or we once had a secretary-level person also on the Board of Management.  
 
Dr. Vihaan and Dr Aabha suggest that government entities such as the All India Council for 
Technical Education (AICTE), the University Grants Commission (UGC), and the Ministry of 
Human Resources Development (MHRD), through the policies and standards they enforce, steer 
the university. Dr. Vihaan says “we have to obviously follow their standards” and Dr. Aabha 
agrees. This means that decisions made at GHU must lead to organizational outcomes that have 
consistence with the expectations of and standards laid down by the government. As suggested 
by Dr. Prisha, government officials also can influence decisions internally, and more directly, by 
having representation on governing bodies, or governing authorities as the UGC defines them. 
The representation of government officials on these bodies may be understood as a way the 
government holds the university accountable to socially determined goals. 
There are also stakeholders at GHU in the faculty body whose needs and interests are 
more about student formation, career development, research, and teaching. Below, Dr. Kiaan 
(Professor) shares what he believes to be important.  
I [want] to be a good researcher first. Then a good teacher...As for their [students] needs, 
they should be given some different component of the teaching, maybe mentoring, maybe 
helping them to go ahead in the career orientation program. We have to be...Though we 
are taking the students, teaching for the four years, and we are not leaving like this. We 
have to give them a proper roadmap, where you will go depending upon their attributes, 




Similarly, Dr. Aarav (Dean) who also represents the faculty talks a good portion about student 
formation and career development during his interview. 
My objective, my vision for the university is to be the seat of trained manpower...Be it a 
doctor, be it a nurse, be it is clinical researcher, be it a healthcare manager, be it a 
technologist, a simple thing that you want to train...Today's technologists that we are 
training understands the background. He's [student] provided sound clinical foundation 
course, which explains to him his role in the entire supply chain management...He 
realizes his importance. 
 
Ultimately, Dr. Kiaan and Dr. Aarav’s role as faculty is linked to what Gutmann (1999) refers to 
as the cultural purpose of higher education, which relates to furthering the mission of serving 
society and teaching students to be effective and responsible members of the workforce. Dr. 
Kiaan and Dr. Aarav’s interest is rooted in the dissemination of knowledge for the purposes of 
student development and training. Therefore, they may pursue activities and resources that 
support and further their academic work, while exerting pressures on other stakeholder groups to 
remove barriers restricting their agency. We may further speculate that they represent academic 
interests when participating in decision-making on governing authorities.  
The interests and motives of faculty may be compared with those of the administration. 
According to Corson (1996), the administration is a stakeholder group whose interests diverge 
from those of the faculty and align to a utilitarian purpose. Administrative members are more 
concerned with strategic organizational planning that leads to reputational enhancements and 
financial wellbeing. The administration of Grand Hall University is no exception to having such 
a focus. In the following quotes, Dr. Aditi (Vice-chancellor) and Dr. Vihaan (head of an 
administrative office) share their interests and vision for the university.   
Dr. Aditi: Yea, I would love to see it recognized as one of the best academic institutions  
across India. Today we have something called a National Institutional Ranking 
Framework. We are in the top 50. I hope we will remain in the top 25, in years to come. 




Dr. Vihaan: In terms of vision, obviously much like my family members...I would love to 
see this university lined up in the rankings in terms of being one of the best in Asia, if not 
one of the best in the world. We are doing that. We are ranked very highly in the QS 
World Rankings recently... 
 
It is important to note that Dr. Vihaan and Dr. Aditi do not have a singular focus on rankings. 
There are many instances during their interviews where the importance of teaching, research, and 
student formation was discussed as university goals. However, it becomes interesting to compare 
their interviews with those of faculty. As expected (based on literature), whereas faculty leaned 
toward talking about academics and working with students, the administration had a greater 
focus on talking about institutional reputation and the university’s position on ranking league 
tables.  
Students are identified as another stakeholder group. According to several interview 
participants, they are stakeholders because they care and have opinions about the services they 
receive and the faculty they interact with. They provide feedback on a wide range of institutional 
matters. Dr. Aarav (Dean), Dr. Aditi (Vice-chancellor), and Dr. Kiaan (Professor) relate the 
following when asked to identify the stakeholders of GHU.  
Dr. Aarav: Internal stakeholders are the students, most important. Because students 
would like to participate in what healthcare decisions which we take, whether to set up a 
health center, whether to provide these facilities, whether to have this staff, whether to 
have these policies. Simple things like, as a health-promoting university, I wanted to have 
brown bread sandwiches. So students said, yes sir, brown bread sandwiches are good, but 
brown bread sandwiches cost a lot. We cannot afford it...Likewise, the faculty who teach, 
their [student] feedback is also taken regarding the content, the delivery mechanism, the 
teaching aids that they use, the way the difficulties are resolved. Depending on the 
feedback of the students, the continuity of the faculty is also decided. 
Dr. Aditi: Students often come and tell us, “Ma'am, but we heard that this is important for 
us to know, and it's not there in our curriculum. Can we introduce it?”...So I think we do 
have a very strong feedback mechanism which helps us improve our curriculum, year 
after year. 
 
Dr. Kiaan: Because certain decisions taken in the university. Students raise the question. 
For example, suppose the examination...Now we are conducting the two internal 
examinations, one final examination. If suppose the internal examination instead of two 
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we put three...And if students take objection? We don't give that option...because in 
[Grand Hall] overall, it is a student-centered, and any education should be student 
centered. What student needs we have to provide. It is not because I like to teach one 
subject, so I'm teaching. It should be the student-centric. 
 
In the above quotes, we learn that students at GHU have specific needs, which they make known 
to the administration and faculty (in this case, to Dr. Kiaan, Dr. Aditi, and Dr. Aarav) by 
providing feedback on programs, courses, and even cafeteria food.   
The final group that interview participants identify as a stakeholder group is the 
Managing Committee.  
Dr. Prisha: And here, the most powerful panel or team is the Managing Committee...In  
the Managing Committee there was a time when [Dr. Prem’s] family had three members. 
Today they are almost four or five. [Dr. Prem], then [Mrs. Prem], then [Dr. Aabha], then 
[Dr. Nishita], then [Dr. Aarav]...Five are from family.  
 
Dr. Vihaan: And then you also have a managing committee...because various projects 
have to pass through these committees.  
 
Dr. Danielle: The key stakeholders are the governing board [managing committee], the 
academic leaders and managers, the senate and the faculty members, the senior leaders 
from department heads and research center heads to the deans, to the Pro-chancellor and 
Vice-chancellor... 
 
Dr. Aabha: So today [Grand Hall] is known for certain values, known for certain things. 
That should continue, not just continue but it should be strengthened...So I think it's the 
board of trustees which holds the university, upholds the values and the vision 
 
Three key points may be discerned from these quotes. First, the Managing Committee is 
involved in decision-making at Grand Hall University as Dr. Vihaan points out. He says that 
various projects have to pass through the Managing Committee. Based on chapter 5, we may 
infer that these projects are related to those functions that the Managing Committee centralizes, 
which include human resources, legal, finance, and purchasing. Second, we learn from Dr. Prisha 
that the Managing Committee has five family members. This number represents a minority group 
on a committee of 11 members of which six are nonfamily. However, for the purposes of this 
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study, we may understand the family to have considerable influence on this committee—in part 
because a family member controls the chair position (i.e., Dr. Prem), in part because family 
members constitute nearly half of all members, and in part because of anecdotal evidence found 
in Altbach et al. (2020). In the volume they edited, several authors (Lamagna et al., 2020) share 
that family-owned universities in Bangladesh have boards where non-family members are 
typically designated by the family and come to have little decision-making power. Further, Choi 
(2020) explains in the same volume that in Korea nonfamily top leadership positions including 
those in the board are filled by nonfamily candidates who buy into the vision of the family. Thus, 
we may infer that there is little opposition coming from nonfamily members. Based on these 
understandings, we may understand the Managing Committee as a family-based stakeholder 
group with nonfamily members who may be more supportive than adversarial. Finally, we learn 
that the Managing Committee is a stakeholder group that sets the vision for the institution. In 
principle, members of the institution are expected to follow this vision.    
In sum, there are a number of stakeholder groups at Grand Hall University. These include 
the government, Managing Committee, faculty, administration, and students. Interviews suggest 
that all of these groups have different roles and different needs, and based on their needs may 
want different things.  
Competing Interests and Organizational Dissent 
Having different roles, needs, and views does not necessarily mean that stakeholders at 
GHU are at variance with one another. Indeed, this point was emphasized by several interview 
participants who recoiled at the word ‘organizational conflict.’ According to them, 
organizational conflict may not be found at GHU. However, interview data suggest that 
differences in opinions, views, and needs lead to lively discussion and in some cases dissent 
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among stakeholders. Grand Hall University is not immune from having stakeholder groups 
opposing the views and opinions of other stakeholder groups, as Dr. Kalinda (senior 
administrator) shares:  
I don't want to say most disagreements. Whenever we've had this disagreement, or 
differences in opinion is a better term, we've been able to tell whether it is a leadership or 
staff or faculty. And then, as in my role as Dean [of] Academics and Administration, if it 
is faculty, I have been able to tell them that, "This is where I disagree with you and this is 
the vision of the university." And unfortunately, whether you like it or not, this is how it 
is… 
 
In the context of this discussion, Dr. Kalinda shares an example of when faculty raised concerns 
regarding a new system for evaluating faculty performance. In her example, the administration 
would award points to faculty based on, for example, research output and attendance to 
compulsory faculty development workshops/programs. Dr. Kalinda further relates the story 
below.   
As Dean Academics, I went to explain this structure to all the faculty members. Many of  
them said, "We don't agree. It's very unfair that you're giving us negative marking. I said, 
"Why is it unfair? Because we are paying for it. The university is paying for it. The 
university is not charging you a rupee for that. The university is investing in building 
capability in you, then why aren't you attending?" So they said, "It's not relevant to 
us."...So somewhere we have to show that we don't appreciate that. So we've had some 
disagreements where we stuck to our guns and we said, "No, you will get negative 
marking for that." And that's not only for you, it's across the university." 
 
The faculty is noted with not agreeing with Dr. Kalinda and saying that the new system is not 
relevant to them. Such a response is consistent with what we learn of the organizational culture 
in higher education. The faculty and staff are understood as two groups with diverging priorities, 
needs, and interests (Morey & Piderit, 2006). It is thus not surprising that faculty at GHU 
sometimes disagree with the administration. Dr. Aditi (Vice-chancellor) also identifies the 
faculty as a group that questions the administration. She explains: 
My deans, which is their role. The role of my deans is to make sure that they question, so  
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that it is understood properly, and their concerns, if any are addressed…So yes, the deans 
do question...They ask us [the administration] if some of the restraints that we are laying 
down, which are governed by, in turn, the government, whether they are something that 
can be...whether that is essential for us to follow…So the academic community, led by 
the dean, would be the people who would ask questions, and I would believe that's their 
role.  
 
Additional testimony evincing the presence of diverse opinions and views, and 
organizational dissent, at GHU come from Dr. Vihaan (head of an administrative office), Dr. 
Keya (Director of an institute), and Dr. Prisha (Dean of a faculty). They share the following in 
response to a question about organizational conflict. 
Dr. Prisha: For example, Design Institute, I remember I was part of the counsel and  
Design Institute had an argument that the teacher who monitors the project only will  
assess. I objected. I said an external scrutiny should be mandated. Then at that time we  
had a chancellor who was through the state university system so he supported that idea  
and they brought it in. 
 
Dr. Keya: And, then sometimes you need someone to push you aside and say, "Does it 
really help? Is it really worth it? Is it worth the effort? Do you really need to have a 
thoughtful classroom size of not more than 15?" And someone in a budget meeting asked 
me, "but, why not twenty? Are you going to say that your faculty will not be stuck with 
20 people? What's the magic about 15? Then why not 12?" And, I said, "Yeah, I actually 
need to go back and do some research on that as well."  
 
Dr. Vihaan: And second is sometimes I feel that being young and exuberant, I have a lot 
of ideas and as I said, the vision for the university in terms of different aspects. But then 
to get the key administrative decision makers on board is sometimes a challenge…on 
multiple aspects and they don't agree with me. To make them…that's a challenge…I 
faced a lot of disagreements with the dean of academics or even the key decision makers 
from the Pro-chancellor [and] Chancellor.  
 
I infer two points from these quotes. One is that Dr. Vihaan confirms that disagreements happen 
between different stakeholder groups. Dr. Vihaan, who represents the administration in this 
study, is found to meet resistance from top leadership. Second, we learn that a difference of 
opinions and disagreements can happen within the same stakeholder base. Dr. Prisha recounts an 
experience where she came to disagree with other members of the faculty body. This is not 
surprising since the literature describes faculty as being a fragmented group (Hill, 1996). Based 
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on all of the examples above, it may be inferred that Grand Hall University is indeed an 
organization that resembles the prototypical higher education institution in terms of having 
stakeholders with varying perspectives, needs, and interests, which at times lead to discussion 
and even dissent. 
Accountability to the Government 
The landscape of higher education is constantly evolving relative to myriad shifting 
environmental circumstances: intensifying government accountability (Altbach, 2016; Austin & 
Jones, 2015; Cohen, 1998; Hazelkorn, 2015), new accreditation standards, changing market and 
societal trends, decreasing public funding, and stiff competition. Among these circumstances, 
intensifying government accountability has become common in most parts of the world (Altbach, 
2016). Higher education institutions are inevitably part of the external governance systems in 
which they operate, and must conform to the expectations and norms laid down by these 
systems.  
Grand Hall University is no exception to being a part of a larger educational system. 
Chapter 4 hopefully made this clear. The University Grants Commission together with the 
Ministry of Human Resource Development (MHRD), the state departments, and professional 
councils all determine the behaviors, financial practices, and the organizational structure of 
India’s universities and colleges, in both private and public sectors. Further, for deemed 
universities, such as GHU, violations of these rules are met with swift and sometimes severe 
disciplinary action including the withdrawal of grant monies, sanctions that prohibit program 
development, reduction of enrollment levels, and even the annulment of deemed status. 
We also learned earlier in this chapter that GHU presumably follows government and 
accreditation rules and regulations. The government and accreditation councils were discussed as 
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a stakeholder group that exerts pressures on GHU to conform to socially-determined agendas, 
through visits made by government officials and having representation on governing authorities.  
In this section, I present quotes from interviews and excerpts from documents suggesting 
that GHU is like the prototypical university in terms of having accountability pressures from the 
government. This finding is supported by data organized into three codes: ‘salary controls,’ 
‘program controls,’ and ‘facility controls.’ 
Program Controls, Salary Controls, and Facility Controls 
Dr. Prem (Chancellor) shares that educational institutions in India need permissions and 
approvals from myriad external governing bodies. Dr. Prem explains in written information he 
provides: 
Educational institutions must of necessity turn to various organs of the government. You 
need permissions and approvals from a veritable jungle of authorities: state government, 
the Central Government, ministries and departments of education, Ministry of Human 
Resource Development, University Grants Commission, All India Council of Technical 
Education, Distance Education Council and so on...During the course of this [written 
material], I have narrated, often ad nauseum, accounts of my encounters with various 
authorities. I can only describe those experiences as agni-divya, ordeal by fire. (written 
information by Dr. Prem) 
 
As an educational institution, GHU must seek government approval from the external authorities 
of India. We learn further from other interview participants exactly what affairs are being 
controlled or steered by these bodies. Below are quotes from interviews with Dr. Keya (Director 
of an institute), Dr. Aditi (Vice-chancellor), and Dr. Kian (Professor).  
Dr. Keya: Yes, yes, yes, yes, yes. The UGC is the apex body that governs us. So, for  
example, when I wanted to set up the liberal arts school years ago, I wasn't allowed to set   
up a BA of liberal arts or a bachelor or liberal, because the UGC doesn't allow it. So, I  
had to fit it in. So now I have a bachelor of arts into brackets liberal arts…approvals still  
need to be got. So, my four-year program needed approval from UGC. We couldn't do  
that on our own. So, anything major, so, for example, setting up of institutions,  
accreditation for institutions, faculty recruitment criteria—all of these are government- 
led. So, the government also mandates, for example, how much space you must have, for  
students. How many books should be there in library. What is the student-teacher ratio.  
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So, they definitely impact us. 
 
Dr. Aditi: You see, for instance, if it were to be a financial decision, okay, “Do we set up  
a new campus?”, that's not influenced by a teacher, not influenced by a student. It is  
influenced by an invitation from the government. So it's influenced by external agencies  
often. So for instance, if I want to set up an architecture school, I need the approval of the  
[government]… 
 
Dr. Kiaan: If we wanted to put some program, a new program. Yeah, we have to get the 
approval from the government. And they take a lot of time. So, today if I go to this office, 
after six months another desk. So it will go roaming, roaming. That is only that 
conflicting to us. 
 
According to these quotes, we learn that government controls reach into a broad range of 
university affairs. Government approval is needed to develop programs and establish institutes, 
and for any financial-related decision. The government establishes faculty recruitment criteria. 
The government even determines the requisite number of books the library at GHU should 
maintain. We also learn that working with the government can be difficult. Dr. Prem describes 
his encounters with the government as an “ordeal by fire.” Dr. Kiaan shares that it takes a long 
time for government approvals.  
In addition, government prescriptions determine pay bands and scales. Even transport 
allowance is fixed according to UGC specifications. The following is a quote from a university 
document.  
The designations of the university and administrative posts of [Grand Hall University],  
their grade pays and qualifications & work experience requirement will be as per UGC  
regulation... (University document) 
 
In fact, broad standards and regulations established by the UGC and other government 
entities inform all human resource policies at GHU. The following are additional quotes taken 
from a university document.  
The committee decided to frame policy in consonance with existing policies of state and  
central government. Since [Grand Hall University] is prominently engaged in delivery of  
'Higher Education', the committee incorporated the rules and guidelines framed by UGC  
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for teachers and statutory posts of the University in totality. (University document) 
 
The Committee referred following documents as guidelines for formulating [this 
document].  
a. UGC Regulations (Minimum Qualifications for appointment of teachers and 
Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education.  
b. Guidelines/Directions/Regulations of various statutory councils regulating Higher 
Education such as AICTE, BCI, MCI, Nursing Council of India, etc. 
c. Constitution (Memorandum of Association and Rules & Regulations) of [Grand 
Hall’ Society]. 
d. Existing [Policy] and various Circulars issued from time to time by [Grand Hall] 
Society and [Grand Hall University].  
e. Civil Services Rules of Government of [this state]. (University document) 
 
In sum, Grand Hall University is no different from other nonfamily private institutions 
around the world that operate under myriad compliance-related pressures, and conform to 
government rules and regulations.  
Shared Governance and Faculty Empowerment 
Shared governance refers to the set of practices undergirding the culture of collaborative 
decision-making among key stakeholders (American Federation of Teachers, n.d.). It is a 
collegial model of governance centralizing the principles of partnership, equity, accountability, 
and ownership among different stakeholders (Swihart, 2006). 
In the context of higher education, shared governance has become synonymous with 
faculty empowerment and representation in organizational decision-making (Nadler et al., 2010). 
Further, leading scholars in the field (e.g., Gutmann, 1999; Kerr, 1970; Newman et al., 1996; 
Rhoades, 2005; Tierney, 1994) discuss shared governance as necessary to keeping the university 
accountable to its academic mission of serving society.  
Interviews suggest that Grand Hall University is no exception to having the need for and 
implementing governance modalities and structures empowering different stakeholders (for 
advancing the academic mission), especially faculty, in decision-making. This finding is 
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supported by data organized into four codes: ‘need for shared governance,’ ‘two decision-
making chains,’ ‘representation on governing authorities,’ and ‘governing authorities as 
stakeholders.’ 
The Need for Shared Governance at GHU 
The need for shared governance is apparent at Grand Hall University based on several of 
the interviews. The following are quotes from interviews with Dr. Prisha (Dean) and Dr. Kalinda 
(senior administrator). 
Dr. Prisha: Every dean of faculty has to have this kind of role where, from their faculty,  
they draw ideas for new courses, new programs…Being at the direct meeting point of  
stakeholders such as students, parents and community, directors or deans require that  
autonomy to bring new influence, knowledge and other resources to the table. They are  
spearheading the fiercely independent body of faculty who need their autonomy and  
space to think, guide and motivate. It is an operational need for creating as well as  
catalyzing output, meeting expectation and to create a conducive ecosystem for learning.  
Directors are experts in their field, senior professors knowing the latest developments and  
having good network with important who's who in the field...It is the business of building  
and enriching human life, building a nation, building people. Hence, one should walk the  
talk and be careful in following what one claims. This is because, the students watch  
what one does and follow. Hence the governance team must exude ethical leadership,  
simplicity, command respect. Hence the decision making needs to be participatory,  
transparent, systematic and reasoned. 
 
Dr. Kalinda: Courses are required to be taught, revised, dropped, etc, keeping in view the 
programme objectives, appropriate teaching methods, methods of evaluation to measure 
attainment of objectives etc. These aspects need to be decided by the Deans, Directors 
and faculty members so that the programmes offered remain relevant and the students 
graduate with knowledge and skills required for their professional and personal life. 
 
According to Dr. Kalinda and Dr. Prisha, faculty autonomy and empowerment in decision-
making are needed because they are the key contributors of relevant and new knowledge to 
course and program development, as well as student formation and marketable skills 
development. Dr. Prisha argues that faculty “need their autonomy and space to think, guide, and 
motivate” as well as build the reputation of the university. This is because they are experts in 
their fields and possess esoteric knowledge on pedagogy, educational goals, subject-matter 
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related to their fields, and creating appropriate educational spaces. Indeed, what Dr. Kalinda and 
Dr. Prisha share is consistent with what we find in the higher education literature about shared 
governance. Shared governance is needed to advance the academic mission.  
Dr. Keya (director of an institute) and Dr. Aarav (Dean) emphasize the importance of 
collective decision-making for another reason. Shared governance is needed to alleviate 
stakeholder concerns. 
Dr. Keya: Because I think goals need to be collectively decided, so that all the  
stakeholders have an equal say and feel that the university is achieving [and] the  
organization is progressing… 
 
Dr. Aarav: Unless you believe in participatory management, you will never find the favor  
of the stakeholders. They'll (stakeholders) keep on creating problems. You have to make  
the heart and the minds meet.  
 
For Dr. Keya, alleviating stakeholder concerns means safeguarding procedural justice, which 
Birnbaum (2004) defines as fairness in decision-making. It is important that all members feel 
valued in the decision-making process. For Dr. Aarav, alleviating stakeholder concerns means 
having stakeholder support. He is afraid of the alternative scenario in which stakeholders left out 
of decision-making may create problems.   
Shared Governance via Two Decision-making Chains 
Interviews and documents suggest that democratic governance is promoted at GHU. 
Before I present data from these sources, it is important to reiterate the point that these data may 
be an estimation of reality. As mentioned, they may represent one perspective of reality 
according to either what the interview participants choose to share or what they believe to be the 
case.  
Interviews and documents suggest that there is shared governance at GHU, promoted via 
three ways. One way in which governance is shared at GHU is through the bifurcation of 
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decision-making responsibilities between the top leadership and faculty. Consider the following 
quote from a university document.  
As mentioned above [GHU] is one of the main constituents of [Grand Hall] Society. 
[GHU] being primarily an academic body and with the aim to focus and concentrate on 
academic activities, desires to exercise certain functions, other than academics through its 
parent body i.e. [Grand Hall] Society...This [relationship] between [GHU] and [Grand 
Hall] will enable [GHU] to focus its energy on academic growth of university while 
leaving certain administrative affairs to be managed by [Grand Hall] Society, thereby 
creating a harmonious relationship and environment between the two bodies. (University 
document) 
 
This quote provides clarity on the dual decision-making structure of Grand Hall University. The 
university (where faculty are concentrated) is to focus on academic activities while the Trust 
handles nonacademic functions. This structure is similar to what may be found at the 
prototypical university according to the higher education literature. Based on the literature, we 
learned that universities have two decision-making chains. One is the domain of the 
administration who wield what Corson (1996) calls administrative authority. The other is the 
domain of faculty who wield professional authority.  
The distinction of these domains at GHU becomes sharper in the following quotes by Dr. 
Prem (Chancellor) and Dr. Aabha (Pro-chancellor). 
 Dr. Prem: Before appointment of director of any institution, we think ten times. We look  
 at where he has served, but once we select the person as director, we give him total  
 academic freedom…not financial…academic…and he is [to] bother only about  
 academics…financial problem he may not bother…we take that responsibility…if some  
 student fight in court against him, we fight on his behalf…because total academic  
 autonomy given to all directors, they think they are custodians of their institutions…they  
 take ownership.  
 
 Dr. Aabha: So there are two kinds of decisions that are required to take. One is a purely  
 academic decision, which is starting new programs and new institutions and new courses  
 and so on...Whereas policy decisions on where to establish a campus, new expansion  
 plans, is what I look after. So whether to expand into setting up a campus in New Delhi  
 or Mumbai or whatever, the decision comes from the [Grand Hall] Society office...So  
 whereas the university manages all of the academic functions...the non-academic  
 functions are managed by the Trust, which is human resource, which is the projects,  
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 creating infrastructure, managing the infrastructure. All that is done by the Trust... 
 
These two quotes bring further clarity to GHU’s dual decision-making structure. We learn that 
the Trust handles decisions related to human resources, projects, creating infrastructure, and 
funding while the university handles decisions related to starting new programs and new courses. 
Other interview participants besides the leadership confirm this. The following are quotes from 
Dr. Keya (Director of an institute) and Dr. Prisha (Dean).  
Dr Keya: To be honest, the Chancellor and the Pro-chancellor. I don't work with them  
when it comes to academic stuff on a regular basis. I work with, for example, the dean of 
academics...They are the ones who I'm discussing, brainstorming.  
 
Dr. Prisha: The moment I'm made the director, I'm the whole and soul of this institute. 
But two functions are centralized, HR and finance. And I'm very happy that it's 
centralized...I don't want that headache because I'm more interested in my stakeholders, 
namely the parents, the students, my staff, my faculty, and my research.  
 
Dr. Keya shares that she doesn’t even work with top leadership when making academic 
decisions. These decisions are discussed with deans who are members of the academic 
community. As a dean, Dr. Prisha confirms this. She shares that she works with stakeholders at 
the level of the institute which include the faculty. The faculty thus seemingly have autonomy to 
make decisions on their own. Decision-making at GHU is shared between two groups: the 
faculty body and the top leadership. Even our informant, Dr. Danielle, observes this to the case 
and explains that decision-making is divided between the board (Managing Committee) and the 
senate (Academic Council). As explained, Dr. Danielle spent a significant amount of time at 
GHU working with faculty and top leaders. She shares the following in response to a question 
about decision-making at GHU.  
Well, I think the university is acting as a typical university. They are a deemed university  
in India where they have their decision-making structures divided into a board, which is  
policy-oriented, the management structure for implementing board policy and a senate  




Shared Governance via Representation on Governing Authorities 
The second avenue through which the different stakeholders of Grand Hall University 
seem to share decision-making power is by having representation on GHU’s governing 
authorities. We learned in chapter 5 that governing authorities are representative bodies of 
different stakeholders including faculty, administrative staff, top leadership (members of the 
Trust), and government officials.  
The diverse membership on governing authorities affords different stakeholders at GHU 
an equal opportunity to participate in academic-related decision-making. This opportunity is 
guaranteed by the University Grants Commission, which stipulates that each member has the 
ascribed right (ascribed as a function of their membership) to cast one vote on decisions 
deliberated on these bodies. Below is an excerpt from the 2019 UGC Regulations for deemed 
universities, in this case regarding the Board of Management.  
Every member of the Board of Management, including its Chairperson, shall have one 
vote and decisions at the meetings of the Board shall be taken by simple majority; and in 
case of a tie, the Chairperson shall have a casting vote. (University Grants Commission, 
2019b, p. 28) 
 
The voting system ensures that decision-making proceeds within an open and democratic forum. 
Votes are cast in a context of shared discussion and consensus on governing authorities that can 
be quite large. For example, the Academic Council has over 30 members. In principle, all of 
these members, coming from the administration, faculty, and industry can participate in decision-
making. Dr. Kiaan (Professor) explains the decision-making process on the Academic Council.   
I want it [new program] to launch in this college...I have put [together] the proposal. I  
have to get the sanction from the university...through the academic council, yeah. 
Academic council is a very huge body that has multiple members. They might be more 
than 30 members. All the members from various disciplines they will come to this. They 




As Dr. Kiaan explains, proposals (in this case related to starting new programs) are submitted to 
the Academic Council for consideration. As he further shares, all the members of the Academic 
Council become involved in considering the proposal. They all participate in decision-making. 
According to Furguson (2009), such a process where people work through consensus and 
discussion is referred to as ‘horizontal governance’. Horizontal governance replaces hierarchical 
leadership with collaboration, coordination, shared responsibility for decisions and outcomes, 
and a willingness to work through consensus (Furguson, 2009, p.2). Figure 1.5 below depicts the 
horizontal governance modality. As shown, different stakeholders who come from different 
levels of the organizational hierarchy (professors, deans, and directors) come together to discuss 
and deliberate as equals, as members of the same governing authority.  
 
















Shared Governance via Different Governing Authorities Working Together 
The process described by Dr. Kiaan earlier, where proposals are submitted to the 
Academic Council and discussed by its members, is part of a larger decision-making process 
involving different governing authorities. This larger process represents the third avenue through 
which decision-making is shared among stakeholders at Grand Hall University. Dr. Aabha (Pro-
chancellor) and Dr. Keya (Director of an institute) provide insight into this process below.  
Dr. Aabha: So the Academic Council, the Board of Management, Board of Studies, so if  
a new course or a new program has to be started, it comes from the Board of Studies, and  
goes to the Academic Council, the Board of Management. 
 
Dr. Keya: So, for example, if I were to... I want to introduce a new program, like I am.  
I'm introducing a new honors program this June, I had to discuss it within the institute,  
within my faculty, I had to get student feedback on it, I dealt with a whole lot of other  
industry, et cetera. Experts, I had to get their feedback on it...I got feedback from my  
foreign collaborators...Then I had to put in a proposal to the registrar, and then he gave  
me, in principal, some kind of an approval, and then I ran it through my faculty, so I went  
to Board of Studies...Then I had to go to the Academic Council, where, again I had to  
present it, and the Academic Council has deans and directors and faculty members and  
outsiders, et cetera. And then, ultimately, it went to the Board of Management... 
 
Both Dr. Aabha and Dr. Keya describe a process by which academic decisions are facilitated by 
sending proposals up the chain of command. Proposals—after horizontally discussed with 
experts, people from industry, and foreign collaborators as Dr. Keya shares—are presented to 
governing authorities in a particular order, beginning with the Board of Studies. In other words, 
different governing authorities, some located at lower levels of the organizational hierarchy and 
others at higher levels, come to participate in what may be described as a vertical process of 
decision-making.  
There is reason to assume that governing authorities operating at lower levels of the 
organization have less influence in decision-making than those operating at higher levels. My 
understanding is that proposals that have been approved at lower levels in principle could be 
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rejected as they move up the reporting hierarchy. Indeed, in this way, the Board of Management 
may be understood to have more authority than the Academic Council. However, interviews and 
documents suggest that the different governing authorities of GHU work democratically to arrive 
at decisions. Consider the following excerpts, the first from the 2019 UGC Regulations for 
deemed universities and the second from my interview with Dr. Vihaan (head of an 
administrative office). 
The Board of Management shall not infringe upon the powers of the respective  
      authorities provided under these Regulations; and where any authority has been given  
      advisory/recommendatory powers, the Board of Management shall obtain  
      advice/recommendations from such authority, before deciding on any matter before it.  
      (University Grants Commission, 2019b, p. 27) 
 
Dr. Vihaan: So there's definitely a lot of democratic participation between within each  
and every committee. And then there obviously are subcommittees...So in terms of only  
academic concerns, then we have the Academic Council and the Board of Management.  
They have to work together to ensure that the academics are well met. Academic  
standards or any new course has to be set up...If there's a need to increase the fees, we  
have a fee committee also on board, which in conjunction with the finance department,  
they work together to basically ensure, let us know whether actually we need a change in  
fees is a simple example I'm giving. 
 
According to the UGC and Dr. Vihaan, the different governing authorities of GHU work together 
and respect the authority of and recommendations made by other governing authorities when 
making decisions. The decision-making process is perceivably not autocratic and based on 
hierarchy, but as Dr. Vihaan suggests is democratic. Interestingly, according to Dr. Aditi (Vice-
chancellor), the decision-making process involving different governing authorities is ground-up. 
She explains:  
For different things, it would be different people. For instance, if it's academics, it can be 
the teacher on the ground, who becomes one of the key decision makers, because our 
process starts, ground-up. So we have a teacher at the base, who recommends a course 
that she or he wants to teach...So that's how the teacher will build it up. So it comes from 
the program review committee, the Board of Studies to the academic council. So there the 




Dr. Aditi perceives that the real decision-makers (for academic decisions) are the teachers on 
governing authorities found at lower levels of the organizational hierarchy. This is echoed by Dr. 
Kalinda (senior administrator). She explains: 
Whatever the BOM [Board of Management] says is final. All right. So does it mean that  
it has most influence?...No...Even faculty members can be very influential, right?  
Because at the institute level we have something called the Program Review Committee.  
And it has got a composition which has been notified. So it says at the institute level, you  
must have all the professors, you must have heads departments who will give you the  
program to say, "Yes, this program is one which will address the program objectives."  
All right. Now, then they are the ones who are actually influencing that...And this goes to  
the Academic Council, the Academic Council ratifies that. When you're talking about  
influence, it is at the lowest level that influence is highest. 
 
Dr. Kalinda suggests that the Board of Management—while having final authority to ratify 
academic decisions—is just one stakeholder group among others that also have power to affect 
the decision-making process. These stakeholder groups include the Academic Council and even 
those at lower levels of the decision-making process, such as the Program Review Committee. 
The Program Review Committee is an institute/college/center level body that meets to discuss 
matters pertaining to the relevancy and goals of academic programs. They ensure that academic 
programs meet learning objectives and institutional goals. At GHU, Program Review 
Committees consist of all the professors and the heads of departments. According to Dr. Kalinda 
above, the faculty on this committee have the most power because they are providing the most 
valuable input when developing courses. Based on the interviews and documents examined in 
this section, we may understand the governing authorities themselves as stakeholder groups that 
can influence each other and the decision-making process.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I addressed the first research question of this study and profiled Grand 
Hall University as typifying the major characteristics of the prototypical university. These 
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characteristics are identified in the higher education literature (i.e., Birnbaum, 2004; Cohen & 
March, 1986; Gutmann, 1999; Newman et al., 1996) and include the dimensions of complexity 
of organizational structure and culture; the presence of multiple stakeholders with competing 
interests and needs; missional ambiguity; organizational conflict; strong accountability to the 
government and society; and the need for and practice of shared governance. Interview and 
document data suggest that GHU possesses all of these characteristics. GHU operates within a 
regulatory framework established by India’s government and professional bodies. Grand Hall 
University is also a large organization with a complex organizational structure. Also, there are 
several stakeholder groups at GHU that have different views, interests, and needs, which at times 
intersect and cause organizational dissent. Finally, the stakeholders of GHU perceivably share 
decision-making responsibilities and can participate in decision-making on governing authorities.   
In the next chapter, I continue to profile the major characteristics of Grand Hall 
University, but with a focus on identifying the family-based traits that may be found there. As 
explained, GHU is a hybrid organizational possessing dual characteristics. The characteristics 
relating to the higher education dimension have been discussed in this chapter. Confirming their 
presence at GHU is important. But it also important to confirm the presence of family-based 








CHAPTER 7: THE FAMILY-BASED DIMENSION OF GRAND HALL UNIVERISTY 
Introduction 
The previous chapter profiled Grand Hall University as resembling the prototypical 
university in terms of having key higher education characteristics. In this chapter, I highlight 
quotes from interviews and documents to infer that Grand Hall University also typifies the 
family-based traits of family-owned businesses. This chapter focuses on answering the second 
research question—What family-based characteristics may be found at FOMHEIs? As explained, 
the confirmation of both higher education and family-based traits at GHU satisfies the criteria 
required for the purpose of theory testing.  
Since the socioemotional wealth dimensions of family firms may be understood as 
constituting the familiness characteristics of the family firm, I organize this chapter according to 
the five dimensions of SEW: family influence, identification with firm, binding social ties, 
emotional attachments, and renewal. Showing that these dimensions exist at GHU means that 
GHU typifies the family-based traits of family-owned businesses.  
Family Influence 
Interviews and university documents suggest that the managerial family of GHU has a 
strong influential presence. This finding is based on connections made among several codes: 
‘authority to make decisions,’ ‘representation on governing authorities,’ ‘control of key 
positions,’ and ‘family managerial involvement.’  
Family Influence as Indicated by Controlling Key Leadership Positions 
According to Berrone et al. (2012), the filling of leadership positions by family members 
is an external indicator of family influence. In other words, Berrone et al. suggest that “the 
ability to exercise authority vested in family members can emanate from a strong ownership 
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position” (p.262). The power to control the strategic direction of the firm can be exerted directly 
from positions of authority. Also, the family can maintain control indirectly via the authority 
vested in their positions to appoint other leaders.  
This type of influence may be found at Grand Hall University. Several leadership 
positions at GHU are filled by family members. As we learned in chapter 5, these include the 
positions of President, Chancellor, Pro-chancellor, and Principal Director. While these positions 
are all nonexecutive positions as Dr. Aabha states in her interview, they are positions of authority 
nevertheless. The following is a quote from a university document that defines the Chancellor 
position as an authority.  
The authorities of [GHU] are:  
A. Chancellor  
B. Board of Management  
C. Academic Council  
D. Planning and Monitoring Board Finance Committee. (University document) 
 
A member of the family also fills academic leadership posts as dean of one of the 
faculties and director of an institute within the same faculty. As explained in chapter 5, deans are 
responsible for the overall supervision, management, accountability, and coordination of all the 
institutes under him or her, and directors are responsible for his or her institute. Thus, these 
positions as well may be understood as positions of authority.   
Finally, family members at GHU have membership to governing authorities. For 
example, five family members may be found on GHU’s Managing Committee: Dr. Prem 
(Chancellor and President), Dr. Aabha (Pro-chancellor and Principal Director), Dr. Aarav 
(Dean), Dr. Nishita (Pro-Chancellor of another university under Grand Hall Trust), and Mrs. 
Prem (the founder’s wife). Family members are also found occupying membership positions on 
other governing authorities. In fact, family members may be found on all of GHU’s top 
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governing authorities, which according to university documents (i.e., Prospectus 2018-2019 and 
Grand Hall University Annual Report 2016-2017) are the Board of Management, Academic 
Council, Board of Studies, Planning and Monitoring Board, Board of University Development, 
and Finance Committee. Table 1.7 below provides an overview of the top governing authorities 
of GHU and the number of family members represented on them. 
Table 1.7 Family Representation on Governing Authorities  
Governing authority  Number of family members 
Managing Committee 5  
Board of Management 3 
Academic Council 1 
Finance Committee 1 
Planning and Monitoring Board 2 
Board of University Development 2 
University Sports Board 2 
Source: Author 
By virtue of filling key leadership positions (within the Trust and university and on 
governing authorities), the Prem family is in a position of authority to exert influence in 
organizational affairs. And interviews and data from documents suggest this to be true. For 
example, we learn from a university document and the 2019 UGC Regulations that Dr. Prem as 
Chancellor/President has authority to handle several matters related to human resources.  
The report of the Selection Committee will be put up for consideration and further 
appropriate action by the Appointing Authority. If the Appointing Authority is unable to 
accept the recommendations of the Selection Committee, it shall record its reasons about 





The Vice-chancellor shall be a whole-time salaried officer of Institution Deemed to be 
University, and shall be appointed by the Chancellor from a panel of three names 
suggested by a Search-cum-Selection Committee. (University Grants Commission, 
2019b, p.32) 
 
Above, we learn that the Chancellor has the power to reconcile issues related to the appointment 
of staff. We also learn that Dr. Prem can appoint persons of authority such as the Vice-
chancellor. He also has authority to appoint the Pro-chancellor as we learn from Dr. Aabha (Pro-
Chancellor) who says, “So the Pro-chancellor position is a position that is appointed by the 
Chancellor, like the Vice-chancellor is appointed by the chancellor.” As mentioned, the authority 
to appoint other leaders gives the family some form of indirect control. 
Finally, the Dr. Prem at GHU can influence university affairs by chairing the Managing 
Committee. As chair of the committee, it is reasonable to assume that Dr. Prem has significant 
involvement in determining the outcome of decisions deliberated on the committee, such as those 
related to campus expansion, funding strategies, and compliance, all functions centralized by the 
Trust. Interviews suggest this to be true. Below, Dr. Vihaan (head of an administrative office) 
shares that Dr. Prem is very much involved in making decisions related to funding. 
So, obviously, the [Dr. Prem], the founder is very much involved. Even now in terms of  
the funding decision lies in the hands of him, followed by [Dr. Aabha], who is the Pro- 
Chancellor.  
 
We may similarly argue that the Pro-chancellor can also influence organizational affairs 
in the ways described above. Below are quotes from Dr. Aabha (Pro-chancellor) and Dr. Keya 
(Deputy Director of a center) that support this argument.  
Dr. Aabha: Yes, I am involved in the university affairs which is being as a member of the 
Board of Management or even working with the Vice-chancellor in some policy making 
work, or policy making and several other things. 
 
Dr. Keya: And, [Dr. Aabha] is the executive director, so together we are responsible for 
full-time international students, for scholarships for African nation students, for diversity 
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amongst staff, student, faculty, and for all collaborations and activities that take place...I 
work very closely with Dr. Aabha.  
 
From these quotes we may infer that Dr. Aabha has involvement (and influence) in 
organizational affairs because of her membership to the Board of Management and her position 
as executive director of the Center where Dr. Keya may be found. In these capacities, she is able 
to work on university policy with the Vice-chancellor and on internationalization with Dr. Keya. 
As Dr. Keya explains, she works very closely with Dr. Aabha. We may infer that this is because 
Dr. Aabha is her direct supervisor.   
Family Influence as Indicated by Family Members Assuming Multiple Roles 
According to Mustakallio, Autio, and Zahra (2002), family member having multiple roles 
(multiple positions) within an organization is another indicator of family influence. Filling 
multiple positions effectively concentrates the responsibilities of two or more positions under the 
purview of a single individual. Such an arrangement, by design or not, broadens the scope of 
influence that a single family member can exert because of having an expanded set of 
responsibilities.  
This type of family influence may also be found at Grand Hall University. For example, 
Dr. Aabha (Pro-chancellor) can influence university affairs related to those centralized by the 
Trust (human resources, purchasing, estates, finance, etc.) and those found in the center where 
Dr. Keya is deputy director. This is because she is both the Principal Director of the Trust and 
the Executive Director of the center. She confirms this in her interview. She explains: 
...the non-academic functions are managed by the Trust, which is human resource, which  
is the projects, creating infrastructure, managing the infrastructure, all that is done by the 
Trust. Therefore, in my capacity of being the Principal Director and the Chief Executive 
Officer of the Trust, I am involved in the activities of the university in that way...I handle 
the internationalization also. That's sort of my passion...out of my own passion I look 
after internationalization—all internationalization activities because I'm very passionate 
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about it. So [Dr. Keya] kind of reports to me on internationalization, and [my daughter] 
reports to [Dr. Keya]. 
 
Filling multiple leadership positions also means that Dr. Aabha has many university personnel 
reporting to and interacting with her, in both formal and informal capacities. Interviews with Dr. 
Kalinda (senior administrator), Dr. Vihaan (head of an administrative office), Dr. Prisha (Dean), 
and Dr. Aarav (Dean) reveal that Dr. Aabha works with many staff, for most staff in a 
supervisory capacity. These include directors (e.g., Dr. Keya), deans (e.g., Dr. Aarav), key 
administrative staff (e.g., Dr. Kalinda and Dr. Aditi), chiefs of all of the service departments 
centralized by the Trust (HR, estates, finance, etc.), and more, even Dr. Vihaan who is the head 
of an administrative office. They also reveal that Dr. Aabha is active and as Dr. Kalinda shares 
very involved. Dr. Kalinda shares:  
I report to the Vice-chancellor and to the Pro-chancellor...So the level of involvement for  
all of them is very high, both for the Chancellor and for the Pro-chancellor. The level of  
involvement is very high. It is not as if there is an investment, you all do it and return and  
report. They're themselves hands on working with us. So the Pro-chancellor works very 
closely with...Let me put it this way. I work very closely with the Vice-chancellor and  
Pro-chancellor because they're looking into the day to day activities very keenly. 
 
Figure 1.6 below maps the people reporting to or working with Dr. Aabha as revealed by 
interview data and as connections denoted by the dotted lines. The key takeaway is that Dr. 
Aabha has access to many different people based on her position(s) of authority. Having multiple 
points of access (or simply connections) to people in organizations such as GHU is an important 
point to consider. According to Wasserman and Galaskiewicz (1994), the number of connections 
a person has to other people determines a person’s centrality within the organization, or capacity 
to influence others. People who are well connected will have more access to resources and 
information (Rowley, 1997), which they can leverage to push their agendas. Thus, we may say 
that Dr. Aabha, through the people reporting and working with her, can influence a wide range of 
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university affairs. She is in a position to influence academic affairs through Dr. Aarav; the affairs 
of the administrative service managed by Dr. Vihaan; the affairs related to internationalization 
through Dr. Keya; and the processes related to human resources and funding through the chiefs 
of service departments. As explained in chapter 5, positions are color-coded to denote type of 
stakeholder group. All of GHU’s family members are coded ‘yellow’; nonfamily faculty are 
coded ‘green’; and nonfamily administration is coded ‘orange.’  




Figure 1.6 warrants additional clarification. Two of the connections may be understood as 
being different from the others. While the majority of connections between Dr. Aabha and other 
university personnel are family-nonfamily, the connections that Dr. Aabha has with Dr. Aarav 
and Dr. Vihaan are family-family. We may even add a third family-family connection between 
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connections illuminated by the red dotted lines. As explained, the black dotted lines denote 
family-nonfamily connections. 




The family-family reporting arrangements at GHU are important to consider. According 
to Mustakallio, Autio, and Zahra (2002), family-family interactions are generative to shaping and 
strengthening the family’s shared vision and goals. Ultimately, the Prem family may be in a 
better position to steer the organization according to the vision they come to share and believe in 
by having these connections. Having more family allies may be beneficial to ensuring that family 
goals are met. How the family leverages their family-family connections warrants further 
investigation, perhaps for future research.  
Dr. Aabha is not the only family member assuming multiple roles and having access to 
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dean of a faculty and the director of one of the institutes within the faculty he oversees, but also a 
member of the Managing Committee and other governing authorities. As a member of these 
authorities and as a dean and director, he can also influence a wide range of university affairs 
through the many people reporting to and working with him. Similarly, Dr. Vihaan whose 
parents are Dr. Aabha and Dr. Aarav is not only the head of an administrative office, but also is 
in a position overseeing other service-oriented areas of GHU. Filling these positions gives Dr. 
Vihaan the ascribed authority to oversee and influence several areas of university affairs and to 
interact in a supervisory capacity with the university personnel reporting to him, which are many 
as he shares below.  
I'm the [head of an administrative office] …and they have the directors as well as their 
campus segments...and my office coordinates with the directors and the campus 
administrators...So both of these [directors and administrators], they report to me...Then 
under the second responsibility we have the director of the [this school]...So the director 
and staff, they also report to me. And the [other service] as you know, the [managers of 
this service] and they also report to me. So these are the people who actually report to 
me. 
 
In sum, the above quotes and excerpts demonstrate that members of the Prem family are 
in positions of authority with some family members assuming multiple roles and having multiple 
personnel reporting to them including other family members.  
Identification with Firm 
It is important to note that I did not aim to collect data related to the socioemotional 
dimension of ‘identification with the firm.’ This is because in this study I am only interested in 
problematizing family-centric socioemotional wealth in the organizational context of GHU, or 
SEW that may have a negative interaction with the governance realities of higher education. 
Thus, I did not focus on gathering information related to the SEW dimension of ‘identification 
with the firm,’ which in fact was understood in the literature review to have a beneficial impact 
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on the organizational culture. In other words, gathering such data and confirming that the family 
shares an identity with the university has no relevance to the aim of the study. Thus, the data 
provided here may not be as robust as in other sections. Notwithstanding, I put forward some 
quotes from interviews and written information provided by Dr. Prem to show that the Prem 
family shares an identity with GHU. This finding is based on connections made among several 
codes: ‘emotional investment,’ ‘shared reputation,’ and ‘psychological connection.’ 
Psychological Connection 
The psychological connection established between the managerial family and the firm is 
an indicator of shared identity (Berrone et al., 2012; Craig & Dibrell, 2006; Dyer & Whetten, 
2006; Klein et al., 2005). Some quotes from written information provided by Dr. Prem suggest 
that a psychological connection exists between the Prem family and the university.  
What does it mean to have land of one's own?  it is akin to the feelings an individual gets  
when he or she builds a house and starts transforming it into a home. The feeling is both  
emotional and physical. I faced myriad difficulties. There were occasions when I was 
acutely depressed, with not a clue to how I was going to get out of a situation...Getting an  
acre of land would hardly seem to be a significant achievement...it was one small step for  
me, but a giant leap for [Grand Hall]. (written information by Dr. Prem) 
 
Finally a formal letter granting [Grand Hall University] the status of deemed university 
arrived. This was one of the most memorable days of my life...I went home late at 
night...I went to bed, but sleep did not come easily...The entire [Grand Hall] saga 
unfolded before my mind...All the trials and tribulations, success and defeats, pleasure 
and pains, washed over...I saw all of this with a great sense of personal fulfillment... 
(written information by Dr. Prem) 
 
These quotes show that Dr. Prem’s emotional state changed according to the circumstances of 
GHU. Periods of difficulty had a detrimental impact on his emotional state and left him acutely 
depressed. And, times of triumph, when challenges were overcome, had the opposite effect. Dr. 
Prem felt “a great sense of personal fulfillment” when the future of GHU seemed assured. As he 
shares, the day the university received deemed status was one of the most memorable days of his 
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life. What Dr. Prem shares here seems to speak to a special bond that he has with GHU. It is a 
bond between an entity and a person in which circumstances of the entity triggers an emotional 
response in the person. The bond is thus of a psychological nature. According to one definition, 
‘psychological’ means having an effect on or involving the emotional state or mind (Cambridge 
online, n.d.). Indeed, we may say that Dr. Prem shares a psychological bond with GHU. We may 
further infer that this special bond was forged over time and since the founding of the institution, 
and that the bond indicates that Dr. Prem shares an identity with GHU. This is confirmed by Dr. 
Prem.  
Over the past 35 years, to all practical purposes, I have virtually merged with [Grand 
Hall] to the extent that today even I am unable to say where one ends and the other starts. 
I eat, drink and breathe [Grand Hall]...I live [Grand Hall] every moment. (written 
information by Dr. Prem) 
 
Dr. Prem is explaining that the time he spent building the university (over the past 35 years) has 
led to a state where his identity has become blurred with that of Grand Hall organization.  
Shared Reputation  
Shared identity may also be indicated by how the reputation of the organization is 
reflected back on the managerial family, and vice versa. Families will enjoy a positive reputation 
when their firm is performing according to expectations. Conversely, poor performance of the 
firm, for whatever reason, will be perceived as damaging the reputation of the family.  
A couple of quotes from written information provided by Dr. Prem suggest that this is the 
case at Grand Hall University. For example, consider what Dr. Prem says about a sensitive 
ordeal he had to deal with when purchasing and developing a plot of land for the university. To 
give some context, Dr. Prem’s action of purchasing and developing this land was perceived by 
the public as profit-oriented. Dr. Prem explains that his actions were of no such nature, but noble 
in purpose. I will not go into specifics because any clarifying information may compromise the 
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identity of Grand Hall University.  
No other experience equals the mental agony and social antagonism I had to face when I  
was trying to establish the [organization]...There was an uproar...One journalist launched  
a tirade and a major storm of controversy arose...[Grand Hall] was charged with using the  
[organization] as an excuse to grab land and spoil the natural beauty of [land]...Municipal  
corporators joined in and the General Body of the municipal corporation denounced  
[Grand Hall]...With every media against us...I was a target and not a day passed without  
an article, often editorial, criticizing [Grand Hall University] and me...my family and I  
started receiving threatening calls. (written information by Dr. Prem) 
 
The environmentalists, including my esteemed senior friend...filed a writ petition in the  
Bombay high court, restraining [Grand Hall] from constructing the [organization]...I was  
left with no other alternative than to fight the case...my character had been assassinated...  
(written information by Dr. Prem) 
 
It is clear from these passages that the affairs of the organization, in this case related to the 
purchasing of land, reflects back on the family. The controversy related to the purchase brought 
both Grand Hall and the family into the public spotlight, and both became objects of societal 
criticism. Not only was Grand Hall accused of profiteering, but also the Prem family received 
threatening calls. Dr. Prem further explains that he perceived that his character was being 
“assassinated.” This suggests that the Grand Hall organization and Dr. Prem share the same 
reputation. The circumstances of GHU reflect back on the family.  
Higher Emotional Involvement of Family Members 
According to Deephouse and Jaskiewicz (2013), family members of the managerial 
family are understood to be more emotionally invested than nonfamily members. This means that 
family members are more loyal to the firm, and more involved in firm activities, in part because 
of the identity they share with the firm. In other words, the family is more committed to seeing 
the firm succeed (and become more emotionally involved) than nonfamily staff because firm 
performance reflects back on the family.   
Not having asked targeted questions to see if this is the case at GHU, it is difficult for me 
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to extrapolate any substantive conclusions from the data (or rather lack thereof) that the family is 
more involved in university activities than nonfamily members. However, I highlight some 
quotes from interviews that at a minimum show that the family is emotionally invested and cares 
about seeing the university succeed, and perceivably more so than nonfamily members. Consider 
the following quotes from Dr. Vihaan (head of an administrative office and grandson of the 
founder) and Dr. Kiaan (Professor and nonfamily member). 
Dr. Vihaan: So that I find it almost a day to day challenge to make them feel as  
passionate like me. I know it cannot match the passion. But at least if 50% of the  
matches, then you know my work gets easier to convince them to work even more so  
harder to come on board...I always believe that family, what the vision and goal and the  
family members all the way of family member sees of organization...is not the same as  
what a non-family member will see.  
 
Dr. Kiaan: Somebody [nonfamily] may deteriorate the institute, but family member will  
not deteriorate. Family member they [stay the course].  
 
These quotes suggest that family members at GHU compared with nonfamily members care 
more about the university. Dr. Vihaan suggests that his passion outstrips that of nonfamily 
members, and that he tries to get nonfamily members to work as hard as him. Dr. Kiaan is even 
more direct. He argues that the university will not “deteriorate” in the hands of the family while 
the same cannot be said of nonfamily members. He may make this claim as a direct observer of 
the Prem family. Dr. Kiaan further explains:  
He [Dr. Prem] was a professor, and he established the university. That is a unique feature,  
because many people might be some corporate people can open a college, even some  
Trust can open the college, but individually, an individual person, who is a teacher, and  
opens the college. So that is something different...he put his entire life [into] [Grand  
Hall]. 
 
Dr. Kiaan says that Dr. Prem puts his “entire life into Grand Hall.” Similar language may be 
found across other interviews. For example, Dr. Aditi (Vice-chancellor and nonfamily member) 
during her interview explains that Dr. Prem and his family are the “whole and soul” of the 
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university. She further says that the family is wholly committed to the business of educational 
activity. She says, “It's not one of the activities that they are doing, this is the main activity. 
Academics is the main activity that they are involved in.”   
Binding Social Ties 
This dimension is also understood as having a positive effect on a firm’s organizational 
culture. Thus, like ‘identification with the firm,’ confirming its presence at GHU is unrelated to 
the aim of this study. However, I was able to collect relevant data even though I did not ask 
targeted questions related to this dimension. Quotes from written information provided by Dr. 
Prem and a university document suggest that there is positive relational capital as a result of the 
family’s proactive stewardship of it. This finding is based on connections made among several 
codes: ‘fair treatment,’ ‘proactive stewardship,’ and ‘trust and respect.’ 
Proactive Stewardship of Relational Capital 
According to socioemotional wealth theory, the managerial family is understood to 
cultivate relational capital at the firms they own and operate. In other words, the family is behind 
shaping the culture where positive relational capital is abundant and where members feel 
accepted. Data suggest that the Prem family proactively cultivates relational capital. While not 
proving anything, a quote from a university document suggests that the family and other top 
leadership strive to make employees feel welcome.   
The Management, realizing the importance of good quality human resources, strives to  
      formulate policies which will not only attract and retain dedicated employees but make  
them feel proud to be members of [Grand Hall] Family. (University document) 
 
We learn that the management, which includes family members in top leadership positions, 
formulates policies for the purpose of promoting belongingness among GHU employees. Making 
sure that employees feel accepted in the Grand Hall family is important to leadership. 
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Corroborating data come from Dr. Prem (Chancellor). Consider the following quote from written 
information he provides: 
After becoming president, I made special efforts to communicate with Managing 
Committee members, to involve them more actively in decision-making to instill in them 
a sense of pride for being members...I maintained intensely personal relationships with 
the members so that they understood the total context of my personality. (written 
information by Dr. Prem) 
 
Here, Dr. Prem talks about the importance of maintaining personal relationships with 
members of the Managing Committee. Dr. Prem wants to make them feel like they are a part of 
GHU by as he says maintaining “intensely personal relationship” with them. The approach to 
relationships on the Managing Committee perceivably extends to other members of GHU’s 
community including faculty and those in society, as Dr. Kiaan shares below.  
They [Prem] family are really working very hard to get attached to each and every one  
[all GHU personnel]...One of the good strengths of the [Prem] family. Strength of the  
      [Prem] family is a networking... They have very good relations with good people...He  
[Dr. Prem] has very good relations...Right from the prime minister of India, president of  
India, chief minister of [our region], the local leaders. They [members of the family] have  
very good relations. I know the [Prem] family is a very humble family...Even I, a very  
small, one professor in one small department, but [Dr. Prem] knows me personally. 
 
Thus, Dr. Prem’s cultivates a feeling of belongingness in top management staff, faculty, and 
members of society. It is reasonable to assume that the same extends to non-leadership staff.  
Relationships Built on Trust and Respect 
According to the family firm literature (Cennamo et al., 2012; Cruz et al., 2010), the 
emotions or feelings of trust and respect reciprocated by firm members also indicate relational 
capital. Some interviews suggest that members of GHU’s community trust and respect each 
other. Trust and respect are important components of the relationships at GHU. Consider the 
following quotes from Dr. Aabha (Pro-chancellor) and Dr. Prisha (Dean) interviews.   
Dr. Aabha: So today when I sit here in probably the exhibited governance structure as a  
CEO, I won't visit an institution unless I'm invited there, for months, because I have trust  
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and faith that the director of that institution will be doing her or his best...Like she's [Dr.  
Prisha] a very highly accomplished lady, the director of [one of the faculties]. She would  
probably get a position of maybe a higher salary anywhere. But just for the trust that she  
has in us [the family], and the trust that we have in her is what keeps her here in [Grand  
Hall], or probably the things we did for her and her little child when she came into 
[Grand Hall]. So all those emotional things also matter. 
 
Dr. Prisha: He's [Dr. Prem] a teacher. He thinks all of us are teachers, so he respects us 
and he allows everyone to grow around him. He doesn't suppress your growth, you never 
feel you are subordinated, that's the feeling you get. He's highly liberal...he has never 
graduated from the US, but he can think like Harvard. I think that internal expansion and 
openness to delegation. Openness and delegation, which you delegate and you don't 
distrust. You delegate and you trust. 
  
These quotes suggest that the family trusts and respects the faculty. Both Dr. Prem and Dr. 
Aabha seemingly trust the faculty when delegating responsibilities. These quotes also suggest 
that trust is bidirectional at GHU. In the first quote, this is clearly stated. Dr. Aabha says that Dr. 
Prisha places her trust in the family. We may corroborate this with the second quote. While there 
is no explicit mention of Dr. Prisha trusting the family, we may infer that she does so based on 
what she shares. She talks very highly of Dr. Prem. We may interpret her accolade as stemming 
from how she feels about him.  
Fair Treatment 
The fair treatment of employees is another indicator of ‘binding social ties.’ Fair 
treatment may mean different things to different people, but in this study I define fair treatment 
as leadership behaviors that safeguard employee rights. In other words, fair treatment is 
understood to exist when the leadership follows institutionally-espoused rules in hiring, 
promoting, and evaluating staff. Within higher education, we may say that merit-based hiring or 
merit-based promotion is an example of fair treatment.  
Some data suggest that employees at GHU are treated unfairly. These data come from 
anonymous online reviews by current and former GHU faculty and staff found on one of the 
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largest jobs recruiting and review sites worldwide called glassdoor.com. Glassdoor is used by 
millions of recruiters and job seekers globally, and according to the company’s ‘Terms of Use,’ 
verifies employee status when users post content.  
According to some reviews found on glassdoor.com, GHU’s performance appraisal 
system is “highly classified,” “selective,” and “biased.” These reviews are few relative to a larger 
proportion of positive reviews I found on the same site. Thus, they may represent a subjective 
reality not shared with most of the reviewers who praise GHU’s management, work culture, and 
review system. Most say that there are opportunities for growth and that the work environment is 
“motivating” and “professional.” The following are six select reviews from both former and 
current GHU personnel.  
Former employee (anonymous): Good Crowd to work and connect.  
 
Current employee (visiting faculty): Cooperative colleagues, good work environment. 
 
Current employee (assistant professor): Good Work Culture, Good environment. 
 
Current employee (associate professor): Good work atmosphere, reasonable teaching  
load. 
 
Current employee (visiting lecturer): Good management and motivating colleagues. 
 
Former employee (assistant professor): Professional environment, rigorous feedback and 
review system, regular on-time salary, opportunity for development programs, quality 
students and education. (Glassdoor.com) 
 
We may understand these reviews, and for that matter most of the reviews on GHU found on 
glassdoor.com, as suggesting that management at GHU treats employees fairly. It makes little 
sense to praise the work environment, the management of GHU, and the evaluation system if the 
unfair treatment of employees is a pervasive issue at GHU. 
The positive reviews are corroborated by interview and document data. Consider the 
following quotes from written information provided by Dr. Prem.  
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The same principle [principle rooted in ethics] applies to the recruitment of faculty and  
staff. [Grand Hall] directors are chosen on merit alone... (written information by Dr.  
Prem) 
 
Because right from day one we decided to run these institutions on purely ethical  
practices, total transparency. Appointments based purely on merit. No consideration of  
caste, creed, religion or region. (written information by Dr. Prem) 
 
According to Dr. Prem, fair treatment exists at GHU in the form of merit-based hiring. The 
blanket application of merit-related criteria in the hiring process may be understood as favoring 
no single group. The merit-based approach to hiring is corroborated by other interview 
participants. Below are quotes from Dr. Prisha (Dean) and Dr. Keya (Director of an institute). 
Dr. Prisha: With [Dr. Prem] any decision was a fraction of a second. [Dr. Prem] never  
went by his likes and dislikes. He went by facts and keen observation. He went by merit  
and quick clear decision making, taking bull by the horn. That's why I said guru is born  
only once. You can't create nor be a successor. 
 
Dr Keya: So, I think this is a great university that's really going to manage the  
professional part of it. Hire people on merit, give them a greater amount of autonomy. 
 
According to interview data, fair treatment at GHU also manifests in the form of the 
family following reporting protocol. Consider the following quotes from Dr. Kiaan (Professor) 
and Dr. Keya (Director of an institute).  
Dr. Kiaan: In a protocol. Even, I have a part of ... I experienced when [Dr. Aarav], he's a 
family member. His son and daughter, they are also part of some of the portfolios in the 
university. They never bypass anybody...Because we are focused to learning, and we are 
doing a good job, transparency is there. Nobody is here doing some wrong things, or 
some violation of the rules. I don't find anybody like this. 
 
Dr. Keya: Yes, because, for example, if you see the two people of the family that I work 
more closely with, [Dr. Aabha’s daughter] hasn't come in on a high position. She actually 
came in as an officer first, and then became a head. And, she's very conscious of the fact 
that she's here to learn. She's never played the family card with me...I screamed at her 
when she's made a mistake, just [as] I screamed at anybody else, and in fact, when she 
first came in, that was her first thing that she [Dr. Aabha] told me, that don't look at her 
as my daughter. She just happens to be my daughter. Just treat her like anybody else, and 




Both interviews suggest that the family respects established lines of authority. As Dr. Kiaan 
observes, the family does not bypass anyone. Similarly, Dr. Keya shares that both Dr. Aabha and 
Dr. Aabha’s daughter made/make an effort to abide by the reporting norms of GHU. Dr. Keya 
shares that the “family card” is never used.  
Finally, we may say that the fair treatment of personnel at GHU is indicated by 
standardized salaries. Salary levels are perceivably not different between family and nonfamily 
members at the same positional level. The following quote is from Dr. Aabha: 
For example, so if both my children are working at these levels as I told you...So for 
example, my daughter would get the same salary as someone of her level. My son would 
get the same salary as someone of his level.  
 
In sum, interview and document data presented above reveal that fair treatment is 
indicated in several ways at GHU, even though some negative reviews were found. The 
leadership respects official lines of authority/reporting, enforces standardizes remuneration levels 
that extend to family salaries, and appoints faculty and staff on the basis of merit.  
Emotional Attachments 
 As I shared in earlier chapters, this socioemotional wealth dimension may be family-
centric or altruistic depending on the types of emotions family members have for each other. 
Positive emotions are understood to benefit nonfamily members and firm activities while 
negative emotions are understood to disrupt firm activities.    
 For this study, I am only interested in the ascertaining whether the negative emotional 
attachments among Prem family members, if any are found, make kin relations dysfunctional 
and have a disruptive effect on governance patterns. While I was able to discern from an 
interview the presence of negative emotional attachments, there is no indication that the Prem 
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family is dysfunctional or disruptive to university activities and processes. These findings are 
supported by a connection made among two codes: ‘negative emotions’ and ‘no spillover.’ 
Negative Emotional Attachments 
According to family firm literature, negative emotional attachments may manifest as 
emotional states: frustration, anger, or disappointment. Further, negative emotional states can 
lead to persistent family-based conflict and may render kin relations dysfunctional. There was 
only one family-based interview during which I was able to discern a negative emotional state 
from the family participant. Consider the following quote from Dr. Prem’s interview. He shares 
the following in response to a question about family disagreements. 
So many, so many times...nature is sometime when they [Dr. Prem’s daughters] feel that  
we should not start institute…I ask them why?  Then we start arguing. My approach is  
either you convince me or I convince you. So then there is a dialogue, turns into debate,  
turns into hot, but ultimately at least so far they listen to me. They feel that, and I have  
worked for almost all important bodies of [the public university where I worked]…I was  
member Board of Management. Member of board of Academic Council. Three times I  
was the chairman of Board of Studies in [my field]. For 25 years I was working in  
university bodies public university. I was professor. [Dr. Aabha] has never taught a single  
class…But at the end of it, they listen, follow what I say. 
 
I cannot help but to infer from this quote that Dr. Prem feels a bit frustrated toward his daughters 
about the arguments he has with them. I can discern what seems to be frustration when Dr. Prem 
compares his professional experience to those of his daughters. He lists all of the positions he 
worked in and states that his professional career spans 25 years. In contrast, he says that Dr. 
Aabha “has never taught a single class.” In this comparison, Dr. Prem seems to imply that he is 
more qualified and in a better position to make organizational decisions based on his diverse and 
long professional history. Therefore, we may infer that the reason for Dr. Prem’s (perceived) 
frustration stems from having his views challenged by family members that cannot make as 
informed decisions as Dr. Prem.  
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 Does this mean that the Prem family is dysfunctional? Seemingly not. Relationships 
among family members are positively perceived by both family and nonfamily members alike. 
Family members speak highly of other family members and seem to respect each other. Further, 
disagreements among family members, which can be an indicator of dysfunctionality, are 
explained by several interview participants to occur as part of healthy and constructive 
discussions where the exchange of ideas lead to better organizational decisions and outcomes. 
For example, Dr. Vihaan (head of an administrative office) shares: 
 So conflicts, obviously a very heavy duty word, I would say disagreements are  
 definitely there, different perspectives all always there. And I firmly believe it should be  
 there. Otherwise, you know, the decision-making will look very boring. You need  
 different ideas to come on board even they are not on the same page. And disagreements  
 between us, family members are always there and I believe they are always going to be  
 there... 
 
 Another question to ask is whether the disagreements that occur between family members 
persist over long periods of time. Interviews suggest that they do not. Several interview 
participants including Dr. Prem (Chancellor), Dr. Vihaan (head of an administrative office), and 
Dr. Kalinda (senior administrator) all explain that disagreements among family members do not 
last a long time, but are quickly resolved.  
Spillover of Emotional Attachments into Business Affairs 
 According to the family firm literature, persistent family-based conflict and dysfunctional 
relations (resulting from negative emotional attachments) are understood to have a detrimental 
effect on the affairs of the business and on decision-making (Baron, 2008; Berrone et al., 2012). 
Family-based conflicts are understood to spill over into the affairs of the business. This is 
because family members will do everything possible to maintain emotional dissonance even 
when reconciliation is the only course to ensure the proper functioning of the organization. For 
example, family members may not attend board meetings because they hold a grudge against 
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other family members. This may mean that the board does not have a quorum to pass votes and 
make decisions in a timely manner. In other words, family members have a tendency to be more 
concerned about satisfying the affective need to win an argument or maintain “face” than about 
satisfying firm goals.  
 As discussed in the previous section, there is no indication that the Prem family is 
dysfunctional nor engaged in persistent family-based conflict. Therefore, there is no reason to 
believe that university affairs are detrimentally affected by something that may not even exist. 
Indeed, the interviews bear this out. Below, both family and nonfamily interview participants 
respond to a question about whether the family system, especially disagreements among family 
members, spills over into university affairs.  
 Dr. Aditi: If there are any minor differences between them...I mean, I'm sure at some  
 point of time, when they're talking to each other, they may have a difference of opinion,  
 but certainly not something that affects the functioning of the university.  
 
 Dr. Prem: ...most of these skirmishes. They are superficial...No no no, it [disagreements]  
      happens within the four walls, difference of opinions in this room. [Dr. Aabha] and I will  
      be there. Nobody else.  
 
      Dr. Prisha: I’ve never seen that.  
 
      Dr. Aarav: No, family issues don't come in the process of decision-making for the  
 institute. 
 
Renewal (Family-Based Succession) 
Transgenerational succession corresponds to the last socioemotional wealth dimension 
and not only the final but also the most important characteristic defining the family firm. It refers 
to the mechanism by which the family remains managerially involved in firm affairs, in 
perpetuity.   
Interviews suggest that Grand Hall University is no different from other family-based 
firms where succession is important and practiced. Succession is important and practiced at 
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GHU, a finding based on data categorized into several codes: ‘mentorship,’ ‘process of renewal,’ 
and ‘importance of renewal.’ 
Importance of Family-Based Succession 
Both family and nonfamily interview participants share that family-based succession is 
important at GHU. I first highlight quotes from family interviews. Below Dr. Aabha (Pro-
chancellor) responds to a question about the importance of family-based succession. 
Dr. Aabha: I think if you want to maintain the vision of the creator, then obviously  
because finally the vision is also driven by a certain personality and a characteristic of a  
person and an individual, right?...The kind of drive that I would have to carry forward my  
father’s vision and probably my children would have to carry forward the same vision of  
their grandfather, I don't know how many generations this will last, but I certainly see  
value in carrying this forward through generations. 
 
Dr. Aabha: And we're very clear that the [Grand Hall] Society or the Board of Trustees 
should remain with the family, whereas the Vice-chancellor should not be preferably a 
family member...So I think it's the Board of Trustees which holds the university, upholds 
the values and the vision is the one that should remain with the family. And we should 
pay professional people to manage the university. 
 
According to Dr. Aabha, family-based succession is important to ensure continuity of the vision  
and values of the university. This is echoed by Dr. Aarav (Dean) who explains that family-based 
succession is important because the family “understand[s] the long-term vision.” He further 
explains that it is important for him and successive generation family members to nurture the 
vision “sown” by the founder. Dr. Prem (Chancellor) offers a slightly different perspective on the 
importance of renewal. He feels that family-based succession is important because the family can 
keep the culture together and continue to take care of the community of GHU. He says the 
following:  
I tell you the benefits are tremendous. You see, those opposed to family system of  
university. They come from western civilization, especially from America. After 18  
years, boys or girls out of family. They don’t care for elderly people. No family  
attachment...But that is there culture. Whether good or bad, that is there culture. But in  
Asian culture…family is the unit...there is family attachment…So the concept of family  
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is there for thousands and thousands years in India and Asia...and there is tremendous  
attachment, emotion…[Grand Hall] is like family to me…[Dr. Aabha], [her son], [her  
grandson], [Grand Hall] has become big family. Everyone has become family member.  
We participate in their difficulty. Our university takes care of his family…so this family  
has tremendous advantages.  
 
 For Dr. Prem, renewal preserves the emotional attachments made among all of the 
members of GHU including both family and nonfamily. This touches upon an important point. 
Renewal may be understood as the family’s way of holding on to other SEW, such as emotional 
attachments, as Dr. Prem suggests, as well as family influence.  
 Nonfamily interview participants also corroborate the importance of family-based 
succession at GHU, mostly for the same reasons put forward by family members. Consider the 
following quotes from Dr. Kalinda (senior administrator) and Dr. Aditi (Vice-chancellor). 
 Dr. Kalinda: Otherwise...when the director changes, each director wants to bring in  
 something different. Rightly or wrongly. But then [are they] aligned with the philosophy  
 of the university? We don't always know. For example, I'll give you, very quickly...Our  
 Media and Communication Institute with each Director had a different agenda. When we  
 had the first director from Journalism and Mass Media, he had given a completely...The  
 focus was on journalism. The next director was from [the field of management]. For him,  
 it was communication management. That became the focus and journalism took a  
 backseat. With another director coming something else will become the focus, which is  
 each person's vision. You can't force them. That's their vision for the Institute...So, for  
 this organization, if you had people coming from outside, then the vision of the founder  
 may get lost somewhere...So it is easy to perpetuate that vision if it is from the family. 
 
 Dr. Aditi: I would think one of the big benefits is that the tradition that has been set, is  
 something that...Building on the tradition is very, very important. One can lose track of  
 that tradition, of what we stand for. If leaderships changes to hands which is not within  
 the family, the tradition with which it was built, the ethos on which it was based, could  
 get lost...It could become more commercial for instance, because then your parameters  
 shift. You then measure yourself by how much money the university makes. 
 
Both Dr. Kalinda and Dr. Aditi echo Dr. Aabha and Dr. Aarav (whose interviews were discussed 
earlier) and explain that family-based succession is important because the family is able to 
“perpetuate” the family vision and continue upholding the “ethos’ of the organization.  
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Mentorship of Successor 
Interviews, from both family and nonfamily participants, suggest that Dr. Prem 
(Chancellor) is grooming Dr. Aabha (Pro-chancellor), his oldest daughter, and other family 
members to assume leadership positions. I first highlight quotes from family interviews. The first 
quote is from Dr. Prem’s interview.  
Of course…I have passed on the task to [Dr. Aabha]...So I come here and watch what  
they [Dr. Aabha and other family members] are doing. Give full freedom. Watch what  
they are doing. And give them advice, the benefit of my wisdom [and] give them some  
solution if they ask... 
 
Dr. Prem explains that he has passed on the “task” to Dr. Aabha who is currently the Pro-
chancellor and the Principal Director of the Trust. We may understand “task” to mean the 
authority to run GHU. Thus, passing on the task becomes synonymous with family-based 
succession. The two are talking about the same thing. Dr. Prem also shares that he comes to 
GHU and gives advice to the family. This dynamic where Dr. Prem offers advice to family 
members gives the impression that the family is being mentored by Dr. Prem. Dr. Prem seems to 
be preparing the family for leadership positions. This is corroborated by Dr. Aabha herself. She 
explains:  
So he's the president and I'm the chief executive you can call as a principal director. But  
he still is into the governance. He does come to office every day, he's not into day-to-day  
operations as much as I am, but still he's there. I always feel that I'm blessed that he's  
there, because he's there for guidance, for mentorship, for our expansion plans which he's  
very much interested in. 
 
In this quote, the dynamic between Dr. Prem and his daughter is clarified. Dr. Prem is perceived 
as a mentor by Dr. Aabha. She is thus in a position to learn from Dr. Prem, presumably about 
matters related to running the organization.  
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There is further reason to believe that Dr. Prem is grooming the family from the 
interviews I had with nonfamily members. Consider the following quotes from Dr. Keya 
(Director of an institute), Dr. Aditi (Vice-chancellor) and Dr. Prisha (Dean).  
Dr. Keya: Well, I presume there is [a grooming process]. I don't know officially what is  
the thing, but I presume there is. I presume that [Dr. Aabha] is slowly taking over more  
and more responsibility from [Dr. Prem]... 
 
Dr. Aditi: Over time, I'm sure, I do not know whether it was by design, but [Dr. Aabha]  
did get into the picture...She decided to join her father. And I could see him grooming  
her, interacting with her, keeping her in the loop. She began sitting in on the meetings,  
she would observe. So he mentored her, I'm sure he spent a lot of time talking to her. She  
observed him. She observed the rest of us, the dynamics of the university. And I think it's  
been a very smooth transition now...  
 
Dr. Prisha: In the beginning it was [Dr. Prem], at that time [Dr. Aabha] was serving as,  
we could say apprentice, first two years of my engagement here. But slowly she took  
over and she was sharing the fort with him...Today its [GHU] face is [Dr. Aabha],  
Principal Director. And of course, she's still mentored and guided and sometimes  
regulated by the Chancellor, the founder. He's president...I don't see that in university, but  
in parent body, I see that strong family succession model possibly coming in the next  
generation.  
 
These quotes suggest that family-based succession is happening. Both Dr. Aditi and Dr. Prisha 
share that Dr. Prem mentors his daughter while she assumes more and more responsibilities 
within GHU. Dr. Prisha even qualifies Dr. Aabha as an apprentice in the early stages of her 
engagement with GHU. According to one definition, an apprentice is someone who works for an 
expert to learn a particular skill (Cambridge online, n.d.). We may infer that the skill that Dr. 
Aabha is learning is related to effectively managing a university. We also learn from Dr. Prisha 
that the learning is happening at the level of the Trust and not in the university. This suggests 
that family-based succession at GHU is facilitated at the very top level of the organizational 
hierarchy. I corroborate this with an understanding related by Dr. Aabha. She says the following 
in response to question about succession.  
One is integrity and ethics, because that is what will stand all through. And the ability to  
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carry forward the vision of the creator. Because the moment you divert that vision to 
something else, then you never know whether the same brand and the same legacy or the 
same standing in society of the university will remain. So today [Grand Hall] is known 
for certain values, known for certain things. That should continue, not just continue but it 
should be strengthened...So I think it's the board of trustees which holds the university, 
upholds the values and the vision is the one that should remain with the family. And we 
should pay professional people to manage the university. 
 
In this quote, Dr. Aabha relates two important points. First, we learn about the 
importance of the Trust, that its members uphold the values and vision of the university. They 
ensure that university operations do not deviate from upholding the core values of the university. 
Second, we learn that it is not the Trust that keeps the university accountable, but the family who 
controls the Trust. In other words, Dr. Aabha’s implication is that family-based succession at the 
level of the Trust is the best way to keep the university accountable to its mission. It is important 
for the family to maintain control over the Trust. We may thus infer that family-based succession 
at GHU happens at the very top level of the organization, within the Trust. This does not mean 
that family members begin their formal engagement at GHU at the Trust level. Their formal 
engagement begins much earlier, as indicated by the interviews highlighted in the following 
section.  
Process of Family-Based Succession at GHU 
Family members at GHU begin their formal engagement at lower levels of the 
organizational hierarchy before moving up to fill leadership positions. The following quote from 
Dr. Aabha (Pro-chancellor) describes how she came to fill her current position. 
My professional engagement began when I came back in 1998. So being a medical doctor 
I started something called the [Grand Hall] Center for Healthcare...That's how my kind of 
formal association with [Grand Hall] began...While that was going on, at the same point 
in time, my father had applied for [Grand Hall] to become a university to the government 
of India. That's when I started traveling with him to New Delhi and getting a glimpse of 
what the whole higher education governance was all about, and that's how slowly I 
started moving from healthcare and providing healthcare to our students and staff to 
higher education and helping my father. So this was a transition between 1998 to about 
178 
 
2000. And from 2000 I slowly started moving towards working with him in the main 
governance, but even then I wasn't what I am today, I wasn't a Pro-chancellor or 
anything...So then I became a Deputy Director, he was a Principal Director. Then it was 
many years and I became the Joint Director. In about five years, then he said that now 
you should be an executive chair and I should just be the president. So he's the president 
and I'm the chief executive you can call as a principal director...So I had to climb three 
positions, because my father still believes and rightly so, even I do believe that people 
should not just be put in their positions by way of them being related to him, or being 
from the family, but they need to work at the grass-root level to understand the system, to 
see whether they're really interested, to see whether they are capable of, and then really 
make them climb up in positions of governance.  
 
We may assume that what Dr. Aabha is describing is related to the process of succession. If not 
the whole process, she seems to be talking about the staging of her eventual succession as 
GHU’s Chancellor. Certainly, the logic with which she moves up the organizational ladder and 
fills the positions her father left, as he too moves up in the organizational hierarchy, gives us 
some idea that she will eventually fill the chancellorship position. Filling the chancellorship 
position seems to be the next logical step in the progression. We also learn from the above quote 
that both Dr. Prem and Dr. Aabha believe that there is a “right way” to succession. Next 
generation family members must begin at the “grass-root” level as Dr. Aabha puts it, and climb 
up gradually as they figure out for themselves whether they are a good fit for leadership.  
The succession process that Dr. Aabha describes above is corroborated by Dr. Vihaan 
(head of an administrative office). The following is what he shares about how family members 
enter GHU and move up in rank.  
So my, my mother [Dr. Aabha], she was Director of [Grand Hall] healthcare, then she  
climbed up the rank when she became the Deputy Director, then the Principal Director,  
now she a Pro-chancellor. As similar to my father, he was the director, now dean...So I  
mean obviously everyone will comes up from scratch. 
 
Dr. Vihaan corroborates that Dr. Aabha (Pro-chancellor) climbed three organizational levels to 
fill her current position. It is also likely that she did not become a member of the Managing 
Committee until she filled higher positions. I infer this because Dr. Vihaan (her son) who is in a 
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lower position at GHU is not part of the Managing Committee yet. We also learn that Dr. Aarav 
filled his current position in the same fashion that describes Dr. Aabha’s journey at GHU. He, 
too, began at a lower position before eventually becoming a dean (and a member of the 
Managing Committee).  
We may also assume that members of the third generation are also following the same 
process describing Dr. Aabha’s and Dr. Aarav’s ascent to leadership positions. When asking Dr. 
Vihaan (third generation family member) about his succession process, he responds with the 
following. 
I know that I have to grow my mettle first. Same for my sister. Yes there is  
expectation...Yes, I would like to believe that even nonfamily personnel expect me to be  
part of core leadership...I mean from my peers and my friends, obviously they are  
continuously, you're harping on the fact that when will I go on that level. There's still  
time. Always, every day is the new learning process. You cannot just automatically go  
from kindergarten to 12th. You have to climb up the ladder. 
 
We learn from the above quote that there is an expectation placed on the third generation to grow 
their “mettle” before presumably ascending to higher positions. Climbing up the ladders, as Dr. 
Vihaan puts it, is an expectation held by not only his friends, but also by university personnel. 
The way in which nonfamily interview participants talk about the third generation also shows 
that there is at least an understanding that the third generation is expected to fill leadership 
positions. The following is what Dr. Aditi (Vice-chancellor) says about the organizational 
involvement of third generation members at GHU.  
Now the next successor? They're [Dr. Aarava and his sister] very young yet. They're very  
young. They're involved in some way, but not very deeply at this point of time...But yes,  
I would think a strong commitment. A strong commitment to the values that [Grand Hall]  




In sum, we may say with some confidence that family-based succession is not only 
happening at GHU, but also that it is important to the family. Keeping the institution, or rather 
control over the Managing Committee, within the family is a key goal.  
Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the major family-based traits of Grand Hall University. GHU is 
seemingly like any other family-owned businesses in terms of having socioemotional wealth 
created from the family’s managerial involvement. The Prem family has a strong ownership 
position at GHU, through the leadership positions they occupy. The Prem family shares an 
identity with the university. The Prem family seems to cultivate relational capital. The Prem 
family may have negative emotional attachments. The Prem family values family-based 
succession. These SEW were all found at GHU. However, GHU may be differentiated from the 
typical family-owned business in one major way. We did not find any indication of dysfunctional 
familial relations and persistent family-based conflict at GHU, and concluded based on data that 
negative emotional attachments (which presumably exist at GHU) do not disrupt organizational 
processes and decision-making.  
Now that I have in this chapter and the previous chapter indicated that both higher 
education and family-based characteristics may be present at Grand Hall University, I can ask in 
the following chapter the more involved question of if and how these characteristics interact. As 
explained in the literature review, it is expected that the family system (constituting the family-
based characteristics) and the higher education system (constituting the higher education 
characteristics) are not completely in congruence. In other words, I expect that the pursuit of 
some SEW (i.e., family-centric SEW) may be challenged in an environment that places greater 
primacy on satisfying other goals than those related to the family.  
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The two preceding chapters characterized Grand Hall University as a hybrid organization 
having dual characteristics. On the one hand, GHU resembles what society has come to 
understand as the prototypical (traditional) higher education institution. Like nonfamily 
institutions around the world, GHU is large and complex, and a site with stakeholder diversity 
and interests plurality. Shared governance is also promoted at GHU. On the other hand, GHU 
was also discussed as a family-managed enterprise possessing most of the trappings of family-
owned organizations.  
In this chapter, I pause to reflect on the interaction of these characteristics, and confirm 
whether the interaction is conflictive as I hypothesized in the literature review. Families in 
ownership positions may find it difficult to concentrate or protect family-centric socioemotional 
(SEW) wealth in an organizational context where family-centric SEW only benefits the family 
system and not the higher education system. For example, family influence, which espouses 
authority to be concentrated in the family, may be resisted by nonfamily stakeholder (such as 
faculty) who want to share authority with the family. In this way, the family may be expected to 
act in socially accepted ways, which are beneficial to the higher education system and not only 
the family system. This chapter aims to clarify the factors resisting family-centric SEW. The 
research question addressed in this chapter is as follows: What are the factors placing limits on 
the family’s agency? 
I believe answering this question is crucially important to answering the primary research 
question of how the family navigates decision-making. Once we understand the limitations of the 
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family’s position to make decisions, we are then in a position to investigate how the family 
reacts (how the family approaches decision-making) within a reality where limitations restrict 
their decision-making power, which the family firm literature assumes is absolute (Gomez-Mejia 
et al., 2007).  
This chapter will focus on investigating the interaction between the governance realities 
of higher education identified in chapter 6 and only the family-centric SEW of family influence 
and renewal. We already showed that negative interactions between the governance realities of 
higher education and negative emotional attachment were marginal in the case of GHU, and so 
do not have to be taken into account. However, the reason for focusing on family influence and 
renewal, as opposed to what I referred to as altruistic socioemotional wealth (i.e., identity and 
binding social ties), is because family-centric socioemotional wealth are understood to be not 
only self-serving and beneficial to only the family system, but also understood to have a negative 
interaction with the higher education governance culture.  
Factors Resisting Family Influence 
As explained in the previous chapter, the Prem family has a strong ownership position at 
GHU through the leadership positions they fill (including those on governing authorities). It was 
also shown that based on filling leadership positions, the Prem family has broad organizational 
responsibilities and are highly involved in university affairs.  
However, this does not mean that Dr. Prem and Dr. Aabha, and the other family 
members, constitute an all-powerful stakeholder group with absolute authority to make decision 
unilaterally. There is reason to believe that the family’s decision-making influence has 
limitations. The family’s capacity to influence organizational affairs and decision-making may 
depend on what they can and cannot do within what is allowed by the realities of the higher 
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education governance culture. These realities are identified and discussed in chapter 6 as four 
higher education organizational characteristics: organizational complexity, stakeholder diversity, 
stringent government rules and regulations, and shared governance. I first investigate if and how 
the organizational complexity of GHU challenges family influence or agency. 
Organizational Complexity as a Factor Restricting Family Agency 
We learned that in higher education different administrative and academic units that 
operate according to unique rules, customs, and pressures undermine the dominant university 
culture or the efforts of the leadership to create uniformity. This phenomenon has been referred 
to as “loose-coupling,” meaning that organizations operate less as a rational whole and more as 
an assemblage of loosely-coupled subcultures (Cohen et al., 1972; Weick, 1976; Rowan, 1977). 
Ultimately, loose-coupling is understood to preclude institutional coherence (Deal & Celotti, 
1980). Loose-coupling frustrates and undermines authority and the decisions made by the 
leadership (Dean & Celotti, 1980). Weick (1976) sums all this up by explaining that centralizing 
authority is an incredible challenge in education.  
Quotes from several interviews suggest that the reality of loose-coupling at GHU 
frustrates efforts by leadership to establish institutional coherence. In this study, the 
implementation of university-wide policy by leadership or efforts by leadership to take the 
university in a unified direction is understood as a way the leadership tries to establish 
institutional coherence. The following is what Dr. Aabha (Pro-chancellor) and Dr. Kiaan 
(Professor) share in response to a question about the difficulty of implementing institutional 
policy or taking the university in certain directions. 
Dr. Aabha: That does happen [different institutes challenging policy]...The school of  
Liberal arts, the school of liberal arts has a totally different pedagogy, they have very  
small class size, they teach differently, and their evaluation system is totally different  
from what a conventional business school [looks like]. They want continuous evaluation  
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and so on. So that's when the liberal arts director will come to the Vice-chancellor and  
explain... 
 
Dr. Kiaan: Very difficult...Because see, the top leader seat is a limited one. Maybe more  
up management, maybe with the madam [Pro-chancellor], Provost, Chancellor, or Vice-
chancellor, they are limited people. And they help to coordinate with all, there are 45, 47 
institutes...Everybody's discipline is different. Everybody's accreditation bodies are 
different. They might be finding the difficulty. 
 
Both Dr. Aabha and Dr. Kiaan suggest that implementing institutional policy is frustrated by 
organizational differences among institutes. In Dr. Aabha’s quote, she makes this point by 
drawing attention to the evaluation system of the liberal arts school, and how it is different from 
the business school. My understanding is that the policy in question, while presumably enforced 
without problems at the business school, is problematic when enforced at the liberal arts school 
because of the different evaluation system employed there. Further, Dr. Aabha suggests that it is 
because of this difference that the liberal arts director approaches the Vice-chancellor to 
presumably raise an issue regarding the policy in question. The key point is that the Vice-
chancellor is frustrated in her effort to establish institutional coherence by organizational 
differences.  
We may further infer that the family is also frustrated in their effort to establish 
institutional coherence. I infer this because the Vice-chancellor generally runs important matters 
past the family before making decisions or engaging the formal decision-making process. This 
was shared by Dr. Kalinda (senior administrator) in her interview, and also corroborated by the 
Vice-chancellor herself. I also infer this because of what Dr. Kiaan says in the second quote. He 
understands the leadership as including the family and the Vice-chancellor, who together 
implement policy. Thus, we may understand that resistance directed at the Vice-chancellor is by 
extension resistance also directed at the family. The Vice-chancellor and the family together 
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have difficulty implementing policy because of organizational differences among the institutes of 
GHU.  
The following quote is from another interview that similarly suggests the leadership’s 
difficulty when implementing policy. Dr. Prisha (Dean) explains: 
For example, when healthcare was made mandatory, within which slowly they brought 
up the concept of wellness, I have challenged them [family and likely the Vice-
chancellor], in the sense that there was a common fee levied across all institutes. The 
institutes which had a small playground, and the institute which had huge playground 
facility. I said, 'why should my student pay for some other students’ comfort?' 
 
Dr. Prisha explains that she challenged the leadership on their position on levying the same 
healthcare fee for all institutes. Indeed, this too is an example where organizational differences 
frustrate institutional coherence or uniformity. A couple of other interview participants agree that 
the leadership is challenged when implementing institutional policy. They, however, highlight 
the fragmented, loosely-coupled character of the faculty body as impeding efforts to establish 
institutional coherence.   
Dr. Aarav: Today, predominantly they [faculty] are focused, a little siloed. The challenge  
of the university top management...is to get them to talk to each other. Building platforms  
of connection...It's a challenge [implementing policy], if not difficult, but the top  
leadership at the university is trying to get them all together on a common platform... 
 
Dr. Aditi: They [faculty] do function often as silos...It is tough [implementing  
institutional policy]. It is tough. See there will always be people who think the way I do,  
that there must be interdisciplinary work. But there will always be some faculty who  
believe that my faculty, pure, is what I need to concentrate on...Yeah, we can only push  
them, we can only show them the path. Finally, whether a faculty is interested in, even in  
teaching. When I'm teaching a particular subject, I could bring in many other dimensions  
into it. But if I choose not to, even if someone tells me to do so, if I choose not to do so,  
nothing anybody can do about it. 
 
Both Dr. Aarav (Dean) and Dr. Aditi (Vice-chancellor) share that faculty are siloed and 
focused within their academic domains. According to the higher education literature (Hill, 1996), 
this means that faculty are a fragmented group where members care little about the activities and 
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research of other members. Also, Dr. Aditi suggests that faculty, as people siloed within their 
own academic disciplines, tend to do what they want to do. This may mean that faculty at GHU 
are accustomed to doing things according to the norms of the academic cultures in which they 
work. With this understanding, it certainly makes sense why the leadership may find 
implementing institutional policy difficult.  According to one definition, a policy is a set of ideas 
or a plan that dictate the actions of people (Cambridge online, n.d.). In other words, policies 
dictate behaviors. For certain faculty, who have become accustomed to doing things a certain 
way, they may find mandates or even requests to change their behaviors unwelcome. Indeed, Dr. 
Aditi implies this in the quote above.  
Not all interview participants agreed that the leadership of GHU has a difficult time 
implementing policy and establishing institutional coherence. For example, Dr. Vihaan (head of 
an administrative office) in the context of describing GHU as a diverse organization with units 
having distinct cultures says that policy directions coming from the top are not resisted by GHU 
faculty and staff. He explains: 
No, I don't think it's [implementing university-wide policy] is difficult. In fact, it is  
relatively easier. I'm not saying totally easy, it is relatively easier because all the people  
I've known and they're taught to be on the same page as university goal and mission. 
 
At first glance, this quote seems to contradict the other interviews highlighted thus far. Dr. 
Vihaan claims that implementing institutional policy is not as difficult as we were led to believe. 
However, a consideration of Dr. Vihaan’s position, as someone overseeing several nonacademic 
areas of GHU, lends to some understanding as to why Dr. Vihaan’s response diverges from those 
of Dr. Kiaan, Dr. Aditi, Dr. Aarav, and Dr. Aabha. Dr. Vihaan is the head of an administrative 
office, and also oversees other services at GHU. These roles are more related to campus 
operations and the provision of support services than university affairs found within institutes 
187 
 
and/or related to program development, teaching, or even evaluation as in the example provided 
earlier. Thus, Dr. Vihaan may not possess full knowledge on the challenges associated with 
implementing institutional policy affecting academic matters and/or affairs within institutes. He 
may be saying that implementing policy is relatively easy from a position of limited knowledge. 
In contrast, the aforementioned four interview participants are all involved in academic decision-
making and may know more about the affairs within institutes. Even Dr. Aabha is part of the 
academic decision-making process because of her membership to the Board of Management 
(BoM). Thus, the four interview participants may be privy to or have direct experience dealing 
with the challenges of implementing policy affecting specific affairs found within institutes. 
Also, it is unclear what Dr. Vihaan means when he says “taught to be on the same page.” 
Teaching people to be on the same page may mean that a certain amount of convincing does take 
place, in which case we may assume that the leadership faces challenges initially when 
implementing policy. In other words, the leadership may find the need to convince non-
leadership personnel of the need and benefit of implementing certain policies because faculty 
and staff resist these policies. 
Stakeholder diversity, Competing Interests, and Missional Ambiguity as a Factor 
Restricting Family Agency 
 
Stakeholder diversity, competing interests, and missional ambiguity represent another 
reality of higher education governance that may restrict family agency. In chapter 6, we learned 
that Grand Hall University has stakeholder diversity. Five stakeholder groups were identified: 
the government and accreditation bodies, Managing Committee, faculty, administration, and 
students. We also learned that these stakeholder groups come to have different views and 
interests that become grounds for discussion and even organizational dissent.  
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 It is within this reality, where stakeholders come to express diverse opinions, that the 
family may find decision-making a contentious process. Family members may find the 
nonfamily stakeholders themselves as factors resisting their influence. In other words, the family 
members in both top leadership positions (e.g., Dr. Aabha) and in faculty positions (i.e., Dr. 
Aarav) may find that they are no exception to being part of a decision-making culture where their 
views conflict with those of others and are even resisted. Interviews indeed bear this out. 
Consider the following quote from Dr. Keya (Director of an institute).  
 So, I've never held back from voicing my opinion, and I'm not by nature a rude person,  
 but I've seen some people in your face with dissent...I mean, in terms of agitated, in your  
 face opinion, you know, get carried away sometimes. I've always felt that while that's a  
 sign that people aren't afraid just because it's family…I mean I think we've created a  
 system with...Somebody needs to play devil's advocate. Somebody needs to throw a  
 hammer in your logic. Because I think that brainstorming that then happens, and it is...  
 Nobody falls in line and says, "Oh, yeah. Great, great, great." Everyone looks at the  
 conversation as a conversation that's going to be meaningful only if they're able to look at  
 it from multiple perspectives. 
 
Dr. Keya shares that the nonfamily members of the university are not afraid to express their 
dissent to family members. Family members, thus, may not be able to make decisions 
unilaterally, but with sensitivity to the needs of other stakeholders. This dynamic, where family 
members are confronted by nonfamily stakeholders who have diverging views and opinions, 
describes a reality captured by the higher education literature. According to several scholars 
(Newman et al., 1996; Flexner, 1968; Tierney, 1998), higher education is a marketplace of ideas. 
Different stakeholders come to express diverse opinions and exchange information. Further, 
these stakeholders are understood to politicize the higher education environment as they express 
their views and resist the views of others.  
The capacity of one group to resist the views of other groups may be understood as 
ultimately an activity using power to achieve a purpose. Indeed, this is how Bolman and Deal 
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(2017) describe power. They argue that groups within an organization, groups with diverging 
interests and needs, require power to accomplish their aims. In other words, people cannot push 
their agendas and resist the agendas of others without having power. Cartwright and Zander 
(1968) similarly define power as Bolman and Deal. To them, power refers to the ability to affect 
the outcomes of others. Understanding power in these ways is central to understanding the 
politized environment of higher education, as well as understanding how no single group within 
an organization with multiple groups can come to have absolute authority to make decisions 
unilaterally. Thus, I expect power to be distributed among the stakeholder groups of GHU. 
 Data collected from interviews bear this expectation out. As part of several interviews, I 
asked study participants to rank GHU stakeholder groups according to the decision-making 
power they perceivably have relative to each other. The six stakeholder groups ranked in this 
exercise are the government, accreditation bodies, students, faculty, administration, and the 
Managing Committee. In the ranking scheme used, decision-making power was mapped on scale 
from ‘1’ to ‘6’ with a ranking of ‘1’ denoting the greatest concentration of power. The results of 
this exercise are shown in Figures 1.8 and 1.9 below.  
 These figures illustrate two reasons why power is not fixed to one group. First, decision-
making power levels of all stakeholder groups changed by decision type. The two figures below 
illustrate this shift. Figure 1.8 shows decision-making power levels perceived by interview 
participants for those decisions related to academics. Figure 1.9 shows the same, but for 
administrative decisions. As shown, there is a shift of the decision-making power levels of 
stakeholder groups when moving from Figure 1.8 to Figure 1.9. For academic decisions, 
interview participants consider the faculty stakeholder group to possess significant decision-
making power relative to other groups. However, the faculty move down along the decision-
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making power scale (from lower numbers to higher numbers) for administrative decisions. Their 
decision-making power becomes marginal relative to other groups such as the board and the 
administration. Similarly, but to a lesser extent, the same directional shift may be observed 
regarding the decision-making power associated with students. For academic decisions, Dr. Aditi 
and Dr. Aabha rank students as having considerable leverage in decision-making. However, their 
power is diminished relative to other groups for decisions concerning nonacademic matters. 
These shifts suggest that decision-making power is not fixed to one group, but distributed and 
also circulating among groups depending on the decision type. Within this reality, the family 
(who are most represented on the board) may find their academic decision-making power 
diminished by other groups.  
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Figure 1.9 Perceived Decision-Making Power for Administrative Decisions 
 
Source: Author 
 The decision-making power levels of stakeholder groups may also be shown using 
‘relative power circles’, which may be useful to further clarify that no single stakeholder group 
within GHU possesses absolute decision-making power. Kells (1992) used them to represent the 
balance of power distributed among three different stakeholder groups—the government, the 
board, and faculty—in the US, UK, and continental Europe. In this study, we use them to 
represent the distribution of decision-making power among the six stakeholder groups identified 
earlier.  
 The size of the relative power circle for any single stakeholder group is based on 
calculating the average of ranking positions given to this group by interview participants.  As an 
example, I calculate the relative power circle (related to academic decisions) for the faculty 
stakeholder group. For academic decisions, two interview participants perceived faculty to have 
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taken from Figure 1.8 shown earlier. Calculating the average or mean of these numbers, I can 
determine faculty to have a relative power circle level of 1.3, which I visually show in Figure 
2.0. As shown, the decision-making power of faculty is visually represented by the blue circle. 
Lower numbers are associated with larger relative power circles and vice versa.   
Figure 2.0 Decision-Making Power of Faculty (mean=1.3) 
 
Source: Author 
 Using the same approach above, I can calculate the relative power circles for all of the 
stakeholder groups at GHU. Table 1.8 below shows these calculations in the far-right column, 
which are based on taking the average (mean) of all of the ranking positions given by interview 












Table 1.8 Calculation of Relative Power Circles for GHU Stakeholder Groups 
Stakeholder Group Ranking Position 
Given by Dr. 
Keya 
Ranking Position 
Given by Dr. 
Aditi 
Ranking Position 





of the three 
columns to 
the left) 
Faculty 1 1 2 1.3 
Board 3 6 4 4.3 
Administration 2 5 3 3.3 
Students  4 2 1 2.3 
Government  5 3 5 4.3 
Accreditation bodies 5 4 6 5 
Source: Author 
Thus, for academic decisions, the faculty have a relative power circle level (or mean level) of 
1.3; the board (Managing Committee) has a relative power circle level of 4.3; the administration 
has a relative power circle level of 3.3; students as a stakeholder group has a relative power 
circle level of 2.3; the government has a relative power circle level of 4.3; and finally 
Accreditation bodies have a relative power circle level of 5. These levels are mapped visually in 
Figure 2.1 below. As shown, the faculty body, with a mean of 1.3, is perceived by interview 
participants as having the most power to influence academic decisions as their relative power 
circle is larger than those of other groups. Their power level is 1.3. However, the board and the 
administration are perceived to have less power to influence academic decisions. Their power 





Figure 2.1 Distribution of Power Among Stakeholders Regarding Academic Decisions 
Source: Author 
 We may also calculate the relative power circle levels of stakeholder groups for 
administrative decisions. These levels are mapped visually in Figure 2.2 below. It is important to 
point out that, as we established earlier, the distribution of decision-making power shifts when 
moving from academic to administrative decisions. This shift represents that power is not fixed 
to one group, but circulates based on type of decision. This shift is denoted in Figure 2.2 using 
arrows that show power bases of stakeholder groups either shrinking or expanding. While faculty 
and student power to influence decisions shrinks, the power of the board, administration, and the 
government increases.   





 It is important to discuss one key limitation of the power level representations shown 



























power levels. For academic decisions, power levels were determined using data from three 
interview participants. For nonacademic decisions, a smaller group of two interview participants 
was used. Using such small groups raises concerns about the representativeness of the sample. 
We may assume that the findings (the size of the relative power circles) would change as we use 
larger samples. However, it was not feasible to use data from the other interview participants. 
This is because the other interview participants (total five) ranked stakeholders without 
considering decision type. Thus, it was unclear whether they were referring to academic or 
administrative decision-making when they were ranking stakeholders. This was a limitation of 
my approach as I did not instruct interview participants to rank stakeholder groups according to 
decision type. For interview participants who ranked stakeholder groups according to decision 
type, they did on their own volition. Interviews with these participants revealed that there are two 
decision-making chains at GHU. In hindsight, I should have asked all interview participants to 
rank stakeholder groups according to decision type.  
 However, the other data collected (rankings that are not based on decision-type) is not 
completely useless. When mapping these data using Kells’ (1992) model, we arrive at the same 
conclusion—that power is not fixed to one group, but distributed among the six stakeholder 
groups at GHU. Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of decision-making power among stakeholder 
groups based on general rankings (ranking that are not based on decision-type).  As shown, it is 











 In sum, we may infer from the representations of power provided in this section that the 
family’s capacity to influence decision-making is limited in a reality where nonfamily 
stakeholder groups—in the administration, faculty, students, government, and accreditation 
bodies—also possess decision-making power. We also may say that nonfamily stakeholder 
groups use their power to challenge the views of the family, presumably as I explained earlier to 
push their agendas. This reality makes it difficult for the family to make decisions unilaterally.  
Government and Society as a Factor Restricting Family Agency 
Accountability pressures coming from the government and society represent the third 
dimension of higher education governance that may place limits on family agency. We learned in 
earlier chapters that Grand Hall University is no exception to operating according to the 
regulatory expectations and pressures of India’s higher education system. Some of the 
expectations and pressures relate to prescriptions that shape the patterns of governance at GHU. 
For example, the UGC requires that deemed universities have governing authorities (e.g., Board 
of Management and Academic Council) on which members can participate in decision-making 
by casting votes. Other expectations and pressures relate to criteria used to appoint governing 
authority members, as shown in an excerpt taken from the UGC regulations 2019.   















any of the authorities of the Institution Deemed to be University:  
          a) if he/she is of unsound mind  
b) if he/she is an un-discharged insolvent  
          c) if he/she has been convicted by a court of law for an offence involving moral  
                turpitude.     
d) if he/she has not been appointed as per the provisions of these Regulations. 
(University Grants Commission, 2019b, p.32) 
 
Such government pressures may be understood as controls ensuring good governance, which is 
crucial for effective organizational functioning as explained by Austin and Jones (2015). They 
state that good governance is “essential to the functioning of higher education at all levels, from 
the basic academic unit of the department, to the level of the organization, and at the level of the 
higher education system (p.23). Good governance is the means by which order is created in the 
academy to achieve the goals of educating, research, and providing service to multiple publics 
(Austin & Jones, p.23).  
Within this reality, where regulatory pressures are enforced to ensure good governance, 
the Prem family may find their capacity to do as they please restricted. As decision-makers, 
members of the family in leadership positions are held accountable to fair governance practices 
and expected to behave in ways that satisfy government expectations and pressures. This 
inference is supported by the following two quotes from Dr. Prem. 
Dr. Prem: Family universities are not that autocratic, because when we decide to start  
[Grand Hall University], I have to register that as a Trust, under Bombay Public Trust  
Act. And there is Charity commissioner...I had to follow the rules and regulations of  
charity commissioner. [Grand Hall] is charitable Trust and governed by [the] act. Annual  
report sent to commission every year. Audit statements every year. If somebody  
complains, Charity Commission [has a] right to make inquiry. This is one. Secondly, we  
have to file income tax every year, and if we don’t function properly, they will conduct  
an inquiry against you. University Grants Commission, they have regulation. So family  
universities are not autocratic universities. The word private is wrong. Family university  
must follow [the] acts and statutes and regulations of [the] University Grants  
Commission, Ministry of Human Resource Development, charity commissioner, [and]  
income tax commissioner. If somebody falls [violates regulations], then government has  




Dr. Prem: Yes yes, it has happened [appropriation of a university by the government].  
They [government] can dismiss me and appoint their own administrator. So family  
university when people criticize...no we can’t do anything and everything we want. For  
example, so all trustees cannot pocket money. They will be arrested. You take salary  
from university but because university is making profit you can’t put in pocket. So there  
are checks and counterchecks… 
 
These quotes suggest that government scrutiny extends to the people within and running the 
organization. Dr. Prem says, “I had to follow the rules and regulations of charity commissioner.”  
The use of “I” here is a point to discuss and suggests that the university is an extension of 
himself. This is consistent with the understanding related in chapter 7 about how the family 
shares an identity with the organizations they run. Actions of the family reflect back on the 
organization and vice versa. What Dr. Prem is saying is that he and others running the 
organization must be careful not to violate the rules and regulations under which the university 
operates. As he explains, leaders are not in a position to “do anything and everything [they] 
want.” Such an abuse of power could possibly surface through as noted by Dr. Prem the various 
annual reports sent to the various bodies regulating the institution. The consequences of abusing 
power, external inquiries and even government appropriation of the Trust, may be understood as 
powerful motivators for the family to follow rules. Indeed, losing the Trust would be devastating 
to the family since we learned in chapter 7 that keeping the Trust within the family is an 
important goal.  
 Accountability pressures also come from society. Consider the following quote from 
written information provided by Dr. Prem. Here, Dr. Prem describes a situation where he and his 
family were met with public backlash because of a decision he made that violated the public’s 
trust.  
 A couple of Founder Members demanded positions in [Grand Hall] institutes, which had  
 to be complied with, but with disastrous results. Both of them found themselves quite out  
 of their depth and on the complaints launched by parents and students...As events turned  
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 out, there was a major upheaval resulting in the resignation of the first President of  
 [Grand Hall] society. A number of founder members resigned from the membership of  
 the Managing Committee...My family and I were subjected to fierce attacks... (written  
 information by Dr. Prem) 
 
To give some context, Dr. Prem was forced by two Managing Committee members to accept 
some students not on the basis of merit, but on the basis of their affiliation to the Managing 
Committee members. In other words, the Managing Committee members demanded that Dr. 
Prem intervene in admissions on behalf of some students that either were related to or family 
friends of the Managing Committee members. The quote above describes the fallout that resulted 
from complying to these demands. We learn that both parents and students launched complaints 
and even directed these complaints toward the Prem family. Ultimately, the GHU public 
community was not happy with a decision that Dr. Prem made. In the next chapter, we learn how 
Dr. Prem approaches decision-making within the reality of public accountability.  
Shared Governance as a Factor Restricting Family Agency 
Shared governance represents the final reality of higher education governance that may 
place limits on family agency. In chapter 6, we learned that shared governance is practiced at 
GHU through primarily three governance modalities. One way is through the separation of 
decision-making responsibilities between the Trust and the university where the faculty body is 
given significant autonomy to facilitate and influence academic decision-making. In other words, 
university authority is shared between the leadership and the faculty body. The faculty body has 
as Dr. Prem explained “total academic freedom,” or professional authority as Corson (1996) 
would put it. This was corroborated by nonfamily interview participants. On the other hand, 
nonacademic decisions are centralized by the Trust. 
Within this reality, where faculty have total academic freedom, the family and other top 
leadership members are expected to take a back seat and not intervene in decisions related to 
200 
 
academics. The limitation of family influence (for those in top leadership positions) is thus a 
function of the family not having the authority to make decisions deliberated in the academic 
decision-making chain. In other words, the bifurcation of decision-making responsibilities 
essentially limits the family’s capacity to influence certain types of decisions. In this reality, we 
may say that family influence is limited because the family shares decision-making authority 
with the faculty body.   
Furthermore, we may conjecture that GHU faculty are in a position to resist or challenge 
the leadership (the family) if the leadership were to intervene in academic decisions. Indeed, this 
would be consistent with literature. We learned from the literature that faculty are known to 
defend their right to fair representation in decision-making. Faculty are not afraid to express their 
disapproval of top-down approaches that marginalize academic agency and/or decision-making 
influence. Teferra (2014) even goes as far as to argue that for faculty conformity to authority is 
not mandatory. Faculty “should fear neither intimidation nor harassment, nor, even worse, firing, 
by their institutions for their non-conformist ideals, values, perspectives, positions, beliefs, and 
statements. The requisite prerogative—academic freedom—is not that compatible with the 
principles of business and corporate regimes” (Teferra, 2014, p.2). In other words, the academic 
culture may be distinguished from commercial contexts in that faculty have a right to resist 
leadership (of course when relevant).  
Interviews suggest that the faculty of GHU also resist leadership when they perceive the 
leadership to be encroaching upon their decision-making autonomy and agency. Consider the 
following quotes from Dr. Prem (Chancellor), Dr. Prisha (Dean), and Dr. Aditi (Vice-
chancellor).  
Dr. Prem: Yes. yes. You see sometimes what happens when you give total autonomy to  
the directors, after five years ten years, he feels he is taller than institution. So he started 
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      disobeying instructions from central office...you see we have 15 percent quartile sanction  
for management quartile…100 admissions which are sanctioned, but out of 100, 10 are  
all management chiefs…so I give those admissions to someone who is minister, who has 
helped [Grand Hall]. If I recommend that person…he [faculty] has to admit it...he 
[faculty member] says no I will not admit. 
 
Dr. Prisha: I was privy to the time when in 2006 the amalgamation of some institutions 
into the merger happened and I came in 2007. I still remember the resistance. I still 
remember the cry for autonomy and reluctance to give up their autonomy because they 
were used to autonomous standards and minimum university standard to be broad, etc. 
 
Dr. Aditi: So yes, the deans do question...They ask us if some of the restraints that we 
[both the leadership of GHU and top leadership in the Trust] are laying down, which are 
governed by, in turn, the government...whether that is essential for us to follow. So the 
academic community, led by the dean, would be the people who would ask questions, 
and I would believe that's their role 
 
In all three of these quotes, the leadership may be understood as either encroaching on the 
decision-making autonomy of the faculty or restricting the agency of faculty in some other way.  
Dr. Prem relates an experience where he intervened in the admission process presumably at one 
of GHU’s institutes. We learn that faculty resisted his directive. Faculty may have perceived Dr. 
Prem’s intervention in admissions as a violation of their decision-making autonomy. Indeed, 
admissions is a university process handled by the faculty. Dr. Prisha relates a similar experience. 
She remembers a time when faculty resisted leadership during a period of restructuring at GHU. 
They resisted because the restructuring had implications to their autonomy as decision-making 
agents. Dr. Prisha explains that the faculty were reluctant to “give up their autonomy.”  Dr. Aditi 
also seems to be talking about the same thing in her quote. She explains that the deans of GHU, 
who represent the faculty body, ask questions about the “restraints” placed on the faculty by the 
leadership. These restraints restrict academic agency and autonomy. These three examples 
exemplify how the family, as part of top leadership, would not be able to do as they please—




The family may be understood to be restricted in what they can or cannot do in another 
way. We learned in chapter 6 that different stakeholders of Grand Hall University share decision-
making power by having representation on GHU’s governing authorities. In this way, 
stakeholders, both family and nonfamily, come to make decisions horizontally, which Furguson 
(2009) refers to as a governance process in which decisions are reached through consensus and 
discussion.  
Within this reality, where decisions facilitated on governing authorities are reached 
through consensus and discussion between both family and nonfamily members, family members 
may find their capacity to make decisions unilaterally challenging. The following is a quote from 
Dr. Aarav’s (Dean) interview that supports this argument.  
They [different stakeholders including faculty and members of the administration] said  
that it's not required because every student and staff had their own faculty physician.  
“What are you going to do by providing these services on campus of educational  
institutes?” We, then, convinced them that it raises the fundamental issues of  
accessibility, availability and affordability, and equity. So three A’s and one E. By  
providing healthcare services, you are addressing these issues. That is one...Second thing  
is, when we wanted to set up a health club on campus, they [different stakeholders] said  
“we don't have infrastructure to run classes, where can we give you classroom area to run  
a health club?” Whether it's a gym, whether it's a yoga studio or an aerobic. We told them  
it's in the larger interest of wellness. When we wanted to start insurance, make it  
mandatory for the students and staff, they [different stakeholders] came up with saying  
that, we'll take care of our own health needs. “We cannot afford the insurance premium,  
right now. We'll take care of it, then we require”  
 
Dr. Aarav is a family member sitting on multiple governing authorities including the 
Board of Management, Academic Council, Board of University Development, and the Planning 
and Monitoring Board. In addition, Dr. Aarav is not only a member of the Managing Committee 
whose authority is above the university, but also a dean of a faculty and director of an institute. It 
is reasonable to say that his combined leadership positions afford him considerable leverage in 
the decision-making process. He is indeed a key decision-maker within the organization. 
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However, the leverage he possesses means very little in the context of how decisions are reached 
on governing authorities. Dr. Aarav is challenged by other stakeholders in the decision-making 
process as we learn from him above. Other stakeholders disagreed with his proposal of 
centralizing health services and are noted with saying “we’ll take care of our own health needs.” 
Ultimately, Dr. Aarav’s capacity to make and influence decisions on governing authorities is not 
absolute.   
Nonfamily participants as well share that the family is challenged on governing 
authorities. The following are quotes from Dr. Kalinda (senior administrator), Dr. Keya (Director 
of an institute), and Dr. Prisha (Dean).  
Dr. Kalinda: We don't use words like challenge…But... I have said it [resisted family]...it  
was a BuD meeting, it's a Board of University Development meeting, and what had  
happened was because analytics was becoming the in-thing, every institute wanted to  
start a program in analytics…I said, "I simply don't agree with this."…“Please don't allow  
every institute to start a program like this."…[Dr. Aabha] did not agree… 
 
Dr. Prisha: These of course go through that process of validation by the academic  
department, at one level, then they are thrashed out in the Academic Council. So in  
Academic Council, our role is to deliberate, to facilitate discussion, to create dissent if  
there is any area which is neglected. I remember by deliberations in last twelve years  
within the Academic Council have been extremely dissenting in some cases, which were  
very patiently and respectfully heard by the Chancellor when he used to head the  
meeting. Later on with [Dr. Aabha], the same convention has been continued...  
 
Dr: Keya. But, you have ten others who come from junior faculty, senior faculty, outside  
industry, representatives, et cetera. So, may not be the majority that you might have a  
situation, where you got, let's say fifteen people on the Academic Council, and seven  
beings say no, but the rest of them say yes, and it's going to go through. 
 
The first two quotes show that the family, as members of governing authorities, is ultimately part 
of a culture where stakeholder dissent is common. Family members do not have absolute 
decision-making power, but must participate in the formalities of decision-making as expected of 
them as members of governing authorities. This means that the family is not in a position to 
make decisions unilaterally, but within a space where multiple stakeholders provide input and 
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reach decisions by consensus. Dr. Keya, in the third quote, supports this claim. According to Dr. 
Keya, proposals are approved or rejected using majority rule. Each member of the Academic 
Council, representing different stakeholder groups (senior faculty, industry, government 
representatives), can cast one vote either in favor of or against any given proposal. Thus, no 
member including family has more decision-making power on the academic council, and for that 
matter on all governing authorities, than other members. Equal weight with respect to decision-
making power is given to all members.  
Finally, family influence is restricted by the vertical decision-making process at GHU.  
We learned in chapter 6 that different stakeholders of Grand Hall University participate in 
academic decision-making as part of a process where proposals pass through various governing 
bodies beginning at lower levels of the organizational hierarchy. We further learned that the 
different governing authorities work together democratically to reach decisions and that 
governing authorities found at lower levels of the organization (such as the Board of Studies or 
Program Review Committee) are the real decision-makers.  
In this reality, where academic decision-making is not autocratic and top-down, but 
democratic and ground-up, the family may find their inputs to carry less weight to influence the 
decision-making process than those inputs coming from members of lower governing authorities. 
Further, we may say that the family when providing their inputs on governing authorities must 
provide them with sensitivity to the needs and demands of the members of other governing 
authorities—since the governing authorities work together democratically. Data from one 
interview suggests that this is happening. Consider the following response by Dr. Kiaan 
(Professor) who was asked a question about the decision-making dynamic between the Academic 
Council and Board of Management.  
205 
 
I don't think such a situation [where the BoM has flat out rejected a proposal coming  
from the Academic Council] has happened. With me it has not happened. Whatever we  
[members of the Academic Council] have [proposed], it is agreeable. Most of the time.  
Certain changes might be there...Total refusal will not be there. There might be  
modifications, there might be some flexibility. It's like this sometimes...I don't think  
there is any resistance or anything [from the Board of Management directed at the  
Academic Council].  
 
It may be that the Board of Management (BoM) does not flat our reject proposals coming from 
the Academic Council because of the reasoning I proposed earlier. Members of the BoM (which 
include family members) may recognize the need to work together with the members of the 
Academic Council instead of taking an autocratic approach where proposals are rejected without 
discussion. Thus, as the two bodies work together, there may be as Dr. Kiaan notes modifications 
and changes to the proposal.   
In sum, interview and document data suggest that the family operates in overlapping 
realities where their power or authority to make decisions must be considered with the decision-
making authority of not only the needs of loosely-coupled units where organizational differences 
frustrate efforts to establish institutional coherence, but also nonfamily stakeholders who possess 
decision-making power. My further understanding is that these stakeholders are able to flex their 
decision-making power by participating in decision-making on governing authorities and having 
decision-making autonomy.  
Factors Resisting Renewal 
Chapter 7 showed that renewal, or family-based succession, is the mechanism by which 
the family maintains control over Grand Hall Trust. Already first- and second-generation 
members are found in the Managing Committee and there is some indication that third-
generation members of the family will move up the organizational hierarchy and eventually 
become members of the Managing Committee. Family-based succession will likely occur and 
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continue to occur at the highest level, but through a ground-up approach where family members 
begin at lower levels in the organization.   
In this section, we explore whether the governance realities identified in chapter 6 also 
have implications to the socioemotional wealth dimension of renewal. Is family-based succession 
frustrated in any way by the governance realities of higher education? I first investigate if and 
how the organizational complexity of GHU challenges the family’s desire to remain 
managerially involved.  
Organizational Complexity as a Factor Challenging Family-Based Succession 
In the above section, a conflicting interaction was discerned between the reality of loose-
coupling at GHU and the centrality of leadership. I inferred based on some interviews that 
loosely-coupled units operating according to their own cultures frustrate efforts by leadership 
among which are family members to establish institutional coherence.  
The data, however, does not suggest the same for the socioemotional dimension of 
renewal. No interaction could be found between the reality of organizational complexity and the 
family’s desire to keep GHU within the family. In other words, family-based succession at GHU 
is perceivably not impeded in any way by the reality of loosely-coupled institutes or the 
fragmented faculty body.   
The absence of data is not surprising. The two dimensions—organizational complexity 
and renewal—fundamentally have nothing to do with each other. Organizational complexity, as 
indicated earlier, is a governance reality of Grand Hall University. GHU is a site where institutes 
and personnel operate according to different and localized norms. This reality, however, in 
principle should have no connection to how authority is established at GHU. As we learned in 
chapter 7, family-based succession happens at the highest organizational level in the Managing 
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Committee. In other words, there is no overlap between the Trust and GHU with respect to how 
Managing Committee members are appointed.  
Said differently, the Trust (which houses the Managing Committee) and the university 
may be understood as two separate entities. The former centralizes administrative services and 
frames policies (in consultation with the university) and the latter concerns itself with matters of 
academic importance. Since family-based succession is found to occur within the Trust, the only 
way it would be impeded is if the General Body (which elects members to the Managing 
Committee) unanimously voted against family successors replacing incumbent family members. 
However, organizational complexity has nothing to do with the makeup or the proclivities of the 
General Body. So the family, with the support of the general body, can continue to appoint 
family members to the board without having to worry about the needs tied to the fragmented 
university culture.  
Stakeholder diversity, Competing Interests, and Missional Ambiguity as a Factor 
Challenging Family-Based Succession 
 
Generally, interview data suggest that at GHU there is no conflicting interaction between 
the reality of stakeholder diversity, competing interests, and missional ambiguity, and the 
family’s desire to keep the organization within the family. In fact, family-based succession is 
accepted as the norm by the nonfamily stakeholder groups found at GHU (represented by the 
nonfamily interview participants who come from the faculty and administration). For example, 
Dr. Aditi (Vice-chancellor) shares that everyone accepts the family-based succession model at 
GHU and that “there would be no other view on it.”  Her observation is echoed by all the 
interview participants at GHU.  
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Further data reveal why family-based succession is accepted. Dr. Aditi adds the following 
while sharing that everyone accepts family-based succession. 
And they are into this whole and soul. It's not one of the activities that they are doing, this  
is the main activity. Academics is the main activity that they are involved in. So for  
instance, there are politicians who run universities in India. So they are mainly  
politicians, and they're running universities. So obviously, those are different kinds of  
institutions. 
 
In Dr. Aditi’s view, family-based succession is not an issue because the Prem family is 
committed to furthering educational goals. She says that education is the “main activity” of the 
Prem family. According to Dr. Aditi, the same cannot be said of other managerial families in 
India that have political leanings.  
 Dr. Kalinda (senior administrator) and Dr. Keya (Director of an institute), also nonfamily 
stakeholders, echo Dr. Aditi and provide similar reasoning as to why they accept family-based 
succession.  
Dr. Kalinda: If the person their motif is sincere, qualified and committed to the cause it  
doesn't matter...So when [Dr. Aabha] took over at the helm of a phase, definitely her style  
of functioning and [Dr. Prem’s] style of functioning are very different. While she  
completely aligns with her father's philosophy, the way they work is different. She's more  
dynamic, she's more a PR person. He's [Dr. Prem] very quick at decision making, but at  
least we have not seen him go too much, connect work. He's not done all of that, which  
she does very well. So they're different, but we know that she believes in the philosophy  
and works. So, there was no problem about that. So I think that is important, being  
qualified, being competent and being committed...those things are important. And if you  
are, then I don't think there is a problem for anybody to take charge. 
 
Dr. Keya: I think India has many family-run higher education institutes. [This city] has  
quite a few themselves. I have friends in who work at some of these, and I think [Grand  
Hall] has managed to be a little different from them. Number one is everyone seems to  
agree that [Grand Hall] manages itself professionally...Here, everyone very well- 
qualified. Even if you look at [Dr. Aabha]. She has a degree in law, and MD, and she has  
a Ph.D. in internationalization and higher education...People are respecting you for your  
own achievements as well, and I think that academic urge is something that comes  
because he's [Dr. Prem] not a business man. He's a teacher. He's always valued education,  




In their view (and the views of other interview participants not shown here), family-based 
succession is not an issue because the Prem family is qualified for positions of authority. Dr. 
Kalinda shares that Dr. Prem and Dr. Aabha are qualified, committed, and competent. This is 
more or less echoed by Dr. Keya who says that family members are well qualified.  
However, Dr. Aabha was not always embraced by the GHU community. When her 
official engagement started with GHU, there was some resistance from nonfamily stakeholders, 
as she and Dr. Prisha (Dean) explain below.  
Dr. Aabha: So initially I did feel, I didn't feel the pressure but I just felt that whether they  
are looking at my position being someone's daughter sitting here...I did meet all the  
challenges with people who were already there in place, who were older than me, who  
were in the organization for a longer time. But that's when it was a little difficult to take  
some instructions or my suggestions as what they would take my fathers.  
 
Dr. Prisha: I have known people who left this organization because they were brought by  
[Dr. Prem]. They were brought by [Dr. Prem] and they took pride that I'm brought by  
[Dr. Prem] because they always thought that he was a person with very high level of  
consciousness and later on [Dr. Aabha] came, much later and they didn't like working  
with her. 
 
We learn from Dr. Aabha that initially resistance came from older staff and those who worked at 
GHU for a long time. Many reasons may explain why these people gave her a hard time. For 
example, in India, like many countries in Asia, respecting elders is a significant aspect of the 
culture. Young people are taught to respect elders. Perhaps older GHU personnel perceived the 
arrangement, where they report to Dr. Aabha, counterintuitive to cultural expectations. Maybe 
they felt offended by having to report to someone who is younger. Their defiance could also be 
related to another cultural dimension. According to the World Economic Forum (2018), gender 
equality in India is poorer than the global average. In India, discriminatory attitudes in the 
workplace against women is quite common. Further, we know from anecdotal evidence from 
Altbach et al. (2020) that in some Asian countries, discrimination against women is 
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commonplace. Indeed, the higher education context of Bangledesh was described as such a place 
where “men in the family might tend to accumulate power leaving women relatives without 
influence” (Lamagna et al., 2020, p.70). Perhaps the Indian higher education context is no 
different. Perhaps some stakeholders at GHU took issue with the arrangement where a woman 
became their superior. Indeed, this is another possible reason explaining their defiance. The 
reason could also be related to noncultural dimensions. These nonfamily stakeholders may 
simply have had priorities, interests, and needs that did not align with those of Dr. Aabha when 
she first entered GHU. Or, perhaps they perceived Dr. Aabha as less competent than her father. 
Whatever the reason, Dr. Aabha’s involvement at GHU was resisted in the beginning and was 
undoubtably a cause of concern for her.  
Similar pressures (the potential for resistance by nonfamily stakeholders) exist currently 
for third generation members of the Prem family, presumably for some or all of the reasons 
explained earlier. Consider the following quote from Dr. Aabha: 
I don't know what will happen, I don't think they [nonfamily stakeholders] will resist, but  
yes, it won't be as easy, and therefore, I keep telling my son and daughter that you have to  
have, see now is a world of people respecting you for your scholarship and your intellect.  
They will not respect you because you come from family...I think the challenge of the  
third generation is going to be still harder, because to prove themselves, because there is  
no matter what, constant comparison between individuals. 
 
Dr. Aabha emphasizes that her son and daughter must not rely on their family status but prove 
themselves in other ways, by earning the respect of nonfamily stakeholders through their 
scholarship and intellect. What Dr. Aabha may be implying here is that it is only through 
building their competency and proving themselves as capable leaders that they can earn the 
respect of nonfamily stakeholders.  
Nonfamily interview participants seem to hold a similar view. Dr. Prisha (Dean) explains:  
I suggested that family members [third generation members] should go through a serious  
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leadership course in place like Harvard or something...I would rather accept or reject 
based on competencies. Let those competencies be grown in families inevitable. Let 
family be rejected if that competency is not grown. 
 
Dr. Prisha suggests that building the competency and qualifications of successors is crucially 
important if the third-generation family is to be accepted by the university community, by 
nonfamily stakeholders including herself. At the very least, her suggestion for younger family 
members to take leadership courses portends the possibility of conflict down the road. In other 
words, family-based succession may be resisted by nonfamily stakeholders, including herself, if 
successors do not possess the right qualifications. Within this reality, the family may find it 
challenging to make decisions favoring their continued involvement at GHU.  
Government and Society as a Factor Challenging Family-Based Succession 
According to one interview participant, Dr. Prisha (Dean), a conflict exists between what 
the government wants and what the family wants. In her interview, Dr. Prisha talked briefly 
about the government’s effort to disrupt family-based succession through policy. She explains: 
Dr. Prisha. Government of India [central government] made a rule that family should not  
lead as...Whereas one of the universities here in [this city] removed that by bringing an  
expert as the name sake, to sign papers and all as the head, you know the control is in the  
hand of the family, but legally in newspapers and in all official papers, some other expert  
was projected as the head. 
 
According to Dr. Prisha, the Indian government created a ruling prohibiting the management of 
universities by family. The reason for this ruling is unclear. It could be related to the 
government’s effort to curb corruption, which is rampant in India’s private sector as explained in 
chapter 4. Loose regulations have led to the proliferation of suspect institutions involved in 
profiteering and malpractice (Agarwal, 2009). The government may perceive family-based 
leadership, which is significant in India’s private higher education sector, as contributing to the 
rampant corruption found in India’s private sector. Or it could be related to something entirely 
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different. Whatever the reason, such a ruling is at odds with family-based succession. By 
prohibiting the family from leading institutions, the ruling effectively disrupts the family’s 
capacity to remain managerially involved. However, as we learned in chapter 7, family-based 
succession is being practiced at GHU. This begs the question of how the Prem family at GHU is 
dealing with this ruling. In the next chapter, I investigate how the family approaches decision-
making in the reality where the government is against families leading institutions.  
Shared Governance as a Factor Challenging Family-Based Succession 
Earlier I highlighted quotes from several interviews that suggest that shared governance 
may place limits on family influence or agency. While family agency in terms of the power the 
family has to make or influence decisions may be restricted by the reality of shared governance, 
there is no indication that shared governance at Grand Hall University is at variance with family-
based succession. Based on the data available, no direct connections could be made between the 
coding categories specific to shared governance and those specific to family-based succession. 
The reasoning for this may be similar to the reasoning I provided earlier when explaining how 
‘organizational complexity’ is unrelated to ‘renewal.’ Similarly, we may say that shared 
governance is a reality of the university, and not the Trust where succession takes place. Thus, 
the reality where different stakeholders come together to facilitate decisions has nothing to do 
with the mechanism of how authority is established. People at the university level presumably do 
not discuss the affairs of family-based succession via any of the shared governance modalities.    
 
In sum, the governance realities of GHU are generally not at variance with family-based 
succession. This being said, interviews suggest that conflict exists when considering certain 
factors. For example, conflict may be discerned between the reality of having stakeholder 
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diversity and family-based succession when family successors are perceived by nonfamily 
stakeholders as being ill-prepared for leadership positions. Also, we learned that there is a 
conflict between the government and the family’s desire to remain managerially involved. The 
government created a ruling aimed at effectively disrupting family-based succession.   
Conclusion 
This chapter addressed the third research question of this study: What are the factors 
placing limits on the family’s agency? Several factors have been identified based on interviews, 
which may be categorized as those resisting family influence and those resisting renewal. In the 
former category, four factors have been identified as resisting family influence. First, there are 
subcultures that frustrate leadership efforts to establish institutional coherence. Second, 
nonfamily stakeholders were found to have decision-making power. Third, there are stringent 
government regulations that carry dire consequences if violated. As well, there are public 
pressures in the form of public backlash and criticism regarding decisions made at GHU. Finally, 
we learned that shared governance provides opportunities for nonfamily stakeholders to 
influence the decision-making process, and even challenge the family on their views, within a 
context of discussion and collaboration. We also learned that the family in top leadership 
positions do not have authority to make academic decisions. Within these overlapping 
governance realities, the family may find that they cannot do as they please, and find their 
decision-making agency restricted.  
In the second category, only two factors have been identified as resisting family-based 
succession. These are nonfamily stakeholders who do not respect younger family members and 
perceive them to be ill-prepared for leadership, and a government ruling aimed at disrupting 
family-based succession. In the next chapter, we turn to investigate how the family approaches 
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decision-making within the governance realities of GHU and relative to the conflictive factors 
























The previous chapter identified several factors that limit family decision-making agency. 
We found that the Prem family’s capacity to influence or make decisions is dependent upon what 
the governance realities of higher education allow. For example, my understanding is that the 
family would not be able to make decision unilaterally on decision-making committees where 
decisions are reached through horizontal governance mechanisms.  
The understanding above is a significant step toward clarifying how the family members 
of Grand Hall University approach decision-making at their university. In this chapter, we take a 
further step and clarify the decision-making behaviors of the family as well as the intent behind 
their decision-making approaches by examining and discussing the data through the lenses of 
socioemotional wealth theory and stakeholder theory. Applying these two theories to the data is 
crucially important to satisfying the aim of this dissertation which is theory testing and 
answering the primary research question of how the managerial family of GHU approaches 
decision-making in a context where inherent governance realities may place limits on their 
ascribed authority.  
If the family is found to make decisions in reference to losing or gaining family-centric 
socioemotional wealth, then we may say that socioemotional wealth theory explains their 
decision-making behaviors. In other words, if the family is found to make decisions in reference 
to protecting or increasing their decision-making influence or the mechanism of family-based 
succession, their capacity to remain managerially involved, then socioemotional wealth theory is 
fitting. On the other hand, if the family is found to make decisions in reference to other criteria 
unrelated to satisfying the family’s affective needs, but related to satisfying the needs of 
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nonfamily stakeholders or organizational goals, then I may conclude that stakeholder theory is a 
better fit to explaining the decision-making behaviors of the family.  
Investigative Approach 
I explain here my approach to applying SEW theory and stakeholder theory to the data. In 
Chapter 8, I clarified several factors that may place limits on family decision-making agency. 
These factors may be understood as realities or circumstances that restrict what the family can or 
cannot do when approaching decision-making. These factors are listed in the middle two 
columns of Table 1.9 below and are categorized by SEW type, as in the previous chapter.  
In this chapter, I illuminate how the family approaches decision-making in scenarios 
where these factors are prominent and may have influence on the family’s decision-making 
agency. In other words, I aim to clarify how the family approaches decision-making relative to 
several scenarios where these factors come into play. Table 1.9 below provides an overview of 
this process. As shown, the far-right column, which represents the family’s decision-making 
approach, has been left intentionally blank. This column will be filled in once we clarify, by 
examining the data, how the family approaches decision-making relative the factors listed in the 
middle two columns. In other words, in the sections of this chapter, I will fill in the appropriate 
cells in the final column once I identify the family’s decision-making approach relative to each 
of the governance realities (first column of Table 1.9). After clarifying the family’s decision-
making approach for each of the scenarios presented (each row and with respect to family 
influence and renewal), I am then in a position to discuss the merits (or limitations) of SEW 
theory and stakeholder theory side by side relative to their fit to explaining the identified 




Table 1.9 Decision-Making by the Managerial Family of Grand Hall University  
 Source: Author 
The Family’s Approach to Decision-Making where Subcultures Preclude Institutional 
Coherence 
This section aims to clarify how the Prem family approaches decision-making within the 
governance reality where loosely-coupled subcultures preclude institutional coherence. I only 
Governance realities 
of GHU 




 Family influence  Renewal   
Organizational 
complexity: Diversity 
of units and loose-
coupling  
Subcultures that 
frustrate efforts to 
establish institutional 
coherence   
N/A      
 
Stakeholder diversity 
with different needs, 
priorities, and interests 
Nonfamily stakeholders 
having decision-making 
power and using their 
power to question, and 
even challenge family 
views, as well as push 
their own agendas  
Nonfamily stakeholders who 
do not respect younger 
family members expected to 
succeed familial incumbents    
 
Stringent government 





regulations that carry 
consequences in the 























facilitated via multiple 
governing authorities 
working together 
democratically and via 
a ground-up 
mechanism 
Expectations placed on 
the family by faculty to 
not interfere in decisions 










at lower levels who are 
the real decision-makers   





focus on examining the family’s decision-making approach with respect to the family’s capacity 
to influence decisions (family influence). This is because in chapter 8 data suggested that there is 
no conflictive interaction between the reality of organizational complexity and ‘renewal’ 
(family-based succession). An interaction was found to exist only between this governance 
reality and ‘family influence’.  
Family Influence   
Subcultures found in GHU’s numerous institutes were found to frustrate the family’s (and 
other top leadership’s) efforts to establish institutional coherence. Where implementing 
institutional policy is understood as a means to establish institutional coherence, I found that 
nonfamily stakeholders located at the institute level resist certain policies that perceivably do not 
fit with the needs of their institutes. According to several interviews, the leadership (including 
family) react to these stakeholders and approach decision-making in the reality of loosely-
coupled units in a couple of ways. In the quote below, Dr. Aabha (Pro-chancellor) provides 
insight into one of these ways.  
The school of liberal arts has a totally different pedagogy, they have very small class size,  
they teach differently, and their evaluation system is totally different from what a  
conventional business school [looks like]. They want continuous evaluation and so on. So  
that's when the liberal arts director will come to the Vice-chancellor and explain...and the  
Vice-chancellor would allow her to do that [modify the policy at the institute level or  
ignore it]. So there is this decentralized governance. 
 
A couple of points may be inferred from this quote. First, the Vice-chancellor is described to 
accept the liberal arts director’s request, presumably to either modify the policy or ignore it 
altogether. For the liberal arts director, the policy does not fit with the needs of her institute. We 
don’t know what has been agreed to, but the important point is that the Vice-chancellor is open 
to listen and meet the concerns of the faculty member. 
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While this interaction is between two nonfamily stakeholders, the faculty and 
administration, I clarify the family’s decision-making approach with some extrapolation. I 
deduce that family members in top leadership positions approach decision-making by respecting 
the decision-making autonomy given to nonfamily stakeholders (in this case the Vice-
chancellor). As Dr. Aabha explains in the quote, there is a decentralized approach to governance. 
This not only explains the autonomy that directors have at the institute level (as we learned in 
chapter 6), but also it may explain the governance dynamic between top leadership (family) and 
the administration of GHU. In other words, the family presumably does not intervene in such 
decisions and lets the necessary administrative authority handle such problems like those raised 
by the liberal arts director. Thus, the family’s decision-making approach regarding such matters 
like the one described in the scenario above is one of giving autonomy to those having decision-
making power.   
Dr. Prisha (Dean) provides insight into another way the family handles decision-making 
in the reality of loosely-coupled units. When asked about how the family reacts to stakeholder 
dissent, she responds with the following: 
For example, when healthcare was made mandatory, within which slowly they brought 
up the concept of wellness, I have challenged them [family], in the sense that there was a 
common fee levied across all institutes. The institutes which had a small playground, and 
the institute which had huge playground facility. I said, 'why should my student pay for 
some other students’ comfort?' They [family] immediately understood the concern. They 
created a small committee and I told them [family], I'll give you the data, you get your 
data. Let us analyze. So, data-driven objective analysis was done, and proportionate fee 
was charged...  
 
The key point we may infer from this quote is that the family takes a cooperative 
approach to decision-making. The family is willing to listen and take steps to figure out if Dr. 
Prisha’s concern is justified. The family even creates a small committee that presumably has 
broad stakeholder representation. In other words, the family opens up decision-making to others. 
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Thus, we may say that in this particular case and perhaps similar cases the family approaches 
decision-making through discussion and by opening up decision-making to other stakeholders 
through horizontal modalities.   
It is interesting to note that there is a difference between this scenario and the scenario 
highlighted earlier. Whereas in this scenario, faculty (represented by Dr. Prisha) is found to 
communicate directly with the family, the faculty in the earlier scenario (represented by the 
liberal arts director) communicates with the Vice-chancellor. Why the difference? The answer 
may be in our understanding of the two decision-making chains at GHU. The concern 
highlighted in the earlier example may be related to academic affairs. Thus, it makes sense that 
the liberal arts director would approach the Vice-chancellor who is part of the academic 
decision-making chain. The Vice-chancellor, although representing the administrative 
stakeholder group in this study, chairs several of the governing authorities involved in academic 
decision-making. She is even referred to as the senior-most faculty member by Dr. Prisha at one 
point during her interview. In contrast, the concern highlighted in the second scenario is not 
related to academics, but to institutional fees. Thus, it makes sense that Dr. Prisha would bring 
such a matter to the family (via the administrative decision-making chain) because the family, as 
members of the Trust, are charged with overseeing those services centralized by the Trust (which 
may include fees).  
In sum, the two scenarios highlighted suggest that the family approaches decision-making 
with sensitivity to the concerns of faculty— either by respecting the authority of decision-
making stakeholders (letting those involved in the academic decision-making chain to handle 
matters on their own) or by cooperation and discussion for those matters related to the 
administrative decision-making chain. With these findings, we may now fill in the appropriate 
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cell in the right column of Table 2.0 below, which is part of Table 1.9 shown earlier. The next 
step is to examine the decision-making behavior I just clarified through the lenses of 
socioemotional wealth theory and stakeholder theory.  
 
Table 2.0 The Family’s Decision-Making Approach (with respect to family influence and within 











Application of SEW Theory 
According to socioemotional wealth (SEW) theory, firm owners frame organizational 
problems and make decisions according to the impact the decisions have on their stock of 
socioemotional wealth. The theory assumes that the family desires the perseveration or 
augmentation of the socioemotional wealth they possess above any organizational interest 
including those related to profit. In fact, as Berrone et al. (2012) argue, the family is willing to 
put the firm at risk if this is the only way to preserve SEW.  
The first order of business is investigating whether the family’s decision-making 
approach, as revealed by Dr. Aabha and Dr. Prisha above, meets the assumptive logic of SEW 
theory. Is the family’s decision-making approach connected to preserving or augmenting their 
stock of SEW, and broadly satisfying a family-centric interest? The answer is both yes and no. 
SEW theory explains the family’s decision-making approach when considering some SEW, but 
not others.  
Governance 







Diversity of units 
and loose-coupling  
Subcultures that frustrate 
efforts to establish 
institutional coherence  
Decision-making by 
respecting the authority of 
other decision-makers, and 




The answer is no because it is clear that the family’s decision-making approach has 
nothing to do with protecting or augmenting the SEW dimension of family influence. In fact, 
respecting the decision-making autonomy of nonfamily decision-makers and reaching decisions 
through discussion and cooperation is more about sharing influence than about protecting or 
augmenting it. The family is effectively diminishing its capacity to monopolize the decision-
making process, and allowing the goals and interests of nonfamily stakeholders to drive decision-
making. In other words, decision-making is not being driven by a family-centric interest of 
protecting family influence, but by the interests and needs of nonfamily stakeholders. This 
certainly does not fit the assumptive logic of socioemotional wealth theory. Furthermore, sharing 
influence diverges from the normative decision-making patterns of families in ownership 
positions. As Gomez-Mejia et al. (2010) explain, families owning firms do everything in their 
power to avoid sharing influence. Sharing family influence is perceived by the family to threaten 
their positional authority and ascribed power. We may therefore argue that socioemotional 
wealth theory does not explain the decision-making approach the Prem family takes in the reality 
of organizational complexity. The Prem family is not motivated by a family-opportunistic 
interest of protecting or concentrating family influence but by an altruistic interest of meeting 
non-family stakeholder needs. 
However, the answer to the question—Is the family’s decision-making approach 
connected to preserving or augmenting their stock of SEW, and broadly satisfying a family-
centric interest?—may also be yes. There may be some reasoning to argue in favor of SEW 
theory, but according to the positive view of SEW. According to the positive view of SEW, 
managerial families in commercial settings proactively engage stakeholders and appeal to their 
interests and needs as a means to legitimize the family’s continued managerial involvement 
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(Brickson; 2005; Berrone et al., 2010; Lyman, 1991). Proponents of the positive view further 
argue that legitimizing the family’s position as leadership is very important because nonfamily 
stakeholder have the power to wrest control of the firm when their needs are unmet. They can 
also damage the firm’s reputation, through rumors or leaking internal affairs to the press. These 
outcomes, of course, are scenarios that managerial families want to avoid.  
Whether by design or not, it may be that the Prem family is also appealing to the needs of 
nonfamily stakeholders (in this case Dr. Prisha and the director of liberal arts) because of the 
aforementioned reasoning. The family may be appealing to the needs of nonfamily stakeholders 
to avoid unfavorable situations that carry negative implications to the university’s (and the 
family’s) reputation. Thus, we may argue that the family’s decision-making behaviors of 
respecting autonomy and reaching decisions through cooperation and discussion are connected to 
protecting or augmenting other SEW besides family influence, in this case renewal (family-based 
succession).  
In sum, the data suggest that the reality of organizational complexity calls for decision-
making behaviors driven by an altruistic motive and not a family-opportunistic motive of 
concentrating family influence. Socioemotional wealth theory does not explain family decision-
making behaviors in this case. However, there is reason to believe that socioemotional wealth 
theory still has a place in explaining the family’s decision-making approach from another 
perspective. It may be that the family is engaging stakeholders as a means to remain in power 
and protect the socioemotional wealth dimension of renewal.  
Application of Stakeholder Theory 
The central tenet of stakeholder theory rests on the premise that firm leadership values 
the legitimacy of different stakeholder groups in decision-making and not only integrates their 
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perspectives in decision-making, but also satisfies their expectations (Freeman, 1984). The 
question therefore becomes the following: Did GHU’s leadership value the perspectives and 
satisfy the expectations of others (nonfamily stakeholders) when making decisions within the 
reality of organizational complexity?  
The answer is affirmative. The family’s decision-making approach, as revealed by Dr. 
Aabha and Dr. Prisha earlier, is about heeding stakeholder concerns. Stakeholder concerns were 
mitigated indirectly via the Vice-chancellor in Dr. Aabha’s example (where the family respects 
the decision-making authority of the Vice-chancellor) and directly in Dr. Prisha’s example 
(where the family directly communicates with Dr. Prisha). Furthermore, the family was noted by 
Dr. Prisha to engage other stakeholders on a committee before making a decision. This is further 
indication that the decision-making approach taken by the family can be explained by 
stakeholder theory. According to stakeholder theorists (e.g., Brummer, 1991; Freeman, 1984; 
Freeman & McVea, 2001), employee participation in governance is necessary to achieve 
organizational goals (Brummer, 1991; Freeman, 1984; Freeman & McVea, 2001). In other 
words, stakeholder theory ties the sharing of governance to the objective of reaching 
organizational goals. Similarly, the higher education literature ties the sharing of governance to 
reaching organizational goals, specifically those related to advancing the academic mission 
(Birnbaum, 1988). Faculty input is considered crucially important to keep decision-making 
accountable to advancing the mission of higher education. Thus, when the Prem family opens 
decision-making up to nonfamily stakeholders by engaging a committee, the family may be 
understood as placing more value on advancing an organizational goal rather than satisfying a 
family-centric need. This certainly fits the theoretical premise of stakeholder theory.  
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Stakeholder theory makes sense for another reason. Freemen (1984) conceives the 
modern-day organization as a complex assemblage of myriad groups, sectors, and divisions that 
operate within their own microcosms of differentiated work, values, ethics and practices. 
Furthermore, governance and decision-making are understood by stakeholder theorists to be 
fragmented, decentralized, and compartmentalized across these cultural subsets. Freeman’s 
(1984) description of the modern-day organization may be applied to capture the organizational 
reality of Grand Hall University. Indeed, GHU is also a complex assemblage of units. It has over 
30 institutes operating according to localized norms and pressures. GHU also has a decentralized 
governance structure as Dr. Aabha (and other interview participants) points out.  
The Family’s Approach to Decision-Making where Nonfamily Stakeholders use their 
Power to Influence the Decision-Making Process 
 This section aims to clarify how the Prem family approaches decision-making within the 
governance reality where nonfamily stakeholders have decision-making power and use their 
power to influence the decision-making process. Since both family influence and renewal 
(family-based succession) were found to be resisted within this governance reality, I investigate 
the family’s decision-making approach with respect to both the family’s capacity to influence 
decisions (family influence) and preserve their capacity to remain managerially involved 
(renewal).  
Family Influence 
 In chapter 8, I inferred that the family may find decision-making a contentious process 
within a reality where nonfamily stakeholders have decision-making power and use their power 
to express opposing views to those of the family’s. Nonfamily stakeholders are not afraid to 
openly challenge the views of the family in top leadership positions. How then does the family 
approach decision-making in such a reality where decision-making power is not possessed by 
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one group, but shared among different stakeholders. The answer may be found in Dr. Kalinda’s 
(senior administrator) interview. Responding to a question about personal interests, Dr. Kalinda 
shares the following: 
 At least I also understand that for them [the family] it is important that the University is  
 ranked because a lot of benefits accrue to us because of that...So, honestly I have not  
 believed too much in rankings. I won't say I want to be in the top hundred, top 50. Why?  
 I know it's inevitable, we will have to ... Some will come to that space also because  
 people's perception is driven by rankings. 
 
Here, Dr. Kalinda seems to imply that the family has a focus on rankings. This is because as she 
reasons “benefits accrue” to the university because of its position in ranking tables. Of course, 
we are not in a position to argue that the family is singularly focused on rankings, but the quote 
suggests that being highly ranked is important to the family. Interestingly, Dr. Vihaan 
corroborates this in his interview. He explains: 
In terms of vision, obviously much like my family members...I would love to see this  
university lined up in the rankings in terms of being one of the best in Asia, if not one of 
the best in the world. We are doing that. We are ranked very highly in the QS World 
Rankings recently... 
 
Here, he explains that his vision, which is like his family’s, is about seeing GHU ranked as 
“being one of the best in Asia.”  
In contrast to the premium the family presumably places on rankings, Dr. Kalinda shares 
that she does not “[believe] too much in rankings.” We get the impression that she is of a 
different view. Dr. Kalinda further explains, as she continues the conversation in the quote 
shown earlier, that her focus is more on creating a robust academic culture. The following is a 
continuation of the conversation: 
We don't even have that today [a level of research output that Dr. Kalinda think GHU  
should have]. So if I say in the next three years, now we're at 0.75 we should be at 2.25  
whatever. Let us drive our quality standards. Internally. I feel it should all be internally  
driven. Okay, I know I also have to submit data to the government, to accrediting  




Here, Dr. Kalinda is proposing that the faculty produce more research papers per year as a way 
to enhance the academic culture. She wants the annual faculty research output to increase 
from .75 to 2.25. These numbers are calculated by dividing the total output of research papers by 
the size of the faculty at GHU. Thus, a number of .75 means that some faculty are not submitting 
any research papers for the year in question. Upon asking Dr. Kalinda if she ever brought her 
view up to the family, she responds with the following: 
Yes. They [family in top leadership positions] agreed. And they're actually setting up a 
Quality Assurance Department...So again, let me not say that it was only my idea, it's not  
as if I'm the only one who's ideating and they [family] agree. It's not like that. It's always  
a very healthy debate. And very often when they [family] say, "We have to get into the  
ranking," we would tell her, "Yes please, we have to get into the ranking, but don't forget  
we have to do this also." 
 
In this quote, we find an example of how the family approaches decision-making in the 
reality where nonfamily stakeholders express opposing views to the family. Dr. Kalinda, whose 
focus is less on rankings than on creating an academic culture, is found to bring her concerns to 
the family. These concerns are then discussed in a “healthy debate” that ultimately results in the 
family agreeing with Dr. Kalinda. The family’s decision-making approach here is consistent with 
the approach the family takes in the governance reality of organizational complexity. In both 
realities, the family’s takes a cooperative approach to decision-making where decisions are 
reached through discussion.  
Dr. Kalinda’s interaction with the family is not an isolated event. We learn from other 
interview participants that the family takes a cooperative approach to decision-making when 
dealing with stakeholder dissent. The family is described as listening to the faculty and accepting 
their ideas and proposals if backed by good research. Consider the following quotes from Dr. 
Keya (Director of an institute) and Dr. Prisha (Dean). 
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Dr. Keya: I'm seeing that there's a value for people's contribution. As long as you're not 
shooting your mouth off without any thought, there's enough of respect for differing 
opinions...There are so many times where they're [the family] happy to adopt and listen, 
to give fully opinions or to change their opinions. 
       
Dr. Prisha: We have a very flat team where everybody talks, everybody listens.  
Dissenters are patiently heard. Dissenting voice has been responded to, and if the dissent  
is backed up by good research, there will be absolutely full acceptance [by the family]  
without any kind of counter-analysis, or anything like that. I have been one of those  
trouble-makers, and tolerated. 
 
Dr. Keya and Dr. Prisha corroborate Dr. Kalinda. They explain that the family not only engages 
nonfamily stakeholders in discussion, but also conforms to their views. 
However, stakeholder resistance (stakeholders who express opposing ideas and views) 
does not always result in cooperative behaviors. The family is found to resist the decision-
making power of others and take a firm position on certain matters. Take, for example, the 
following quotes from Dr. Aabha (Pro-chancellor) and Dr. Kalinda (senior administrator). 
Dr. Aabha: Yeah. So if it's not in the interest of the vision of the university, then of  
course I do resist. Sometimes it happens in the meetings where someone might just come  
up with something that is really not in sync with the vision of the university...generally 
it's the directors will come up with something, and we say "Okay this is not the way we 
want to." 
 
      Dr. Kalinda: It's a Board of University Development meeting, and what had happened  
was because analytics was becoming the in-thing, every institute wanted to start a  
program in analytics...The human resource institute wanted to start analytics in human  
resource data. The telecom institute wanted to start the data analytics program. Every  
institute wanted to start a data analytics...I said, "I simply don't agree with this." I said,  
"This is crazy. What we need to do is we need to offer a data analytics program, a data  
science program with the first year being a data science common thing, and after that,  
allow a student to choose which area or specialization of data analytics he wants to get  
into. Somebody might say HR Analytics, somebody may say Health Analytics, somebody  
may say financial. Let them do that. Please don't allow every institute to start a program  
like this”...[Dr. Aabha] did not agree. She said, "No, it won't work because who will take  
ownership of the program?”...”I don't think we're going with this. I can't accept your  
decision now because we don't have a system which ...” And what I said is, “The  
common program can be offered by one institute."  She said, “I have a feeling that it  




In both scenarios, the family is highlighted as taking a strong and nonflexible orientation to 
making decisions. Dr. Aabha shares that there are times when ideas or proposals coming from 
the faculty are rejected. And Dr. Kalinda explains that Dr. Aabha rejected her proposal to 
centralize the offering of data analytics. At first consideration, the family’s decision-making 
approach revealed in these two scenarios may appear top-down and autocratic. The family seems 
to be getting what it wants. However, a closer examination of the second quote from Dr. 
Kalinda’s interview reveals that the decision-making approach is far from being autocratic. Dr. 
Kalinda, in her explanation of her interaction with Dr. Aabha, reveals that the family comes to 
disagree with her within a context of back-and-forth dialogue. There is discussion and the 
concerns of both parties are brought to the table. The family’s decision-making approach is thus 
not top-down, but one that values and integrates the opinions of other parties, even when ideas 
are rejected. This is confirmed by Dr. Kalinda as she continues her conversation in the quotes 
shown below.   
Dr. Kalinda: They respect our views. Not always are they able to accept it, but at least we 
have the...You have a platform and to that extent you have the autonomy to say what you 
want to say...So similarly, when we have differences, it may not be in an open forum, but  
we'll say, "Ma'am, I have said it a couple of times. I think this is unfair. We need to do  
something more for them." The best thing is they are willing to listen. That's a very, very 
good quality that they have both [Dr. Aabha] and [Dr. Prem].  
 
Dr. Kalinda: Even [Dr. Prem] is very receptive to ideas. He may not agree at the end of it.  
He says, “I listen to you, but I may have certain reasons why I don't think I can do it now,  
which is fair.” So, that way at least we have this [collegial atmosphere]. 
 
In review, several interview participants, both family and nonfamily, corroborate that the 
family approaches decision-making in the reality of stakeholder diversity and resistance by 
taking either (a) a cooperative approach to decision-making or (b) a strong position orientation to 
decision-making. The interview data further suggest that in both approaches the family reaches 
decisions through discussion. With these findings, we may now fill in the appropriate cell in the 
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right column of Table 2.1 below, which is part of Table 1.9 shown earlier. The next step is to 
examine the decision-making behaviors I just clarified through the lenses of socioemotional 
wealth theory and stakeholder theory. 
 
Table 2.1 The Family’s Decision-Making Approach (with respect to family influence and within 
the governance reality of stakeholder diversity) 
Source: Author 
 
Application of SEW Theory 
In applying socioemotional wealth theory, the question becomes whether the family’s 
decision-making approach—in this case by taking a cooperative stance or a firm stance—is 
connected to preserving or augmenting the family’s stock of SEW. First, we examine the 
cooperative approach through the lens of socioemotional wealth theory. The cooperative 
approach to decision-making is not connected to protecting or increasing the SEW dimension of 
family influence. This much is clear—because we already established in the previous section that 
SEW theory does not explain cooperative decision-making behaviors. The act of cooperating is 
interpreted to mean sharing influence and allowing the goals and interests of nonfamily 
stakeholders to drive decision-making. Indeed, this decision-making behavior departs from the 
normative decision-making patterns of dominant family coalitions as understood by 
socioemotional wealth theory.   
Governance realities 
of GHU 




with different needs, 
priorities, and interests 
Nonfamily stakeholders having decision-making 
power and using their power to question, and even 
challenge family views, as well as push their own 
agendas 
Decision-making 
by cooperation or 
remaining firm, 




However, I raise the question of whether I can extend the same reasoning to the strong 
position orientation the family takes to decision-making. Is the strong position approach 
connected to preserving or augmenting the socioemotional wealth dimension of family 
influence? The answer, while not immediately apparent, is again no. The key to answering this 
question is in clarifying the intent behind Dr. Aabha’s decision-making behavior. Her intent is 
altruistic and not opportunistic. The intent driving Dr. Aabha to resist nonfamily stakeholders is 
not related to satisfying any family-centric affective need (including increasing or protecting 
family influence). Rather, the ideas and proposals of nonfamily stakeholders are rejected on the 
basis of their inconsistency with an organizational goal—not a goal of the family. This, Dr. 
Aabha is quite clear on. She says, “Yeah. So if it's not in the interest of the vision of the 
university, then of course I do resist.”  
We may further argue that the family’s strong position approach is not opportunistically-
motivated and explained by SEW theory because of another clue. This clue relates to the process 
by which the family comes to reject ideas from nonfamily stakeholders. According to Dr. 
Kalinda, the family takes a strong position approach to decision-making within the context of 
discussion and treating nonfamily stakeholders fairly and with respect. Such behaviors depart 
from family-decision-making patterns as understood by socioemotional wealth theory. 
According to Zientara (2017), nonfamily employees are on the receiving end of what are referred 
to as “business practice contradictions.” This concept refers to the conflict between the family’s 
need to preserve SEW, especially family influence over day-to-day operations (Chrisman et al., 
2012; Vardaman & Gondo, 2014), and the fair practices that typically (or rather ought to) inhere 
in the business system. Business practice contradictions take many forms including undemocratic 
decision-making mechanisms and processes that do not integrate the views of nonfamily 
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stakeholders (Zientara, 2017). In other words, Zientara is arguing that it is often the case that 
nonfamily stakeholders feel poorly treated and ignored as an outcome of family-centric decision-
making behaviors. However, we learn that the nonfamily stakeholders at GHU are treated fairly 
and with respect. This is corroborated by Dr. Kalinda. The Prem family is found to integrate and 
value the views and opinions of others even when rejecting ideas.  
For the reasons stated above, I conclude that both the cooperative and strong position 
orientations to decision-making (in the governance reality of stakeholder diversity and 
resistance) are not best explained by socioemotional wealth theory. However, as explained in the 
previous section, this does not mean that socioemotional wealth theory is completely irrelevant. 
The family’s decision-making behaviors may be explained by the positive view of 
socioemotional wealth. It may be that the family respects and values the opinions of others to 
demonstrate their capability as leaders in order to remain in power (protect other SEW besides 
family influence). Thus, the suitability of socioemotional wealth theory to explain family 
decision-making behaviors in the governance reality of stakeholder diversity and resistance 
depends on the view we take or the particular SEW dimension being considered.  
Application of Stakeholder Theory 
In applying stakeholder theory, the question becomes the following: Does GHU’s 
leadership (family) value and integrate the perspectives of others when making decisions by 
cooperating or taking a strong position approach? First, we investigate whether the cooperative 
approach to decision-making can be explained by stakeholder theory. As already established, this 
approach is not connected to satisfying the family’s affective need of preserving or augmenting 
family influence. Rather, this approach satisfies the affective needs of nonfamily stakeholders. 
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By listening to Dr. Kalinda and letting her drive decision-making, the family is essentially taking 
a stakeholder approach to management.  
Dr. Aabha’s approach of listening to Dr. Kalinda and addressing her needs can be further 
explained by how stakeholder theory interprets power. According to stakeholder theorists (e.g., 
Brummer, 1991; Freeman, 1984), stakeholders possess decision-making power in the form of 
‘competitive threat,’ referring to the capacity to challenge dominant organizational values and 
practices. This power is understood to stem from stakeholders having different aspirations and 
expectations. In such a context where competitive threat is strong, leaders are encouraged to 
recognize the power bases of stakeholder groups and address these power bases by taking a 
cooperative approach to decision-making. Namely, leaders are encouraged to grant stakeholders 
more autonomy to drive governance transactions and processes (Freeman, 1984).  
The above reasoning may explain why Dr. Aabha takes a cooperative approach to 
decision-making. She may perceive Dr. Kalinda as someone with a high level of competitive 
threat. Certainly, this is a possibility because all of the stakeholder groups at GHU including the 
administrative stakeholder group to which Dr. Kalinda belongs were found to have decision-
making power. In the previous chapter, the distribution of decision-making power of 
stakeholders groups was visually presented using Kells’ (1992) relative power circles. The 
circles were calculated based on taking the average (or the mean) of ranking positions given to 
stakeholder groups by interview participants. The average of these rankings signifies their 
decision-making power level. These averages (means) are shown in Figures 2.4 and 2.5 below 
along with the sizes of the associated relative power circles. As shown, a smaller average (mean) 
means a larger circle, and therefore greater decision-making power. Thus, faculty in academic 
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decision-making, who have a mean of 1.3, has more power relative to, for example, the board 
with a mean of 4.3. 




Figure 2.5 Distribution of Power Among Stakeholders Regarding Administrative Decisions 
 
Source: Author  
 
The size of the relative power circles in the two figures above may be loosely interpreted 
to represent the level of competitive threat that stakeholder groups possess. I justify this 
approach on the premise that power is used by different groups to resist the views of other 
groups (Bolman & Deal, 2017). Thus, power as defined by Bolman and Deal (2017) and 
competitive threat as defined by Freeman (1984) are akin concepts, both describing the use of 
power to resist or challenge others. With this understanding, we may say that Dr. Kalinda’s level 
of competitive threat, as someone representing the administration, is greater than Dr. Aabha’s 



























administrative decisions (Figure 2.5). Thus, Dr. Aabha may find the need to approach decision-
making in consideration of the decision-making power, or competitive threat, that Dr. Kalinda is 
suggested to have. 
Next, we investigate whether the strong position decision-making approach taken by the 
family can be explained by stakeholder theory. According to Dr. Kalinda and Dr. Aabha, the 
family sometimes rejects the ideas and proposals coming from nonfamily stakeholders. Does this 
approach integrate and value the perspectives, as well as satisfy the expectations, of nonfamily 
stakeholders in decision-making? In a first consideration, we may say no and that stakeholder 
theory is not suitable to explain this decision-making approach. The family does not seem to be 
satisfying the expectations and needs of nonfamily stakeholders and in fact appear to be pushing 
its own agenda. The family’s interest prevails.  
However, I conclude that the family, while making decisions firmly and perhaps from a 
position of power, is in fact valuing the perspectives, as well as satisfying the expectations, of 
nonfamily stakeholders—for several reasons. For one, we learn that the strong position approach 
to decision-making happens in the context of discussion and collegiality. Dr. Kalinda explains 
that nonfamily stakeholders “have a platform” to “say what [they] want to say,” and that the 
family is “receptive” to ideas and views. This means that the family is integrating the 
perspectives of nonfamily stakeholders. The family is listening as Dr. Kalinda further explains. 
Second, we may argue that the needs of nonfamily stakeholders are being met in another way. 
According to the higher education literature (Birnbaum, 2004), faculty (and other stakeholders in 
the university setting) care more about the process by which decisions are made than about the 
outcome of decisions. They care more about the perceived fairness of the processes through 
which organizational decisions are made (Birnbaum, 2004, p.12). Therefore, we may say that Dr. 
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Keya, even though the family rejected her proposal, was satisfied by virtue of participating in the 
decision-making process. In other words, her ability to participate in decision-making, and have 
her views and opinions valued, mitigates any concerns that she may have about the outcome of 
her meeting with the family. Indeed, this is the impression I had when interviewing Dr. Kalinda. 
She seemed to express her approval of the family’s approach to decision-making. She says, “The 
best thing is they are willing to listen. That's a very, very good quality that they have both [Dr. 
Aabha] and [Dr. Prem].” We may therefore reason that stakeholder theory has some relevance to 
explaining the strong position approach taken by Dr. Aabha. 
Based on the reasons stated above, I conclude that stakeholder theory is suitable to 
explain both the cooperative and strong position decision-making approaches of the family.   
Renewal  
In earlier chapters, we learned from Dr. Aabha that controlling the Trust in perpetuity is 
an important goal of the family. We also learned that the family’s desire to remain managerially 
involved may be resisted by nonfamily stakeholders who may have skepticism about the 
competency of younger generation family members. In the next few paragraphs, I present 
interview data revealing how the family deals with this situation.  
According to interview data, there are two mutually reinforcing approaches that the 
family takes that together are believed to appease the concerns of nonfamily stakeholders related 
to family-based succession. One of these approaches may be found in two quotes from Dr. 
Aabha’s (Pro-chancellor) interview: 
Dr. Aabha: So at this stage I don't think I have any challenges because people have 
accepted me...I think when you prove your credentials by your actions, by your academic 
pursuits, by your intellect, I don't think so. Because people now, I've sat on so many 
government bodies, one of the highest ones which is the University Grants Commission, 
or the Commission of the Board of Education, and several others. I don't think I was 
appointed there by the government of India because I belonged to a family or because my 
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father did anything, but mainly because of my own intellectual identity...But as I said, 
when you prove yourself by your actions, by your capabilities, by your intellect, then 
people start respecting you and they start believing that you're here out of your own 
credentials and not really because you're a member of the family.  
 
Dr. Aabha: And likewise, even my children are now associated with [Grand Hall], my 
daughter [Mehar]...or my son [Dr. Vihaan] who's done his PhD, and has done his MBA. 
They're all in positions where they still have a lot of reporting authorities that they have 
to report to, because I believe that they should also understand the cause and the culture 
and the vision of [Grand Hall]. They need to really work hard. They need to prove 
themselves and it should not be like a cakewalk that they're someone's grandchildren or 
someone's children, that they should assume positions. Because I believe that people start 
respecting you by your work, by your credentials and by your actions than really by just 
being from a family...you need to have people who are passionate about doing that work 
and also know at a grass-root level what are the functions that go on in an 
organization...Sometimes I have to say this to my son. Once he asked me "How is it that 
so-and-so's son is already the vice president? I said...It's not going to be like this, you're 
different, and this is what we are.  
 
According to Dr. Aabha, family members perceivably receive respect from nonfamily 
stakeholders only after proving themselves as capable and effective leaders, through action and 
on the basis of merit. Dr. Aabha says, “I believe that people start respecting you by your work, 
by your credentials and by your actions than really by just being from a family.” Importantly, Dr. 
Aabha expects her children to “work hard” and “prove themselves,” just as Dr. Aabha has. Dr. 
Aarav (Dean of a faculty and husband to Dr. Aabha) echoes Dr. Aabha and says that the younger 
generation is expected to receive proper education and training. He says, “We empower them 
[younger generation members] by education, by training, by getting them into the ecosystem.”  
The second way in which the family deals with stakeholder concerns about family-based 
succession is found in the quote below from Dr. Vihaan (head of an administrative office and Dr. 
Aabha’s son).  
I mean if the family succession is taking place at decent intervals, decent time intervals  
and not immediately, because as I said, [there] are so many family run organizations in  
[this city]. I have seen positive that the son or the grandson if immediately drafted into a  
vice president role in his first year or her first year...I don't think the internal members  
take that lightly, they feel that they have been working so hard, why can't they also take  
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other responsibility or at least that person or the grandson should have worked for x  
number of years and then come up gradually. So that is definitely, but in here [at Grand  
Hall University] at least we have not face that problem so far. Because even if I wish to  
be in that position solely, but I know that I have to grow my mettle first. Same for my  
sister...So my, my mother she was Director of [Grand Hall] healthcare, then she climbed  
up the rank when she became the deputy director, then the principal director, now she is  
pro-chancellor. As similar to my father, he was the director, now dean...So I mean  
obviously everyone will come up from scratch.  
 
Dr. Vihaan shares that there is a “right way” to facilitating family-based succession. Family-
based succession should be a gradual process with members of the family entering the university 
at lower-level positions, then filling higher positions as they “grow [their] mettle” as Dr. Vihaan 
explains. This is corroborated by Dr. Aabha who in her interview explained that the family must 
begin their engagement at GHU “at the grass-root level to understand the system, to see whether 
they're really interested, to see whether they are capable of, and then really make them climb up 
in positions of governance.” Only by taking the grass-root approach can the family avoid 
stakeholder backlash that according to Dr. Vihaan’s quote above presumably exists in other 
family-run institutions in India.  
In review, family members at Grand Hall University deal with nonfamily stakeholder 
concerns about family-based succession by (a) proving their capacity as leaders based on merit 
and through action and (b) filling leadership positions only after building experience and 
knowledge at lower levels of the organizational hierarchy. With these findings, we may now fill 
in the appropriate cell in the right column of Table 2.2 below, which is part of Table 1.9 shown 
earlier. The next step is to examine the decision-making behavior I just clarified through the 
lenses of socioemotional wealth theory and stakeholder theory. 
Table 2.2 The Family’s Decision-Making Approach (with respect to renewal and within the 
governance reality of stakeholder diversity) 
Governance realities 
of GHU 






Application of SEW Theory 
In applying socioemotional wealth theory, the question becomes whether the family’s 
approach to alleviate stakeholder concerns about succession is connected to preserving or 
augmenting their stock of socioemotional wealth. The answer is yes. We may understand the 
family as making decisions to protect their capacity to remain in power as well as protect their 
capacity to continue influencing university affairs. Thus, the decision-making approach of the 
family is connected to preserving or augmenting the SEW dimensions of renewal and family 
influence. However, the family’s decision-making approach is only explained by the positive 
view of SEW. As explained, this view assumes that managerial families proactively engage 
stakeholder concerns and needs in order to remain in power. Managerial families in commercial 
settings are understood by the literature to appeal to stakeholder concerns to avoid situations 
where stakeholders question the family’s authority and in worse cases exile them from the 
organization. Indeed, this reasoning can be extended to explain how the Prem family makes 
decisions about their managerial involvement at GHU. Family members at GHU suggest that 
there is a “right way” to facilitate family-based succession, which presumably is designed to 
satisfy stakeholder concerns. In fact, I conclude that the family’s approach to succession does 
satisfy stakeholder concerns. Nearly all of the nonfamily interview participants including Dr. 
Prisha, Dr. Keya, Dr. Kalinda, and Dr. Aditi expressed their approval of the family-based 
Stakeholder diversity 
with different needs, 
priorities, and 
interests 
Nonfamily stakeholders who do not 
respect younger family members 
expected to succeed familial incumbents    
Proving leadership 
capability through 
action and merit and by 
filling leadership 
positions only after 
building experience at 





succession model. They all agree that the family is well qualified and deserving of their 
leadership positions. This was shown to be the case in chapter 8.  
Application of Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory is also suitable to explain the family’s decision-making behavior to 
remain in power. This is because, as mentioned, the family is subscribing to a “right way” of 
family-based succession that is designed to satisfy stakeholder concerns. Thus, both the positive 
view of SEW theory and stakeholder theory explain the family’s decision-making approach to 
succession. 
The Family’s Approach to Decision-Making where Government Regulatory and Social 
Pressures are Pronounced  
 This section aims to clarify, if not already done so in the earlier chapters, how the Prem 
family approaches decision-making within the governance reality of stringent regulatory rules 
and ordinances and where social pressures are pronounced. Since both family influence and 
renewal (family-based succession) were found to be resisted within this governance reality, I will 
investigate how the family approaches decision-making in the two contexts of (a) where limits 
are placed on what the family can and cannot do and (b) where family-based succession is 
undermined.   
Family Influence 
 In chapter 8, I discussed government controls as prescriptions ultimately articulating 
good governance practices. I also explained that the family is expected to subscribe to good 
governance practices and that a violation of government prescriptions would result in 
disciplinary action. Relative to these understandings, the question therefore becomes does the 
family subscribe to good governance practices? The following quote from written information 
provided by Dr. Prem suggests that indeed the family does. 
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 A public institution must not only be beyond reproach, it must appear to be so. Decisions  
 at [Grand Hall University] are taken after consultation with everyone concerned. At the  
 mega level there are various committees—the Management Committee and the Planning  
 and Monitoring Committee. At the middle level there are various standing committees,  
 advisory bodies, academic councils and eminent personalities. At the operational level  
 there are directors, senior faculty and even newly recruited greenhorns. All have a say in  
 the matter. There are clear operational guidelines. All appropriate measures are taken, in  
 conformity with the highest principles of public probity. (written information by Dr.  
 Prem) 
 
According to Dr. Prem, “operational guidelines” are not only clear but also followed with respect 
to decision-making. The operational guidelines to which Dr. Prem refers to articulate how 
decisions are to be handled. I argue that these guidelines were developed in consonance with the 
expectations of the UGC. As we learned in earlier chapters, the UGC expects the formation of 
several governing authorities (e.g., Managing Committee and Academic Council) at deemed-to-
be institutions and expects that governing authorities work together, while not infringing upon 
the powers of each other, to reach decisions. According to Dr. Prem’s quote above, this 
expectation seems to be satisfied. Dr. Prem makes explicit that decisions are taken only “after 
consultation with everyone concerned” and “in conformity with the highest principles of public 
probity.” Here, I loosely interpret “public probity” to encompass expectations laid down by the 
government. Dr. Prem is essentially explaining that rules are followed and in a manner that 
satisfies the expectations of society (which we may understand as including the government).  
The following is another quote that shows that the family follows “operational 
guidelines.” Dr. Aabha (Pro-chancellor) explains:  
I started something called the [Grand Hall] Center for Healthcare. So I believed that 
international universities abroad have a very strong health management system for  
students and the staff, we never saw something like this in India or an Indian university.  
So that's something new that I brought back, and I said let us start something like this in  
[Grand Hall], but that also, I just can’t go up to my father and say I want to start  
something like this. I put up this proposal in front of the board of trustees, and I had to  
make a presentation and prove to them that this is something that was required, and then 




Dr. Aabha shares how she established the Center for Healthcare. She established the center by 
not relying on her father, but by adhering to governance protocols. Based on what we learned in 
earlier chapters, we may understand these protocols to be informed by the UGC. According to 
UGC regulations, decisions are expected to be handled on governing authorities where members 
each have and can cast one vote. Decisions are thus reached by majority rule. In the scenario 
above, Dr. Aabha’s proposal was presumably approved in this way, by members of the 
Managing Committee casting votes. Thus, Dr. Aabha may be understood as simply following 
UGC protocol.  
Nonfamily interview participants corroborate that the family follows “good” governance 
protocols. The following quotes are from Dr. Kalinda (senior administrator), Dr. Keya (Director 
of an institute), and Dr. Kiaan (Professor).  
Dr. Kalinda: So what happens is, invariably the Vice-chancellor and Pro-chancellor for  
certain things which I'm dealing with directly, they will definitely say, “Please refer to  
her.” If they go directly. But I won't say that informal networking does not happen. It  
happens...Then the Pro-chancellor will say, "In principle, I told you yes, now follow the  
processes." 
 
Dr. Keya: You see. They [family] run it as professionally as possible. That you follow all  
norms and practices, so that you get an expertise, that people are empowered to speak. 
 
Dr. Kiaan: No, I don't think, because [Grand Hall] works in a protocol...In a protocol.  
Even, I have a part of...I experienced when [Dr. Aarav], he's a family member. His son  
and daughter, they are also part of some of the portfolios in the university...They never  
bypass anybody...Nobody is here doing some wrong things, or some violation of the  
rules. I don't find anybody like this.... 
 
Above, we learn from all three interview participants that the family follows rules, rules that 
presumably are informed by the broader regulatory framework in India. Dr. Kalinda shares that 
the family, while confirming that informal networking does happen, inevitably encourages 
university personnel to engage the necessary channels to get a proposal approved. Similarly, Dr. 
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Kiaan shares that the family never bypasses anybody and Dr. Keya shares that the family runs 
the institutions as professionally as possible. In sum, we may say that the family approaches 
decision-making within the reality of stringent government accountability by referencing the 
rules of the university (and ultimately the government).  
We learned from chapter 8 that accountability pressures also exist in the form of societal 
criticism. We already know one way in which Dr. Prem reacts to social pressures. In chapter 7, 
we learned that Dr. Prem resisted attacks from society regarding his choice to develop a plot of 
land for the university. Indeed, this is an example of the family resisting societal pressures. The 
family makes a decision to push its agenda regardless of what society thinks.  
Dr. Prem is also found to conform to social demands. Consider the following quote from 
written information provided by him.  
A couple of founder members demanded position in institutes, which had to be complied  
with. Both of them found themselves quite out of their depth and on the complaints  
launched by parents and students, had to be relieved of their responsibilities. [Grand Hall]  
was departing from its merit-oriented culture and was already paying for compromising  
its core values. (written information by Dr. Prem) 
 
To give some context, this quote clarifies how Dr. Prem reacts to societal pressures arising from 
a situation I described in chapter 8. As I explained, Dr. Prem was forced by two Managing 
Committee members to accept some students not on the basis of merit, but on the basis of their 
connection to the Managing Committee members. The students may be either family or family 
friends of the members. Complying to this demand landed Dr. Prem in hot water and he and his 
family found themselves a target of public criticism. Both parents and students launched attacks 
on GHU as well as on the Prem family for “departing from [the university’s] merit-oriented 
culture.” The key takeaway from this quote is that Dr. Prem made a decision to relieve the 
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Managing Committee members of their responsibilities—because of societal pressures. Thus, 
this decision may be understood as an example of conforming to societal demands.  
In review, the family is found to approach decision-making in the reality of stringent 
government accountability and social pressures by (a) referencing university protocols that are 
understood to be in line with government regulations and (b) depending on the situation, either 
conceding to the demands of society or take an opposite approach of challenging society. With 
these findings, we may now fill in the appropriate cell in the right column of Table 2.3 below, 
which is part of Table 1.9 shown earlier. The next step is to examine the decision-making 
behavior I just clarified through the lenses of socioemotional wealth theory and stakeholder 
theory. 
Table 2.3 The Family’s Decision-Making Approach (with respect to family influence and under 
government and social accountability) 
Source: Author 
Application of SEW Theory 
In applying socioemotional wealth theory, the question becomes two-fold. First, does the 
family seek to protect or augment SEW wealth when approaching decision-making in the context 
of following rules? I raise the same question regarding the family’s reaction to societal pressures. 












Stringent government regulations that 
carry consequences in the event they are 
violated; Public backlash regarding 
GHU decisions 
Decision-making in the 
context of following 
university protocols 
and depending on 
situation, heeding or 
not conceding to the 
demands of society 
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First, I investigate if the family’s conforming behavior to the government meets the 
assumptive logic of SEW theory. I infer that it does and does not, according to the view taken. At 
face value, family influence is essentially being restricted within a regulatory framework that 
articulates how the family should act. Stringent government regulations may discourage the 
family from making decisions unilaterally. Stringent government regulations effectively narrow 
the decision-making choices of the family to follow what the government deems as good 
governance practices. The family is expected to make decisions via shared governance 
modalities, with the input of a broad stakeholder base, and via governing authorities (decision-
making bodies) working together, as required by the government. In other words, the 
government may be understood as dictating some of the decision-making behaviors of the 
family. Indeed, this does not fit with the idea that the family can make decisions from a position 
of power, as assumed by Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007). Thus, a first consideration may lead to the 
conclusion that SEW theory is not fitting to explain the family’s decision-making approach, that 
the family is not motivated by the pursuit of family influence.  
However, I do not ignore the possibility that the family is conforming to government 
regulations and following university governance protocols as a means to remain in power. 
Satisfying government expectations may be a way for the family to continue their managerial 
involvement and preserve and augment SEW in perpetuity. Indeed, the government is a powerful 
stakeholder group with the power to even appropriate the Trust if rules are violated. Thus, 
socioemotional wealth theory according to the positive view of SEW may be a suitable 




We may extend the above reasoning to infer that the family concedes to societal pressures 
as a way to avoid situations threatening the family’s ability to remain in power. Society indeed 
has the power to damage the reputation of the university and the family who shares an identity 
with the university. In fact, as Dr. Prem explains, society was doing just that. He says that he 
“was a target and not a day passed without an article, often editorial, criticizing [Grand Hall 
University] and [him and his family].” This quote comes from written information provided by 
Dr. Prem.   
Finally, I examine whether SEW theory explains the family’s approach to challenge 
society. In the scenario where the Dr. Prem does not give into social demands, we may 
understand his behavior as ultimately protecting his interests. In written material, Dr. Prem 
explains that he fought to defend his position (for purchasing the land) because of a noble 
purpose (which I will not get into at the risk of revealing the identity of GHU). However, the 
nature of the purpose does not change the fact that Dr. Prem was ultimately protecting his 
interests. He wanted to use the land for a very specific purpose, according to a vision he had, and 
nothing would get in the way of that. In this way, we may say socioemotional wealth theory 
explains the strong-arm approach Dr. Prem takes to fight public backlash. Dr. Prem by resisting 
societal pressures was indeed seeking to protect or augment his ability to do what he wanted 
(family influence). SEW theory also makes sense to explain this approach because Dr. Prem was 
fighting to protect his reputation. He said that his “character had been assassinated,” and that he 
was “left with no other alternative than to fight the case” and recoup his reputation. Thus, he was 
also fighting to protect the SEW dimensions of ‘identity.’ 
Application of Stakeholder Theory 
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The central tenet of stakeholder theory is that firm leadership values the legitimacy of 
different stakeholder groups in decision-making and integrates their perspectives while satisfying 
their expectations (Freeman, 1984). The question we ask is thus two-fold. Are the members of 
the family integrating and satisfying the needs and interests of nonfamily stakeholders when the 
family approaches decision-making in the context of following rules and protocols? The second 
question to ask is whether the family’s reaction to societal pressures is connected to satisfying 
the needs and interests of nonfamily stakeholders.  
First, I investigate if the family’s conforming behavior to the government meets the 
assumptive logic of stakeholder theory. Interview data suggest that the family satisfies the needs 
and expectations of the government indirectly, by following clearly defined institutional 
protocols that I argue are developed in line with government expectations about university 
governance and management. Interestingly, having clearly defined rules that drive management 
behaviors is a stakeholder concept. According to Freeman (1984), there must be clear rules that 
govern the relations between the stakeholders and the organization. In this case, the rules in 
question govern the relationship between GHU and the stakeholder group of India’s government. 
GHU is expected to honor the relationship it maintains with the government by following the 
rules and regulations laid down by the government.  
The Prem family may also be understood as satisfying nonfamily stakeholder 
expectations when conceding to societal pressures. Society is a stakeholder that places 
expectations on how the Prem family should act, as I explained in chapter 8. And according to 
data presented in this chapter, the family seems to satisfy societal expectations. Dr. Prem shares 
that he had to relieve the two managing committees of their responsibilities because of 
complaints launched by parents and students. 
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Finally, we examine the family behavior of resisting social demands through the lens of 
stakeholder theory. Earlier, we inferred that Dr. Prem’s action may be understood as ultimately 
protecting his interests. He was satisfying his affective need to use the land according to what he 
deemed was right. We may therefore conclude that Dr. Prem’s actions were not motivated from 
an interest of satisfying nonfamily stakeholders. The interest that prevailed was not that of the 
society’s, but that of Dr. Prem’s. Thus, I conclude that stakeholder theory does not explain Dr. 
Prem’s behavior to fight environmentalists and government officials in court.  
Renewal 
We learned from Dr. Aabha that controlling the Trust in perpetuity is an important family 
goal. However, we learned in chapter 8 from Dr. Prisha (Dean) that the government is frustrating 
the family’s effort to remain in an ownership/management position. The government created a 
ruling that prohibits family-based leadership, which effectively disrupts family-based succession. 
Dr. Prisha further explained that one family-run university circumvented the ruling by appointing 
a nonfamily member as a figurehead while the family continued to steer the university from a 
distance. When asked how this ruling is being circumvented at Grand Hall University, Dr Prisha 
replied with the following: 
It's not circumvented...We have brought stay to that rule through the court and we are  
continuing with the status quo...It's prevented by bringing a court order...when the court  
issues stay, the existing policy continues and not the ministry policy which prohibits  
family members in helm...  
 
We learn that the family has decided to fight the central government ruling with a court 
order. This court order supposedly nullifies the new ruling by allowing the existing policy 
(which allows family members to lead institutions) to remain in effect. With this finding, we may 
now fill in the appropriate cell in the right column of Table 2.4 below, which is part of Table 1.9 
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shown earlier. The next step is to examine the decision-making behavior I just clarified through 
the lenses of socioemotional wealth theory and stakeholder theory. 
Table 2.4 The Family’s Decision-Making Approach (with respect to renewal and under 
government and social accountability) 
Source: Author 
Application of SEW Theory 
In applying socioemotional wealth theory, I raise the question of whether the family’s 
action to fight the ruling prohibiting family-based succession is connected to the preservation or 
augmentation of their stock of socioemotional wealth. The answer is clearly yes. The family is 
fighting to preserve its ability to remain in power (and motivated by the possibility of losing 
other SEW, such as family influence). Indeed, this finds theoretical anchoring in socioemotional 
wealth theory.  
Application of Stakeholder Theory 
In applying stakeholder theory, I raise the question of whether the family’s behavior to 
fight the government on its ruling integrates and satisfies the expectations of nonfamily 
stakeholders, in this case the government.  It does not. The family’s action does not satisfy the 
needs of the government, but those of the family.  
The Family’s Approach to Decision-Making within the Governance Reality of Shared 
Governance 
This section aims to clarify how the Prem family approaches decision-making within the 
governance reality of shared governance. To note, the family’s decision-making approach within 
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this reality may already be clear based on the interview data provided throughout this study. 
Indeed, we may say that the family approaches decision-making by sharing governance based on 
what we learned in chapter 6 and 8, and in earlier sections of this chapter. If anything, the data 
and discussion provided in this section will further corroborate what may already be apparent. 
Also, I only focus on family influence since no interaction was found between this reality and the 
SEW dimension of renewal (family-based succession).  
Family Influence 
In chapter 8, I argued that the family and other top leadership members are expected to 
take a back seat and not intervene in decisions deliberated in the academic decision-making 
chain. I also explained that the faculty are in a position to challenge leadership when perceiving 
the leadership to be encroaching upon their academic decision-making autonomy and agency.  
Relative to these understandings, the key question I raise is whether the family actually 
participates in the shared governance culture. Does the family meet the expectations of other 
stakeholders with regard to sharing governance? Some data indicate that shared governance 
expectations are being met by the family. Consider the following quotes from Dr. Aabha’s (Pro-
chancellor) and Dr. Prem’s (Chancellor) interviews.  
Dr. Prem: Before appointment of director of any institution, we think ten times. We look 
at where he has served, but once we select the person as director, we give him total  
academic freedom…not financial…academic, and he is [to] bother only about  
academics. Financial problem he may not bother…we take that responsibility…if some  
student fight in court against him, we fight on his behalf…because total academic  
autonomy given to all directors…they think they are custodians of their  
institutions…they take ownership.  
 
Dr. Aabha: Absolutely, because see my father always says that while the person is sitting  
in his chair, trust him [or her] 100 percent. The moment you don't trust him, then he  
should not be sitting in the chair. Right? So it has to be a total trust in someone that you  
appoint...unless you have this kind of, and these are exactly the values and principles that  
I really respect, because it's not easy to sit in chairs of governance and not really govern.  
So today when I sit here...as a CEO, I won't visit an institution unless I'm invited there,  
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for months, because I have trust and faith that the director of that institution will be doing  
her or his best...in [Grand Hall], there's more of a decentralized governance. So academic  
autonomy is given to all the directors to function on a day to day manner.  
 
Both Dr. Aabha and Dr. Prem are essentially describing the bifurcation of powers (the two 
decision-making chains) shared between the leadership and the faculty. The Trust handles 
decision related to financial and legal matters as Dr. Prem explains, and academic matters of 
importance become the domain of faculty. Dr. Aabha shares that she trusts in faculty 100 percent 
and that academic autonomy is given to all of the directors (who represent the faculty body). We 
may thus say that the family respects the authority of others (faculty) when approaching 
decision-making within the reality where decision-making is bifurcated. Nonfamily interview 
participants corroborate this in earlier chapters. For example, Dr. Prisha was noted with sharing 
that when she was made director, she became the whole and soul of the institute, meaning that 
leadership gives her full autonomy to make decisions on her own. Dr. Prisha further notes the 
following in response to a question about the family’s leadership style:  
I see that exposure, he [Dr. Prem] has never graduated from the US, but he can think like  
Harvard. I think that internal expansion and openness to delegation. Openness and  
delegation, which you delegate and you don't distrust. You delegate and you trust. Out of  
100 things he delegated, one mistake might have happened because that individual failed  
him or he misread. Misreading happens even with the machine, but the fact that he  
delegated, he created so many leaders. He allowed their energy to enrich his experiment. 
 
Dr. Prisha corroborates the family’s account that the family respects the authority of decision-
makers in the faculty. She shares that Dr. Prem delegates responsibilities and trusts those who 
have decision-making responsibilities.  
I also explained in chapter 8 that family members may find unilateral decision-making a 
challenge because nonfamily stakeholder create dissent on governing authorities (decision-
making bodies). Some quotes were highlighted to support this. For example, in a quote from Dr. 
Prisha’s interview, we learned that nonfamily stakeholders raise issue with the views of the 
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family on governing authorities. She is noted with further saying that the role of faculty is “to 
deliberate, to facilitate discussion, to create dissent” on governing boards “if there is any area 
which is neglected.” How then, within this reality where faculty create dissent on governing 
authorities, does the family approach decision-making? The following quotes from Dr. Aabha’s 
interview provides some insight into how the family participates in decision-making on 
governing authorities. She responds to a question about what the family does in situations where 
there is stakeholder dissent. 
We [family] have to convince them [nonfamily stakeholders] of course. We have to, as I  
said, we don't take any decision or don't frame any policies unless we discuss. So,  
whether it's in our Academic Council or whether it's in the meeting of the directors, or  
deans, so there are discussions that happen, and then policies are framed. So it's never  
like a top-down approach where you say this should happen...We always come up with  
discussions, so even if we think of something for example, we want to try to follow 
faculty, we want to lay a policy, then we will kind of take opinions from institutions that 
already are attracting foreign faculty and take their views and then frame the policy...It's 
never a top down approach, always in consultation. 
 
According to Dr. Aabha, the family takes a collaborative approach to decision-making where the 
views of faculty are taken into consideration and integrated into the framing of policy. As Dr. 
Aabha explains, this approach is consistent across Academic Council meetings or meetings with 
directors or deans. Decision-making on governing authorities is always facilitated within a 
context of discussing matters with other stakeholders represented.  
In another part of her interview, Dr. Aabha confirms that the family takes a democratic 
approach to decision-making. 
Once in two months, I can say regular meetings with the directors of institutions, again  
this is chaired by the vice-chancellor. So we [family] give enough respect to the chair,  
just because I attend the meetings and I am the daughter of the chancellor and also...So I  
will not sit in chair. I will sit there in the meeting as a member, but she will be in chair to  
carry out the proceedings, because we believe that respect has to be given to the chair. So  
anyways, we have these regular meetings with directors, and it's absolute democratic  
discussions...There is so much discussion that happens that is a vibrant discussion and  
there are so many times things that they might not agree with the Vice-chancellor and the  
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management, but there is a very heavy discussion. Nearly all decisions, again, this is what  
my father has taught us. He always believes that decisions should come out of democratic  
discussions and not really something that is very central. 
 
We further learn from this quote that Dr. Aabha participates in (horizontal) decision-making on 
governing authorities as a member and not as the Pro-chancellor or the founder’s daughter. Like 
every member, she not only gives respect to the Vice-chancellor who chairs meetings, but also 
engages other members through “vibrant discussion.” Thus, we may say that the family 
approaches decision-making as any other nonfamily stakeholder member, not by exerting family 
or leadership status, but by participating in discussion. Nonfamily interview participants 
corroborated this in previous chapters and earlier in this chapter. They explained that the family 
during meetings is willing to listen and discuss matters, even if ideas are rejected.  
Finally, in chapter 8, I argued that members of one governing authority must make 
decisions with sensitivity to the needs and demands of the members of other governing 
authorities. This is because governing authorities work together democratically to facilitate 
decision-making. I provided some indirect interview data to support this inference. Dr. Kiaan 
shared that proposals sent up the Board of Management are always “agreeable” and never flat 
out rejected. My understanding is that within this reality, where members of one governing 
authority respect the needs of the members of other governing authorities, the family as members 
of governing authorities must also make decisions with sensitivity to the needs of members on 
other governing authorities. Unfortunately, there is not enough direct evidence in the interview 
data to confirm and corroborate this inference. However, we can speculate this to be true based 
on the interview quotes presented throughout this study. We learned from Dr. Aditi that 
academic decision-making is not autocratic, but democratic and ground-up. This means that 
governing authorities, and the members of these authorities, at higher levels within the 
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organization do not infringe upon the powers of those located at lower levels. Rather, they all—
governing authorities and the people on these authorities (including family)—work together 
democratically. We also learned that within this ground-up approach, faculty at bottom levels of 
the organization are the real decision-makers when it comes to academic decisions. We may 
assume this to mean that those located higher up (administration like the Vice-chancellor and top 
leadership like Dr. Aabha) are agreeable to the inputs provided by faculty found on governing 
authorities at lower levels of GHU. Third, we learned that the family makes every effort to abide 
by university protocols including those governing decision-making processes. Dr. Prem shares 
that decisions are deliberated on governing authorities and committees from lower to upper 
levels of the organizational hierarchy, and that decisions are reached only after consulting all the 
members of GHU.  
Thus, in this reality where academic decision-making is not autocratic and top-down, but 
democratic and ground-up and where the family strives to observe university protocols, we may 
say that the family approaches decision-making by respecting the academic decision-making 
process in place and respecting the inputs of faculty at lower levels of the organization. In other 
words, the family does not monopolize the (academic) decision-making process, but contributes 
to it as any other nonfamily stakeholder at GHU.  
In review, shared governance is practiced at GHU through three modalities. One way in 
which shared governance is practiced is by the faculty having professional authority and 
controlling the academic decision-making chain. The administrative decision-making chain is 
controlled by the Trust that centralizes various administrative services. In this reality, we found 
that the family approaches decision-making by respecting the authority of decision-makers 
controlling the academic decision-making chain. The second way in which shared governance is 
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practiced is by nonfamily stakeholders participating in decision-making on governing authorities 
(via horizontal governance processes). As explained, horizontal governance processes replace 
hierarchical leadership with collaboration, coordination, shared responsibility for decisions and 
outcomes, and a willingness to work through consensus (Ferguson, 2009). In this reality, the 
family approaches decision-making as any other nonfamily stakeholder on governing authorities, 
by participating as members and in the context of discussion and collaboration. The final way in 
which shared governance is practiced is by different governing authorities (located at different 
levels of the organizationally hierarchy) working together democratically to reach decisions. In 
this reality, I concluded that the family approaches decision-making by respecting and 
participating in the decision-making process as any nonfamily stakeholder. With these findings, 
we may now fill in the appropriate cell in the right column of Table 2.5 below, which is part of 
Table 1.9 shown earlier. The next step is to examine the decision-making behavior I just clarified 













Table 2.5 The Family’s Decision-Making Approach (with respect to family influence and within 
the governance reality of shared governance) 
Source: Author 
Application of SEW Theory 
In this section, socioemotional wealth theory is applied to three decision-making 
behaviors: decision-making by respecting the authority of nonfamily decision-makers; decision-
making through collaboration and discussion; and decision-making by respecting the inputs of 
faculty. 
I first examine decision-making by respecting the authority of nonfamily decision-makers 
through the lens of SEW theory. The question becomes the following: Does the family reference 
the loss or gain of socioemotional wealth when approaching decision-making by respecting the 
authority of nonfamily decision-makers? The answer is yes and no. The answer is no because it 
is clear that by sharing decision-making with faculty the family is not motivated by an interest to 
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protect or increase family influence. Quite the opposite. Respecting the decision-making 
authority of nonfamily decision-makers is about sharing influence—not protecting or 
augmenting it. As explained earlier in this chapter, this diverges from the normative decision-
making patterns of families in ownership positions according to the family firm literature. 
Whereas managerial families in commercial settings do everything in their power to avoid the 
sharing of influence, the Prem family is found to share influence by respecting the authority of 
other decision-makers. Thus, SEW theory is ill-adapted to explain the family’s decision-making 
behavior with respect to family influence. However, the answer may also be yes because the 
family may be respecting the authority of nonfamily decision-makers as a means to remain 
managerially involved. This behavior, as explained in previous sections, is consistent with the 
positive view of SEW. Families in ownership positions ensure that stakeholders remain satisfied 
so that the family’s motivation and status as leaders is not questioned by stakeholders. Satisfying 
the needs and expectations of stakeholders is crucial to giving the impression that family-based 
leadership works. Only in this way can the family remain managerially involved and continue to 
reap the affective rewards tied to socioemotional wealth.   
Next, we examine decision-making through collaboration and discussion (on governing 
authorities) through the lens of SEW theory. In this case as well I conclude that socioemotional 
wealth theory is both suitable and ill-adapted to explain the family’s decision-making behavior, 
depending on the view we take. We may say that SEW theory is not fitting according to the 
negative view of SEW where firm employees are on the receiving end of business practice 
contradictions (e.g., lower salaries, untimely promotions, suppression of decision-making power) 
because of self-serving family behaviors. Indeed, this view is ill-adapted to explain the family’s 
approach of engaging nonfamily stakeholders through collaboration and discussion. The 
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nonfamily stakeholders of GHU are not on the receiving end of business practice contradictions 
(in this case the suppression of their decision-making power); rather, they are empowered to 
speak their minds via horizontal governance modalities that replace hierarchical leadership (the 
family’s authority) with collaboration and shared responsibility for decisions and outcomes. This 
is confirmed by Dr. Aabha who says that top-down approaches are never used and that the 
family will even “try to follow faculty.” Thus, the activities of discussion and collaboration are 
more about ceding and sharing influence and allowing nonfamily stakeholders to drive decision-
making than about protecting or augmenting it. We may also say that SEW is suitable according 
to the positive view. The fair treatment of nonfamily stakeholders on governing authorities may 
be a way for the family to remain managerially involved. 
Finally, we examine the decision-making approach of respecting faculty input through 
the lens of SEW theory. Here too for the same reasons as above we may say that the family’s 
decision-making behavior cannot be explained by SEW theory. The family’s input is but one of 
many contributions coming from a broad stakeholder base as proposals move up the academic 
decision-making chain. By respecting this process and the faculty who are sending up the 
proposals, the family approaches decision-making in a way that does little to protect or augment 
family influence. In the vertical decision-making process, they cede some of their influence to 
nonfamily stakeholders, especially those located at lower levels of the organization. These 
faculty were described by Dr. Aditi as the “real decision-makers.” Again however, the positive 
view of SEW may be salient, for the very same reasons as explained earlier.  
Within the realities of all three shared governance modalities, the family is understood to 
share influence rather than concentrate it. Nonfamily stakeholders are empowered to contribute 
to the decision-making machinery of GHU, and also make decisions on their own. And 
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depending on the view of SEW we take, we may say that SEW theory is either suitable or ill-
adapted to explain the family’s decision-making approaches. Of course, SEW theory would only 
be suitable to explain the family’s pursuit of other SEW besides family influence.   
Application of Stakeholder Theory 
We first examine decision-making by respecting the decision-making authority of faculty 
through the lens of stakeholder theory and ask the question of whether this decision-making 
behavior integrates and satisfies the expectations of nonfamily stakeholders. The answer is yes. 
The act of trusting stakeholders to carry out responsibilities is fundamentally a stakeholder 
approach. According to Brummer (1991), management shares and entrust responsibilities to 
stakeholder groups as part of a what he refers to as the ‘collegial model.’  Thus, when Dr. Aabha 
and Dr. Prem trust the faculty to carry out their responsibilities, they are demonstrating a 
principle of stakeholder theory.  
We may also interpret the family’s decision-making behavior (respecting the decision-
making authority of faculty) through the lens of power as defined by stakeholder theory. 
According to Freeman (1984), when stakeholders are understood to have a high degree of 
competitive threat, or the capacity or power to resist the dominant values and practices of the 
organization, leadership is encouraged to cede the ownership of the decision-making process to 
these groups. In other words, managers are encouraged to grant stakeholder groups more 
autonomy to drive firm governance transactions and processes (Freeman, 1984). This theoretical 
reasoning seems to capture the state of affairs at GHU. The family grants complete academic 
freedom to faculty—who not only seek decision-making autonomy (as shown in chapter 6), but 
also have decision-making power (as shown in chapter 8).  
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I next examine decision-making through collaboration and discussion through the lens of 
stakeholder theory and ask the question of whether this decision-making behavior integrates the 
ideas of and satisfies the expectations of nonfamily stakeholders. The answer is yes. As 
mentioned, cooperating and discussing matters with nonfamily stakeholders are activities not 
about protecting the interests of one group, but about integrating the opinions and ideas of a 
broad stakeholder base. The interests of multiple groups are represented in decision-making. We 
learned from Dr. Aabha that decisions are reached and polices are framed only after having 
stakeholders give their inputs within a context of discussion and consensus. Further, 
collaboration and discussion are understood by the literature (Birnbaum, 2004) to satisfy the 
expectations of faculty. This is because faculty care more about the perceived fairness of their 
participation in decision-making rather than the outcome of any decision. Thus, even if faculty 
ideas were rejected by the family, faculty expectations may still be satisfied on the basis that they 
were able to participate in the decision-making process. Dr. Kalinda, in praising the family for 
their openness, seems to corroborate this. 
Finally, I examine decision-making by respecting the input of faculty through the lens of 
stakeholder theory. As explained, the family’s input is but one of many contributions coming 
from a broad stakeholder base as proposals move up the academic decision-making chain. By 
respecting this process and the input of faculty who participate in this process, the family 
approaches decision-making in a way that gives others, especially those located at lower levels 
of the organizational hierarchy, a chance to influence decision-making based on their interests 
and expectations. In this way, the family is satisfying the needs of nonfamily stakeholders 
(especially faculty at lower levels of the organizational hierarchy). Thus, stakeholder theory is a 
good fit to explaining this decision-making behavior.  
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In sum, all three shared governance approaches may be explained by stakeholder theory. 
The principles of shared governance harmonize quite nicely with those of stakeholder theory, 
which essentially defines decision-making as an inclusive and collaborative process where 
employee participation is not only practiced, but necessary to achieve organizational goals 
(Brummer, 1991; Freeman, 1984; Freeman & McVea, 2001). Likewise, shared governance is 
discussed in the literature as a necessary strategy to advance the organizational goals of higher 
education institutions (Birnbaum, 1988; Brubacher & Rudy,1997; Heaney, 2010; Hirsch & 
Weber, 2001; Kerr, 2001). Universities are in the business of education. Only through shared 
governance (namely faculty empowerment in decision-making) can the university be held 
accountable to satisfy its intended objective. This is certainly the case at GHU as Dr. Prisha 
shares in her interview. She explains that faculty empowerment in decision-making is essential 
because it fulfills the organizational objective of catalyzing output (good research and good 
teaching).  
Is this the Whole Picture? 
While not exhaustive and certainly not capturing all of the decision-making 
circumstances of GHU, the decision-making scenarios highlighted above provide some clarity as 
to how the Prem family negotiates decision-making within multiple overlapping governance 
realities. While decision-making is a complicated affair that changes based on circumstances, the 
Prem family mostly takes a cooperative, nonconfrontational approach to decision-making. 
However, while this finding (and others discussed above) captures a significant part of decision-
making at GHU, it does not relate the whole picture of family decision-making patterns at GHU. 
There are two other factors to consider based on the interview data, which shed further insight 




The Administrative Decision-Making Chain 
Throughout this study, I made clear that there are two decision-making chains. One 
concerns decisions related to academics and the other concerns decisions related to the 
administrative services centralized by the Trust. The former has been discussed at length 
throughout this study. For the most part, it has been the focus of all of the chapters including this 
one.  
We learned that within the academic decision-making chain, the family approaches 
decision-making with sensitivity to the needs of nonfamily stakeholders. Nonfamily stakeholder 
interests and inputs are integrated as the family takes a cooperative approach to decision-making. 
Further, autonomy is given to nonfamily decision-making authorities, and in cases where the 
family takes a strong position on their ideas and views, decision-making is still facilitated in the 
context of dialogue.  
This section provides some clarity on how the family negotiates decisions related to 
nonacademic matters, the affairs centralized by the Trust. Key among them are human resources 
and finance. For the most part, even these decisions are handled by the family in consultation 
with nonfamily stakeholder outside of the Trust and based in the university. Even these decisions 
may be explained by stakeholder theory. Take, for example, decisions related to university 
finances. Dr. Aabha (Pro-chancellor) explains below how budgets are approved.  
We have a budget scrutiny committee which is chaired by the Vice-chancellor, I'm there 
on the committee as a member, then you have the dean, academics and admin, and then 
we have some experts on site, a chief of finance and so on...So that time, the director will 
come and give a prospective plan of what he wants to do for that year, what kind of 
students he will get, what kind of fees that he will charge, what are the expenses he will 
make...So there, there's a lot of threadbare scrutiny to say this is where you can reduce 
your expenses, you could increase it on research, but you cannot do this, you can do 
that...Some back and forth discussions, and then once those budgets are approved we give 
autonomy to the directors to spend within their budget. Of course, with approvals from 
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the chief of finance, because you need to look at particular activities at just the right kind 
of money that they're spending and so on, maybe the chief of finance will even give 
suggestions too. Say they want to purchase something you will say some other institution 
also wants to purchase, so best is to go to the centralized purchase department so that you 
get better rates and so on.  
 
Above, we learn that budget approvals as well as purchasing decisions, all related to the financial 
affairs of the university, are scrutinized on a budget committee consisting of family and 
nonfamily personnel of Grand Hall University. Nonfamily personnel include the Vice-
chancellor, deans, and other faculty. As Dr. Aabha explains, decisions are reached after “some 
back and forth discussions” between these stakeholders and those representing the interests of 
the Trust such as Dr. Aabha and the chief of finance.  
Decisions related to human resources are also facilitated in the same fashion. Consider 
the following quotes from a university document. 
Rules and Regulations shall be prepared by both BoM [Board of Management] of [GHU]  
and Managing Committee of [Grand Hall] Society in consultation with and in  
concurrence of each other. (University document) 
 
It is hereby notified for information of all concerned that the Managing Committee of  
[Grand Hall] and Board of Management of [Grand Hall University] have approved the  
designations, norms of minimum qualification and work experience, job descriptions,  
grades and applicable basic pay. (University document) 
 
Creation of Posts for [GHU] and its Constituent Institutes: Board of Management (BOM)  
of [GHU] is the Competent Authority for creation of posts for [GHU] and its constituent  
institutes. However, the University shall take any further action after creation of the post  
including filling the post by appointment thereof, only after due consultation with [Grand  
Hall] Society as additional recruitment/s involves financial implications. (University  
document) 
 
In the quotes above, we may infer that members representing the Trust (e.g., Dr. Aabha) work 
together with university staff and faculty (e.g., Vice-chancellor) to facilitate human resource 
activities centralized by the Trust. These activities relate to determining HR policy and job-
related criteria, and creating and filling new positions. This is perhaps why Dr. Aabha 
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emphasizes in her interview that the Trust must work congenially with the university. She 
explains:  
The relation between the board of trustees [managing committee] and the university is  
quite tricky in the sense that it should be congenial. Otherwise, if that doesn't work well,  
which means the principal director which is me, and the vice chancellor have to work like  
the wheels of a garden hose, we have to run parallel, and you don't run fast. You know  
the moment we are at conflict right?...the university will crash.  
 
However, not all university affairs centralized by the Trust are handled in the fashion of 
consultation (with nonfamily stakeholders). Some decisions are handled unilaterally. For 
example, decisions related to employee malpractice or moral turpitude seem to be made without 
the vibrant and heavy discussion that may be found in the academic decision-making process. 
Dr. Prem (Chancellor) below relates his experience regarding decisions of this type.  
Yes yes, you see sometimes what happens, when you give total autonomy to the  
directors, after five years ten years, he feels he is taller than institution. So he started  
disobeying instructions from central office. And when that happens, I give them one  
warning. If he again repeats, I am a bad person. I am a butcher. So he is out.  
 
According to Dr. Prem, unscrupulous activities call for the swift exercise of his authority. There 
is no discussion and consultation with nonfamily stakeholder on governing authorities or through 
other officially-sanctioned shared governance modalities. As the “butcher,” Dr. Prem implies 
that he has the power to make such decisions on his own.  
 Decisions related to the hiring and appointing of leadership staff may also be made 
without discussion involving nonfamily stakeholders. As explained in earlier chapters, Dr. Prem 
appoints the Pro-chancellor and Vice-chancellor. This is his choice to make. The following is 
what Dr. Aabha shares when asked if there were other candidates considered for the Pro-
chancellor position.   
 No, no, no. So the Pro-chancellor position is a position that is appointed by the  




 Furthermore, the Chancellor has the power to resolve disputes pertaining to appointments 
made by others. The following is a quote from a university document.   
 The report of the Selection Committee will be put up for consideration and further 
 appropriate action by the Appointing Authority. If the Appointing Authority is unable to 
 accept the recommendations of the Selection Committee, it shall record its reason/s about  
 it and submit the case to the Chancellor/President whose decision shall be final.  
 (University document) 
 
Finally, there is a possibility that appointments and promotions concerning family 
members are made without engaging the necessary channels related to hiring—that is, without 
formally integrating nonfamily stakeholder inputs and views. Consider the following from Dr. 
Kiaan’s interview. He reveals that discussion, or as he puts it “two-way talk” around family-
based succession does not happen.  
Suppose there are top management people, and some like me, professors and others,  
there should be opportunity to explore my visions...There should be a two-way talk...Both 
leader and follower...There should be some dialogues...Discussion. Yes, that leadership  
will work out. Rather than this autocratic, because what I want, this has to happen. This  
concept should be there. 
 
When asked to clarify whether he meant that it would be nice at Grand Hall University if there 
were to be more dialogue around choosing leaders, he replied with the following. 
Yes. Correct. There should be dialogue, there should be discussions, there should be 
opinions...So they are more successful...More dialogue should be there. Then family,  
maybe other leadership positions...Unless, what I will tell you, one single wrong step may  
go through the deterioration, understand? 
 
I inquired further about what he meant by “so they are more successful” and “one single wrong 
step may go through deterioration.” He explained that there should be more discussion and 
planning around training the next generation. To clarify, Dr. Kiaan is not challenging the 
eventual appointments of younger generation family members to leadership positions. As he 
reveals in another part of his interview, he strongly believes that the family should remain in 
control, that the family is the only stakeholder group that can uphold the traditions, values, and 
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vision of the university. In fact, this is more or less the sentiment of every interview participant I 
interviewed (as I revealed in chapter 7). Rather, my point is that Dr. Kiaan is arguing that family-
based succession could be better planned. He is expressing concerns about the level of his 
involvement, or perceived fairness of decision-making as Birnbaum (2004) would put it, in 
ensuring that incoming family members are best fit for the job.  
It is important to point out that conversations between family and nonfamily members 
around succession planning is not entirely absent at GHU. I highlighted earlier a conversation 
that Dr. Prisha had with the family about preparing the younger generation and sending them to 
schools like Harvard for leadership training. This conversation, however, seems to have taken 
place in an informal capacity and is perhaps only occurring between the family and nonfamily 
stakeholders in higher positions. Dr. Kian, who is found at the departmental level, may not be 
privy to such conversations or have less opportunities to engage the family informally.   
The following quote from Dr. Prisha (Dean) also reveals that family-based appointments 
may be differently handled from nonfamily-based appointments. When asked how family 
members come to fill management positions, whether the family-based appointments follow HR 
protocols, she responds with the following.   
It's a very difficult question to answer...For example, we have some universities in [this 
city] where, what you are [asking], that kind of hypothetical situation happens [family-
based appointments not following protocol]. But in [Grand Hall], if you see...Take for 
example [Dr. Aarav]. He is the dean of [one of the faculties]. I can't imagine another, 
more accomplished person in that level. It is only coincidental that he is the son-in-law of 
the family. 
 
It is interesting to note that Dr. Prisha cannot or did not answer the question. She redirected to 
talk about Dr. Aarav’s level of competency. Indeed, he seems very qualified according to his 
biography on GHU’s website. However, the ambiguity of Dr. Prisha’s response is a point to 
discuss. We may infer either that Dr. Prisha does not fully know the process by which family 
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members are appointed or that she knows but for whatever reason has decided not to share. 
Regardless, it seems reasonable to infer that family-based appointments are differently handled 
from nonfamily-based appointments. It may be that the family does not need the formal approval 
of nonfamily stakeholders when appointing family to leadership positions. Indeed, further data 
suggest this to be case. We learn in the quotes below, two from written material by Dr. Prem and 
one from Dr. Aabha’s interview, that the appointments of Dr. Aabha, Dr. Nishita, and Dr. Aarav 
are made possible because Dr. Prem so desired.   
About the same time, my daughter [Nishita] returned to India after a prolonged stay in the  
USA. She is a computer science professional and had plans to start her own information  
technology company. I persuaded her to put the cause of [Grand Hall] ahead of her own  
ambitions... (written information by Dr. Prem) 
 
After [Dr. Aarav] and [Dr. Aabha] returned from [working in a different city], they  
decided to invest their savings in a gynecology hospital. For some time I was a silent  
observer but then decided to take them into confidence. I told them that it was my desire  
that [Dr. Aabha] should devote her time and energies to [Grand Hall]...[Dr. Aarav]   
accepted the position of Deputy Director of [a center at GHU]...In the meantime,  
[Dr. Aabha] joined [Grand Hall] Society as Deputy Director. (written information by Dr.  
Prem) 
 
Dr. Aabha: So then I became a deputy director, he [Dr. Prem] was a principal director,  
then it was many years and I became the joint director, in about five years, then he [Dr.  
Prem] said that now you should be an executive chair and I should just be the president. 
 
I would like to focus on the language used by Dr. Aabha and Dr. Prem. Dr. Prem says 
that it was his desire for his daughter, Dr. Aabha to work at Grand Hall. He also says that he 
persuaded his other daughter, Dr. Nishita, to also work at Grand Hall. This language suggests 
that Dr. Prem may have the authority to hire them or perhaps more pointedly the authority to 
guarantee their appointments. We also can draw the same insight from Dr. Aabha’s quote. Her 
father was described as saying that she should be an executive chair. The use of “should” carries 
some connotation that Dr. Prem has the authority to promote Dr. Aabha or rather can make her 
promotion happen. I would like to importantly point out that Dr. Aabha’s promotion (and for that 
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matter the appointments of all family members) is not solely based on family ties. As shown in 
chapter 8, interview participants all believe second generation members to be competent and 
qualified for leadership positions. It may be that Dr. Prem also thinks of his daughters and his 
oldest daughter’s husband as being best fit for the job.  
In sum, the family seems to have more influence over decisions related to the affairs 
centralized by the Trust. Through the lens of SEW, we may say that the SEW dimension of 
family influence is stronger in the administrative decision-making chain than in the academic 
decision-making chain. We may also conclude that when the Dr. Prem asks family members to 
join GHU that he is in fact seeking to protect the family’ stock of SEW. Their involvement 
would not only concentrate the family’s stock of family influence, but also enhance other SEW 
such as identity and emotional attachment. The family’s identity with GHU and the emotional 
attachments they have for each other would grow stronger as a result of more family members 
having direct managerial involvement. Thus, SEW wealth theory has relevance to explaining 
some of the decision-making behaviors in the administrative decision-making chain.  
Family Values as a Driver of Decision-Making 
There is one final theme emerging form the data that sheds further light on family-based 
decision-making behaviors at GHU. The data reveal that another family dimension, besides the 
desire to pursue socioemotional wealth, is also found to be driving decision-making. This 
dimension is the value system of the Prem family. To be clear, a family’s value system is related 
to SEW and SEW theory. According to several scholars (e.g., Sorenson et al., 2009; Zellweger et 
al., 2011), the SEW model naturally stems from the reality of family businesses where families 
are driven to make choices based on their values, or dominant principles. According to SEW 
theory, the dominant principles are related to pursuing SEW. In other words, the family values 
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the preservation of SEW “as an end in itself that goes beyond any economic reward” (Berrone et 
al., 2012, p. 272). 
However, in the case of GHU, the data point to a unique set of values (outside of the need 
to pursue SEW) driving decision-making. In other words, this value system is external to the 
need to derive SEW. Figure 2.6 below visualizes this family value system. Importantly, the 
figure situates it as a criterion that the family references when making organizational decisions. 
Also shown are the stock of SEW the Prem family possesses and the set of expectations and 
pressures placed on the family by the overlapping governance realities at GHU. These are also 
situated as criteria that the family references when making decisions. The point of Figure 2.6 is 























Figure 2.6 relates another important point as denoted by the dotted line running between 
the criteria of ‘family values’ and ‘higher education expectations and pressures.’ The data reveal 
that the family value system aligns with what the governance realities of GHU demand from the 
family. In other words, the family is found to value faculty autonomy, shared decision-making, 
professional and ethics-based behaviors, all needs tied to the academic culture, and importantly 
the family believes in education as both a goal in itself and a means to transform society. Written 
material by Dr. Prem (Chancellor) confirms this. Dr. Prem explains: 













entrepreneur I want to know how to meet society’s need for higher education. Currently  
this need, in my view, is for the dissemination of existing knowledge. (written  
information by Dr. Prem) 
 
The scientist in me has generated a listening culture. I keep an open mind and let it  
absorb the ideas that enter. Some of [Grand Hall’s] best institutes were established not  
because of careful market research, but I let people freely express their ideas to me. I like  
to think that I am a democrat at heart and in deed. Various forums in [Grand Hall] give  
plenty of opportunities to the faculty and the staff to articulate their views. Our principle  
is similar to that of Toyota’s. One of the Toyota Management Principle is, ‘Make  
decisions slowly by consensus, thoroughly considering all options; implement them  
rapidly.’ There is plenty of discussion. Decisions are arrived at carefully. (written  
information by Dr. Prem) 
 
The quotes above suggest that Dr. Prem (and his family) possesses values that align with the 
needs of the academic culture. Dr. Prem considers himself a scientist and democrat who operates 
from the principle of valuing decision-making through listening and discussion. We may 
understand that this value system formed over time during Dr. Prem’s tenure as a faculty 
member before founding his institution. He is a teacher at heart, as Dr. Prisha (Dean) and Dr. 
Kiaan (Professor) point out in their interviews. And as a teacher he is perceived to “respect 
[other faculty] and “allow everyone to grow around him” (Dr. Prisha, interview). The following 
is further corroborating material that the family values what GHU and its governance culture 
need.  
Dr. Aabha: Not really. Because [Grand Hall] has had really strong values that are  
percolated from the top, which is from [Dr. Prem], the creator. So I think in his  
system of governance it's very democratic, and that's why I think there's been a very  
similar flow of his vision towards stakeholders.  
 
Dr. Aabha: There is so much discussion that happens that is a vibrant discussion and  
there are so many times things that they might not agree with the vice -chancellor and the  
management, but there is a very heavy discussion. Nearly all decisions, again, this is what  
my father has taught us [the GHU community]. He always believes that decisions should  
come out of democratic discussions and not really something that is very central. 
 
These quotes demonstrate that Dr. Prem values democratic decision-making. In fact, Dr. Aabha 
implies that Dr. Prem has shaped the culture of collegiality at GHU. She says that strong values 
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“are percolated from the top” and that Dr. Prem is the “creator” of the system of governance in 
place. In the following quote, Dr. Aabha relates a story where these values play out in practice. 
So the function of the healthcare center is to carry out a new health check up on all the  
students. We call it an annual wellness checkup, and ensure that all students are well. So  
this year we thought that if the hospital is going to start being commissioned probably in  
October, so once the hospital starts, we will have an annual health check-up for all of our  
students in the hospital. So the [Grand Hall] Center for Healthcare presently has stations  
or its presence on all the campuses, you know in [this city] spread across the city. So on  
every campus, we have a healthcare center. So now we said that there's no need to have  
so many healthcare centers and duplicate this whole medical checkup because there's so  
many doctors, you have to be invited, a lot of space gets occupied and so on. So we said  
we'll have the annual health checkup at the hospital...So when I said this, my father said  
"Which means that students will travel for just the health check-up all that distance,  
because there will be some students going from here, from the law campus and on." So I  
said yes...But he said "Have you discussed this with the other directors?" And I said but I  
don't think there's anything that needs discussion, because if you have a hospital then  
obviously you should have the health checkup at the hospital. So he said "No, you will  
take this up with the directors and if they feel it's uncomfortable to send their students all  
the way to the hospital, then I don't think you should do that.” 
 
The above quote describes an interaction between Dr. Aabha (Pro-chancellor) and Dr. 
Prem (Chancellor). Dr. Aabha sets out to make a decision without involving nonfamily 
stakeholders. However, we find that Dr. Prem pushes against the idea and implores that Dr. 
Aabha reconsider. This interaction is another example suggesting that Dr. Prem values 
democratic decision-making and the opinions of others.  
It is important to point out that I am not naively suggesting that the family value system 
replaces the family’s desire to pursue SEW when the family makes decisions. There may be 
instances where the family makes decisions to both protect the ability to remain managerially 
involved and act on the value system they possess. In other words, the two are not mutually 
exclusive, but may be working together to drive decision-making behaviors. For example, we 
learned from chapter 7 that the family wants to keep the Trust in the family. What is interesting 
to note is the reason behind this intent. According to Dr. Aabha, it is important to keep the Trust 
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within the family because the Trust establishes the vision for and upholds the values of the 
university. We may therefore infer that the family wants to remain in control because it wants to 
keep the university accountable to its mission—by animating the organizational culture 
according to the values the family possesses. Therefore, in this case, the family may be 
referencing both SEW criteria (renewal) and its value system. In other words, the family may be 
acting from an interest to protect their capacity to remain in power and also operating from their 
value system of making sure that the university does not stray from its culture of shared 
governance and ethics-based leadership.  
We may thus modify Figure 2.6 by drawing another dotted line between the two criteria 
of ‘family values’ and ‘SEW wealth.’ The modified figure is shown below (Figure 2.7). This is 
certainly an interesting finding. As shown, we may essentially understand the family value 
system as reconciling the two theoretical frameworks of SEW theory and stakeholder theory. In 
other words, it is quite possible that the family in certain decision-making scenarios are 
referencing all three criteria systems. Take for example the scenario where the family protects 
the dimension of renewal by alleviating stakeholder through cooperative decision-making 
behaviors. In this scenario, we may say that they family is referencing all three criteria systems. 
The family is pursuing renewal. Also, the family is satisfying the expectations of nonfamily 
stakeholders. And finally, the family may be operating from their value system that upholds 
decision-making through listening and discussion. 
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In this chapter, I first addressed the primary research question: How does the managerial 
family of GHU approach decision-making in a context where inherent governance realities may 
place limits on their ascribed authority. As expected, I found that the Prem family generally takes 
a cooperative, nonconfrontational approach to decision-making across the governance realities 
and decision-making scenarios highlighted. Nonfamily stakeholder concerns and ideas are heard, 
valued, and integrated when reaching decisions—through varying governance modalities 













negotiates most decisions by proactively engaging stakeholders in a collegial atmosphere where 
university affairs are discussed and governance responsibilities are shared. Another major theme 
lifted from the findings is that the family negotiates decision-making by respecting the decision-
making autonomy of nonfamily stakeholders (faculty and the administration).  
I then discussed the findings (family decision-making behaviors) through the two lenses 
of socioemotional wealth (SEW) theory and stakeholder theory. As expected, I found stakeholder 
theory to be a more robust theoretical framework than SEW theory in explaining family 
decision-making patterns at GHU. As shown in Table 2.6 below, stakeholder theory accounts for 
five out of the six decision-making scenarios highlighted in this chapter (denoted by ‘yes’). This 
makes sense because the decision-making approach consistently taken by the family is one of 
engaging stakeholders through discussion and empowering stakeholders in decision-making. 
This approach is consistent with stakeholder principles. However, socioemotional wealth theory 
conclusively accounts for only three decision-making scenarios, also shown in Table 2.6. Two of 
these decision-making scenarios relate to the family’s intent to protect the SEW dimension of 
renewal (family-based succession). Preserving the model of family-based succession at GHU is 










Table 2.6 Socioemotional Wealth Theory vs Stakeholder Theory 






     
Organizational complexity  Maybe N/A Yes N/A 
Stakeholder diversity Maybe Yes Yes Yes 
Government and societal 
accountability 
Yes and Maybe Yes Yes and No No 
Shared governance Maybe N/A Yes N/A 
Source: Author 
 
To note, there is a possibility that SEW theory may explain a broader range of decision-
making approaches, but according to the positive view of SEW. I speculated that family 
members, by taking a cooperative approach to decision-making, is in fact seeking to protect or 
enhance other SEW besides family influence—but by first making sure that they are in a position 
to seek them. In other words, the family may be using cooperative decision-making approaches 
to demonstrate their capability as effective leaders. This would certainly give the impression to 
nonfamily stakeholders that the family deserves its leadership status. However, I am in no 
position to confirm this in my dissertation. Thus, where SEW theory may explain decision-
making, three of the cells in Table 2.6 are marked with ‘maybe.’ For all intents and purposes, 
‘maybes’ may be treated as the theory not having relevance to explaining the phenomenon.  
The poorer fit of socioemotional wealth theory is consistent with my expectations. 
Namely, the theoretical premise of SEW theory falls apart when applied to the family’s 
cooperative decision-making approach. It was clear that the family in cooperating with 
nonfamily stakeholders (through discussion or conforming to rules) is not seeking to protect or 
increase family influence. Rather, I argued that the act of cooperating means the sharing or 
ceding of influence, and the satisfaction of nonfamily stakeholder needs. Certainly, this does not 
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fit the premise of SEW theory where the family is understood to act in self-serving ways, and 
frame problems and make decisions with the aim of satisfying family-centric needs.  
Furthermore, SEW theory, unlike stakeholder theory, fails to capture the power relations 
of GHU. In other words, SEW theory fails to explain why the family takes a cooperative 
approach to decision-making. I argued that the cooperative approach is necessary in a context 
where different stakeholder groups have decision-making power (or competitive threat) and can 
use their power to resist the views and decisions of the family. Such circumstances behoove the 
family to take a non-confrontational strategy in decision-making, not to mention allow nonfamily 
stakeholders to drive governance processes and transactions. 
As closing remarks, it is important to point out that decision-making at GHU is a 
complicated endeavor requiring different approaches according to different circumstances. The 
decision-making scenarios highlighted in this chapter of course do not represent the full 
spectrum of circumstances that may be found at GHU. However, they do show that decision-
making at GHU can change based on specific needs arising from within different governance 
realities. Decision-making also changes based on decision type where the family may have more 
influence to make decisions that favor the protection or augmentation of family-centric SEW 
within the administrative decision-making chain. What does however seem to remain constant is 
the undergirding family values driving decision-making. In all the decision-making scenarios, 
the family may operate from a value system that promotes cooperative decision-making 






CHAPTER 10: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study is investigating and profiling the decision-making behaviors 
and intent of families involved in higher education ownership or management. The study’s thrust 
comes from the assumption that families involved in nonprofit higher education ownership or 
management may behave differently from the dominant theoretical assumptions of the family 
firm literature. Families in higher education, specifically in traditional university settings, may 
reference other criteria besides socioemotional wealth when framing problems and making 
decisions. Decision-making may not be entirely based on whether or not there is a real or 
perceived risk to losing socioemotional wealth, or the nonfinancial endowments of family firms 
(Berrone et al., 2012). Rather, families in the nonprofit higher education context may negotiate 
decision-making with additional sensitivity to the realities of the academic governance culture.  
As expected, interviews and documents suggest this to be the case within one family-owned or -
managed university in India. Most of the decision-making patterns of the managerial family in 
this university may be differentiated from those in family-owned businesses in the commercial 
context. However, some mirrored what we may find in the commercial context.  
In this chapter, I discuss the findings of this dissertation in the context of broader themes, 
and relative to their import to theoretical contribution, practice, and further research. As part of 
this discussion, a focus is on contextualizing Grand Hall University to understand its place and 
character within the global landscape of family-owned or-managed universities as well as the 
broader private higher education topography. I will also differentiate GHU from family-owned 
businesses in the commercial setting. Contextualizing GHU in these ways is important to clarify 
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the significance of this study, which is a large focus of this chapter. The limitations of this study 
will also be addressed.  
Summary of Findings 
Several findings were discussed across the previous four chapters. Interviews and 
documents suggest that Grand Hall University possesses what I referred to as prototypical higher 
education characteristics, characteristics of the higher education governance culture as 
understood by the literature (i.e., Birnbaum, 2004; Cohen & March, 1986; Gutmann, 1999; 
Newman et al., 1996). Like most universities around the world, GHU is large and complex; has 
stakeholder diversity and interests plurality; is expected to comply to regulatory requirements 
and pressures; and seemingly employs shared governance modalities and structures. GHU was 
also found to typify the key trappings of family-owned businesses. These trappings are in the 
form of what Berrone et al. (2012) refer to as socioemotional wealth, or the nonfinancial 
endowments of the organizational created from the family’s managerial involvement. Thus, 
GHU is neither entirely a university nor entirely a family-owned business. GHU may be best 
understood as a hybrid organization possessing dual characteristics, or simply a family system 
and a higher education system.   
As expected, interviews suggest that these systems may be conflictive. In other words, 
data suggest that the managerial family of GHU, the Prem family, is restricted in what they can 
or cannot do by several factors tied to the higher education system, or as discussed in previous 
chapters governance realities. These factors include subcultures that frustrate leadership efforts 
to establish institutional coherence; nonfamily stakeholders who have decision-making power 
and use their decision-power to contend family in top leadership on their views and with respect 
to implementing institutional policy; stringent regulatory requirements that carry dire 
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consequences if violated; public backlash regarding decisions that GHU makes; shared 
governance modalities and structures that favor the involvement and participation of different 
stakeholders in the decision-making process. 
Finally, I clarified how the family approaches decision-making or makes decisions within 
the governance realities outlined above. The important question raised was how the family 
negotiates organizational decision-making at GHU—given the aforementioned factors that may 
limit their decision-making agency? Interview data suggest that the family, in part motivated by 
a positive value system, generally takes a cooperative, non-confrontational approach to decision-
making when negotiating the overlapping governance realities of GHU. Nonfamily stakeholder 
concerns and ideas are heard, valued, and integrated—through varying governance modalities—
when reaching decisions. The overarching theme of the findings is that the family negotiates 
most decisions by proactively engaging stakeholders in a collegial atmosphere where university 
affairs are discussed and governance responsibilities are shared—even when the ideas and views 
of nonfamily stakeholder groups are rejected. Another major theme lifted from the findings is 
that the family negotiates decision-making by respecting the decision-making autonomy of 
nonfamily stakeholders (both faculty and administration). The family takes a “hands-off” 
approach to decision-making regarding certain decisions.  
However, interviews and documents also suggest that the family, by assuming multiple 
leadership roles, has opportunities to influence a broader range of organizational affairs (than 
nonfamily staff), in both academic and administrative decision-making. For example, as 
Principal Director, Dr. Aabha influences decisions related to those affairs centralized by the 
Trust (finance, estates, etc.). Dr. Aabha is also a member of the Board of Management. In this 
capacity, she may contribute to decision-making related to academics. A key point is that family 
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influence pervades both academic and administrative decision-making chains as a result of 
family members occupying multiple leadership positions. Figure 2.8 below shows how family 
influence pervades both academic and administrative decision-making chains. Dr. Aabha’s 
influence in decision-making is represented by the clear circle spanning the two blue cylinders, 
one representing the academic decision-making chain and the other representing the 
administrative decision-making chain. Since I found that family influence may be stronger in 
administrative decision-making, the color gradient of the circle, representing Dr. Aabha’s 
influence, is stronger on the right side where key administrative decision-making takes place. 































Dr. Aabha as Principal Director 
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Significance of Findings and Theoretical Implications 
Upon initial consideration, the findings of this study may not appear significant. In fact, 
quite the opposite. The findings seem to confirm what we (the higher education academic 
community) already know—that decision-making in higher education is a complicated and an 
often-politicized affair involving different stakeholders seeking to push personal agendas. And 
also that decision-making is shared. Indeed, this is consistent with the literature (Cohen & 
March, 1985; Birnbaum, 2004; Bolman & Deal, 2017). Thus, we come to understand Grand Hall 
University as resembling any other traditional university. This certainly makes sense because 
GHU after all is a university.  
However, the findings become significant when considered relative to how GHU differs 
from the prototypical higher education institution. While GHU shares some characteristics with 
nonfamily types (e.g., there is a nonprofit board of trustees), GHU is fundamentally different 
from nonfamily types because of one defining characteristic. The defining characteristic of GHU 
is that it is ultimately managed by a family unit whose members (a) have a strong ownership 
position through their leadership roles and (b) seek to remain managerially involved by passing 
the authority to manage the institution to successive familial generations.  
The fact that GHU is run by a family may be sufficient grounds to assume that the family 
of GHU makes decisions according to current theorizing found in the family firm literature. As 
explained, the family firm literature assumes that families in an ownership position frame 
organizational problems and make decisions based on the real or perceived loss or gain of what 
Berrone et al. (2012) call socioemotional wealth (SEW), or broken into its five components: 
family influence, identity, binding social ties, emotional attachment, and renewal. Berrone et al. 
further state that pursuing SEW is an end goal in itself and more important than pursuing profit, 
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or satisfying any other organizational goal for that matter. Thus, socioemotional wealth theory 
essentially argues that families in ownership positions make decisions ultimately in self-serving 
ways that are understood to benefit the family system—often at the expense of proper 
organizational functioning and the fair treatment of nonfamily employees (Lansberg, 1983; 
Zientara, 2017). Gomez-Mejia et al. (2010) further argue that families owning firms do 
everything in their power to avoid sharing influence. They do this as a way to not only protect 
the SEW dimension of family influence, but also remain in power to protect or enhance other 
SEW in perpetuity.  
However, the findings of this study suggest that most of the decision-making patterns of 
the Prem family diverge from what is understood to be the theoretical norm. Indeed, the 
theoretical reasoning where families operate in self-serving ways does not fit the decision-
making patterns suggested by interview data. The family not only takes a cooperative, 
nonconfrontational approach to decision-making where stakeholder needs are valued and met, 
but also grants significant decision-making autonomy to other decision-making agents (i.e., 
faculty). Thus, the Prem family may be understood as sharing their stock of family influence 
with nonfamily stakeholders, instead of hoarding it. This study finds significance on this point. 
The family’s divergent decision-making patterns suggest that family-based organizational 
decision-making at GHU less resembles those found at family-owned businesses than those 
found in traditional higher education settings. And thus, organizational decision-making at GHU 
cannot be fully be explained by SEW theory. The theoretical underpinning of SEW theory fall 
apart when applied to the higher education context. The reasons as to why it falls apart is also 
made clear in this study. The primary reason, as mentioned, is because it does not capture the 
Prem family’s altruistic decision-making behaviors. The family is found to share family 
285 
 
influence, not protect it. Further, SEW theory fails to capture the power relations of GHU. In 
other words, SEW theory’s assumption that families in ownership or leadership positions operate 
from a position of absolute power (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007) falls apart in an organizational 
context where power is distributed among a plurality of stakeholder groups. This limitation must 
not be ignored because understanding how power is shared among stakeholder groups sheds light 
on why the family (a) takes a cooperative, nonconfrontational approach to decision-making and 
(b) allows nonfamily stakeholders to drive governance transactions and processes.   
Importantly, the limitations of SEW theory identified in this study prompt the emergence 
of new theoretical understandings for family-based decision-making behaviors in higher 
education. If anything, they prompt us to modify or expand on the theoretical premises of SEW 
theory so that we can appropriately and comprehensively understand how families involved in 
higher education management operate. However, it is important to point out that SEW theory is 
still needed to describe family-based ownership or management in higher education—despite its 
limitations. While not accounting for the cooperative decision-making approach the Prem family 
takes, it does account for other decision-making involving the protection of other SEW. It was 
clear in chapter 9 that the Prem family makes decisions to protect their capacity to remain 
managerially involved. Protecting the SEW dimension of ‘renewal’ is important to the Prem 
family—important enough to even fight the government in court on a ruling prohibiting family-
based leadership. Further, I provided some reasoning to suggest that the Prem family may be 
taking a cooperative, nonconfrontational approach to decision-making as a necessary step to 
protect or enhance other SEW besides family influence. If in fact this is the case, then SEW 
theory would be more relevant. However, I cannot substantiate this inference based on the data 
collected for this dissertation. Proving this may be something for future research.  
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The key point is that SEW theory is still relevant despite its limitations. Thus, I do not 
naively suggest that we discard SEW theory and replace it with new theoretical understandings 
outside of the SEW framework. I’m only suggesting, as mentioned, that we expand on the 
theoretical premises of SEW theory. In the next section, I discuss stakeholder theory as a 
complimentary framework that addresses the conceptual limitations of SEW theory, relative to 
the findings.   
Stakeholder Theory as a Complimentary Framework 
As explained, decision-making at GHU is a complicated endeavor requiring different 
approaches according to different circumstances. Like socioemotional wealth theory, stakeholder 
theory does not explain all the family’s decision-making approaches identified in this study. 
Generally, stakeholder theory does not apply where SEW theory is found to be a good fit. This of 
course is barring the possibility that the family satisfies stakeholder concerns as a necessary step 
to protect or enhance other SEW besides family influence. If this is in fact the case, there would 
be greater overlap between SEW theory and stakeholder theory in explaining family-based 
decision-making patterns. However, as I said, this cannot be proven in this study.  
Thus, we are left with what can be demonstrated, and based on interviews, the key point 
is that stakeholder theory, while not accounting for all of the decision-making patterns, is robust 
enough to capture decision-making patterns in most of the decision-making scenarios highlighted 
in this study. More pointedly, stakeholder theory is well adapted to explain the cooperative, non-
confrontational decision-making approaches taken by the family. Stakeholder theory was even 
shown to be relevant in certain scenarios where SEW is found to be pursued by the family. For 
example, both SEW theory and stakeholder theory overlap in explaining how the family remains 
managerially involved in the reality where stakeholders have skepticism of younger generation 
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family members. The family takes a “right way” approach to family-based succession where they 
also satisfy the expectations and needs of nonfamily stakeholder groups. The robustness of 
stakeholder theory is shown below in Table 2.7, which was already shown in chapter 9. As 
shown, there are more decision-making scenarios where stakeholder theory is relevant (denoted 
by ‘yes’).   
Table 2.7 Socioemotional Wealth Theory vs Stakeholder Theory 






     
Organizational complexity  Maybe N/A Yes N/A 
Stakeholder diversity Maybe Yes Yes Yes 
Government and societal 
accountability 
 
Yes and Maybe Yes Yes and No No 
Shared governance Maybe N/A Yes N/A 
Source: Author 
Further, stakeholder theory’s relevance to explaining family decision-making patterns at 
GHU is not just rooted in the satisfaction of the theory’s primary assumption, which is the 
integration of views from a broad stakeholder base and stakeholder satisfaction (Freeman, 1984). 
Stakeholder theory is also relevant because of several other related reasons. For one, I found that 
stakeholder theory explains the reality where the family delegates decision-making authority to 
nonfamily stakeholders. According to stakeholder theorists (e.g., Brummer, 1991), the activity of 
delegating power is part of a collegial model of governance where management shares decision-
making responsibility with stakeholder groups. I also found that stakeholder theory is a good fit 
to explaining the connection between shared governance and GHU’s goal of advancing the 
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mission of higher education. According to stakeholder theorists (e.g., Brummer, 1991; Freeman, 
1984; Freeman & McVea, 2001), employee participation in governance is necessary to achieve 
organizational goals (Brummer, 1991; Freeman, 1984; Freeman & McVea, 2001). Thus, we may 
say that shared governance does not seek to satisfy the goals of just one stakeholder group, but 
the organizational goals that multiple stakeholders groups come to shape.  
Finally, and perhaps most important, stakeholder theory is found to capture the power 
relations of GHU, which in turn explain why the Prem family takes a cooperative, non-
confrontational approach to decision-making in most of the decision-making scenarios. As Dr. 
Aabha was noted with saying in her interview, “The relation between the board of trustees 
[Managing Committee] and the university is quite tricky in the sense that it should be congenial. 
Otherwise, if that doesn't work well...which means the Principal Director which is me, and the 
Vice-chancellor have to work like the wheels of a garden hose, we have to run parallel, and you 
don't run fast. You know the moment we are at conflict...the university will crash.” In other 
words, a cooperative, non-confrontational approach is needed if the aim is to avoid inter-
stakeholder conflict and disrupting the proper functioning of the university.  
All of the reasons above point to an important understanding. They suggest that 
stakeholder theory fulfills an important and even necessary function in complimenting SEW 
theory by addressing the limitations of SEW theory. Where SEW fails to capture the power-
based relational dynamics of GHU and the family’s reactionary patterns to the power of 
nonfamily stakeholder groups, the need of stakeholder theory to understand family-based 
governance in higher education becomes prominent. Thus, I propose that both theoretical 




As shown in Figure 2.9 below, the decision-making approaches the family takes (denoted 
by the circles in the middle of the figure) are explained by both theories. The big circle 
represents the cooperative, nonconfrontational approach to decision making where family 
influence is shared, not protected. As explained, this decision-making approach is explained by 
stakeholder theory, denoted by the arrow running from the stakeholder framework to the circle. 
This circle is bigger than the others because the family seems to rely on this approach the most. 
The smaller circles represent the other decision-making approaches clarified in chapter 9 (e.g., 
strong position approach). As shown, there are instances where both SEW theory and 
stakeholder theory overlap in explaining family decision-making behaviors (denoted by arrows 
coming from both SEW theory and stakeholder theory frameworks). The key point of this figure 
is that both theoretical frameworks are needed to explain the basket of family-based decision-
making approaches found at GHU. Ultimately, this figure suggests that SEW theory is not 
comprehensive enough to explain family-based decision-making in traditional university 
settings. This study thus expands on the family firm literature and proposes that stakeholder 











Figure 2.9 Comprehensive Theoretical Framework to Understand Decision-Making in Family-









































Generalizability of Findings 
An important question I am compelled to raise is whether the theoretical framework 
shown in Figure 2.9 can be applied to other family-owned or -managed higher education 
institutions (FOMHEIs). In other words, are the findings of this study generalizable to the global 
landscape of FOMHEIs. The answer is yes and no. The answer is yes if we are to consider 
FOMHEIs like GHU. In other words, both theoretical frameworks are required to explain family-
based decision-making at universities that possess both prototypical higher education and family-
based traits. Only when both sets of characteristics are present, can we assume that decision-
making will similarly be a complicated and often contentious affair involving multiple 
stakeholder groups and based on discussion and consensus (similar to what I found at GHU).  
However, the answer may be no when considering FOMHEIs with more pronounced 
family-based traits (where family-based traits overpower such characteristics like shared 
governance). In other words, the answer is no when the families of their universities are more 
controlling and use top-down, autocratic approaches to decision-making. In such cases, the 
family may be in a better position to protect and enhance their stock of SEW, and make decisions 
aligned with satisfying family-centric interests, rather than the interests of the organization. They 
may even run their universities in ways that depart from the mission of higher education. My 
general understanding is that most family-run institutions globally, in both the nonprofit and for-
profit sectors, are not like GHU and have managerial families that take top-down approaches to 
decision-making. Indeed, this is the suggestion made by Altbach et al. (2020). While the case 
studies discussed in their book are all exceptional universities with families having an 
enlightened orientation to management, many of the chapters discuss the general landscape of 
FOMHEIs as having reputational disadvantages connected to outdated modes of leadership. 
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Thus, the findings of this study may only apply to a narrow group of FOMHEIs that are like 
GHU.  
The possibility that the answer can be yes or no in connection with leadership 
style/approach raises an important consideration. It raises the consideration that generalizability 
depends on the family value system. In other words, the findings of this study are only applicable 
to the decision-making behaviors of families who have positive value systems promoting 
relationships based on mutual understanding, trust, respect, and cooperation. These families may 
use their positions (use their influence) to achieve organizational goals, goals not connected to 
benefiting the family system alone. These goals may be tied to creating a collegial culture in 
which nonfamily stakeholder groups feel welcome and valued as members contributing to the 
decision-making machinery. In other words, some families may want to remain managerially 
involved to ensure the success of the institution according to principles largely accepted by the 
academic community (as in the case of GHU). Thus, the pursuance of SEW is not, as Berrone et 
al. (2012) explain, an end goal in itself, but a means to achieve other objectives. In this way, the 
value system of the family is consistent with the needs of the academic culture.  
However, the findings of this study are not applicable to families whose value system are 
more aligned with satisfying self-serving needs and/or using the university to push non-
educational agendas. Altbach et al. (2020) suggest that these types of FOMHEIs abound 
globally. While not a monolithic group (indeed, there are for-profit FOMHEIS that take 
education very seriously), the clearest example of such FOMHEIs are those with a profit 
orientation. For-profit FOMHEIs have been generally discussed in Altbach et al. as organizations 
associated with corporate governance styles and operating with the ultimate objective of 
satisfying shareholders. Other examples come from Agarwal (2009) who says that private 
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deemed institutions in India are mostly family-run and that many of them have political leanings 
and/or manipulate admission requirements to collect huge sums of money through entrance 
exams. Furthermore, Agarwal points out that many of the managerial families in India appoint 
Vice-chancellors from among the members of the family, presumably to protect and enhance 
family influence. This indeed can be contrasted with GHU where a nonfamily member occupies 
the Vice-chancellor position.  
Implications to Practice 
The implications to practice are evident based on the discussion above. FOMHEIs where 
families employ questionable business practices and approach decision-making autocratically 
may draw useful lessons from this dissertation. It may not be a coincidence that Grand Hall 
University is a top-ranking private institution in India. My understanding is that in large part the 
university’s success may be ascribed to the family’s approach to governance and decision-
making. Valuing the members of the academic community and granting significant academic 
autonomy may have invariably contributed to the success of GHU. I infer this mostly on Bloom 
and Rosovsky (2011) who tie the success, positive reputation, and quality of universities to a 
number of characteristics. These include institutional autonomy and self-governance; qualified 
leadership; a commitment to academic freedom and shared governance; and meritocratic 
selection of faculty and students. All of these characteristics seemingly exist at Grand Hall 
University.  
Of course, I am not naively suggesting that a university’s success depends singularly on 
the family’s value system and leadership approach. There are other factors at play (e.g., funding 
and business acumen of the family and other leaders in the organization). It would be interesting 
to pursue further research to parse out the impact of each of these factors including leadership 
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style and value system relative to organizational success. However, I believe that the family’s 
approach to leadership is key. Indeed, the higher education literature ties shared governance to 
institutional effectiveness (Birnbaum, 1988; Brubacher & Rudy,1997; Heaney, 2010; Hirsch & 
Weber, 2001; Kerr, 2001). At the very least, a family who values shared governance may be 
taking the appropriate first steps to ensure organizational success.  
This dissertation may also provide governance and policy lessons for FOMHEIs like 
GHU, where shared governance is valued and practiced and where different stakeholders share in 
the responsibilities of decision outcomes. Family-based succession is a sensitive topic and a 
tricky business. The family must balance their intent to remain managerially involved with the 
suspicions and often critique of nonfamily constituents. Understanding this may be helpful when 
planning family-based succession strategies. Managerial families may consider involving 
different stakeholders, even faculty at the departmental level, in succession planning, rather than 
relying on the collective wisdom of the family and top leadership surrounding the family. Indeed, 
this was raised as a concern in one of the interviews. Such a process where family-based 
succession is discussed formally among different stakeholders may further legitimize family-
based succession in addition to the approaches taken by the Prem family.  
Limitations  
The key limitations of this dissertation are several. An obvious limitation is that the 
findings of this dissertation represent a subjective reality according to the information I could 
glean from university documents and what the interview participants chose to share. In other 
words, this dissertation, as Mertens (2009) would put it, is only an estimation of reality based on 
the data available. To address this, it would have been beneficial to collect more data through 
conducting additional interviews and relying on additional sources (e.g., observation) to 
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corroborate information. However, time and resource constraints did not allow for this. Also, it is 
my understanding that conducting more interviews at GHU would not have resulted in 
significant changes to the findings. I argue this based on an early observation I made about the 
interview data. I observed that diverging perspectives did not abound in the interview transcripts. 
This may indicate that I reached data saturation with the ten interviews I conducted. In other 
words, it is my understanding that I would have collected more of the same data if I were able to 
conduct additional interviews at GHU.  
Another important point related to the above is on the way in which I gained access to 
interview participants. As mentioned, Dr. Aabha, and a colleague of hers, helped me set up most 
of the initial interviews. While this help was immensely appreciated, this approach might have 
precluded the collection of data offering contrasting perspectives. Dr. Aabha may have 
connected me to people loyal to the family, members of GHU that may only share positive 
insights on the family and GHU. There are a couple of factors mitigating this possibility. First, 
Dr. Aabha connected me with key leadership staff that I sought to interview in the first place. So 
even if I could have gained access in another way, the composition of interview participants 
would have not changed significantly, meaning that findings would not have changed all that 
much. Second, I gained access to two of GHU employees on my own, without Dr. Aabha’s help. 
I believe these two interview participants, together with Dr. Danielle, the outside informant, may 
be understood as controlling for the possibility of collecting overly biased data. All three 
interview participants, for the most part, corroborated the interviews of those arranged through 
Dr. Aabha and her colleague.  
It is also important to point out a missed opportunity that could have yielded additional 
contrasting perspectives, if any. I had a chance to connect with a former employee of GHU that 
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worked closely with top leadership. This person, however, declined the invitation to participate 
in my dissertation, with no specific reasons given. I can only speculate that this is a missed 
opportunity. This person may have provided a contrasting perspective.    
Further, I must not ignore that the findings and discussion were in part shaped by the 
subjectivities of the researcher, by personal biases that have been shaped in my childhood 
growing up under my grandfather and father. With a conviction to develop areas devoid of 
postsecondary options and industry, my grandfather founded a number of educational institutions 
in the provincial areas of South Korea. Among these institutions are a four-year university and a 
two-year college. While my grandfather is no longer with my family, his legacy lives on in the 
work of my father who now is the president of the university. 
Being a member of a family that runs a university, I could not help but to discuss the 
findings according to my worldview of FOMHEIs. I believe that FOMHEIs are an important and 
significant part of the higher education systems in which they operate. This is how I have come 
to understand FOMHEIs, as I observed my grandfather and father in their work to build not 
businesses, but institutions of higher learning. Having this understanding, I feel the need to 
validate, empower, and recognize the stories of families like that of my father and grandfather. 
This is especially the case given the current climate where FOMHEIs are generally regarded as 
being of low quality and even worse, sites of corruption (Altbach et al., 2020). Having such a 
positionality, where I find myself pushing against this negative discourse, I inevitably sought to 
produce a contrasting view of the general characterization of FOMHEIs.  
Thus, this dissertation leaned toward illuminating a similar story to that of my 
grandfather and father’s, and I took an approach to examine a very specific type of FOMHEI 
where I expected to learn about “good” governance practices. Certainly, I could have taken a 
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different approach by examining FOMHEIs of a different character as identified in Altbach et al. 
(2020). There are for-profit FOMHEI ventures where governance resembles that found in the 
corporate sector or even nonprofit FOMHEIs where families have a stronger influence in 
decision-making. Perhaps said differently, there are FOMHEIs with more pronounced familiness 
characteristics where the goals of the family may indeed diverge from those of the universities 
they run. Regardless, the point I want to underscore is that my involvement as a researcher 
shaped the production of findings. Indeed, just as I chose the research site, I also was able to 
determine other aspects of my dissertation. For example, I developed the research questions. It 
was also my choice to highlight certain areas of interview transcripts over others, even though I 
took steps to present a data-driven holistic and realistic portrayal of the ownership context in 
higher education as much as possible. 
Another limitation, which was also already mentioned, concerns the calculation of 
decision-making power for each of the stakeholder groups at GHU. I explained that power levels 
were calculated based on limited data, from a very small group of interview participants. A 
concern was raised about the representativeness of this group. I assumed that the power 
distribution would change if a larger sample was used to calculate power levels. However, it was 
not feasible to do so in this study. Future studies should address this limitation and make sure 
that criteria are met to use a larger group.  
Second, there were a number of instances where given the unavailability of relevant data 
I used only one or two quotes to infer a finding. Such inferences are of course less substantive 
than those corroborated by quotes from multiple interviews and/or other sources. Future studies 
should address this limitation by either interviewing more people or revisiting the questions I 
developed with the aim of modifying them to increase their data catchment power. Or, with time 
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permitting, the interviews themselves could be lengthened. In this way, researchers can ask more 
follow-up questions. Unfortunately, for this study, I was not in a position to conduct more 
interviews due to time and resource constraints.  
Another limitation concerns the possibility that other factors besides the family’s 
managerial involvement explain the family-based traits at GHU. One key factor that may need 
much more attention to in this regard is the Indian culture. The Indian culture, for example, may 
partly explain why the family pursues family-based succession. I say this based on some 
anecdotal evidence found in material written by Dr. Aabha. She seems to discuss family-based 
succession as being connected to the Indian culture. She says: 
The Indian family system is more united. In the West, children are likely to leave their  
families at the age of 18 and become more independent. The profession of the father is  
only rarely continued by the son or daughter...The values of the family are passed down 
from one generation to the next along with the family business or profession...(written 
information by Dr. Aabha)  
 
Based on this passage, as well as some interview data echoing the same, we may infer that the 
culture of India has some part in explaining the presence of ‘renewal’ at GHU. Also, the Indian 
culture may in part explain why members of the GHU community treat each other, as well as 
visitors to the institution, with trust and respect. The culture of India is “famously described as a 
land of legendary hospitality, bolstered by a cultural and religious spirit of tolerance” (George, 
2009, p.30). India is a region where being hospitable to others is a cardinal virtue and almost a 
religious duty, rooted in Vedic Hinduism and carried over to contemporary India (George, 2009). 
It may be that the GHU community, most having grown up in the Indian culture, are hospitable 
as a result of the cultural capital passed down to them from their parents’ generation. This is 
certainly a possibility, and something that is echoed by some interview participants. For 
example, both Dr. Prem (Chancellor) and Dr. Kiaan (Professor) have been noted with saying that 
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the family like culture is a reflection of the Indian culture. Even the mission statements of GHU 
are animated by a part of Indian history, encouraging the GHU community to inculcate and 
promote the spirit of 'Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam' meaning the world is one family. This phrase 
may be originally found in the Maha Upanishad, an ancient Sanskrit text teaching the ideas of 
Hinduism, and engraved in the entrance hall of the parliament of India. Thus, the phrase is 
perhaps universally adopted, and put into practice, by not just the community of GHU, but by the 
Indian people in general.  
These factors certainly give the impression that the family-based culture found at GHU 
can in part be explained by the history and culture of India. However, it is my understanding the 
family-based culture at GHU is imputable considerably to the family’s managerial involvement. 
As discussed in chapter 9, Dr. Prem was explained by interview participants to create the culture 
of shared cooperation and mutual trust. This is corroborated by multiple interview participants. 
Thus, both the family’s managerial involvement and the Indian culture may together explain 
some of the family-based traits at GHU. Future studies may want to investigate the nexus of the 
Indian culture and the family system to better parse out the impact of each factor on shaping the 
culture within Indian family-run universities. With this clarification, I would be in a better 
position to differentiate FOMHEIs from their nonfamily counterparts in higher education.  
Future Research 
Given the novelty of studying this topic, the potential research paths are varied, and 
many. Some would be related to this study. For example, as I mentioned in chapter 9, I could not 
prove whether the positive view of SEW applies to a broader range of decision-making 
behaviors. Future research could explore whether this is the case by asking more focused 
questions. Indeed, if proven, the findings of this study may lose some significance because SEW 
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theory would be in fact a theoretical framework that could explain most of the decision-making 
behaviors of the Prem family. Importantly though, even in this case, stakeholder theory would 
still be needed as SEW theory does not explain the family’s approach to sharing influence.   
Another research path could be in investigating how the family uses informal networking 
and the social capital they cultivate as a means to enhance the effectiveness of organizational 
decision-making. According to Birnbaum (2004) and Kezar (2004), what they refer to as soft 
governance, or the interactional and relational dimensions of governance, has higher utility than 
formal governance processes and mechanisms in expediting decision-making without 
compromising the organization’s ability to produce effective outcomes (from the decisions being 
made). Certainly, this is something to explore at family-owned or -managed universities where 
social capital, created from the family’s managerial involvement, may be in abundance. How the 
family leverages the social capital they create to the benefit of the organization is indeed a 
promising area to study.  
A third research path may be in investigating whether there is a link between the 
families’ managerial involvement and the success of the universities they run. Such a link could 
very well exist based on some theoretical reasoning found in the family firm literature. 
According to many scholars (e.g., Ashwin et al., 2015; Carnes & Ireland, 2013; Churchill & 
Hatten, 1987; De Massis, Frattini & Lichtenthaler, 2013; Habbershon & Williams, 1999; Kraiczy 
et al., 2015; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005; Penney & Combs, 2013; Zahra et al., 2004; Zahra 
et al., 2008), family-owned businesses use their idiosyncratic resources (in this study we 
understood these resources as SEW) to give them a competitive advantage in the marketplace. 
Proponents of this view (e.g., Habbershon & Williams, 1999) argue that efficient decision-
making tied to a such SEW such as trust and loyalty, and tacit knowledge, among family 
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members result in the firm’s ability to respond to market changes readily and rapidly. 
Interestingly, a few interview participants mentioned that decision-making at GHU is quick and 
efficient. A future study could take this as a focal point to investigate if and how efficient 
decision-making contributes to organizational success.  
Future research could also employ other theoretical frameworks (in tandem with SEW 
theory) besides stakeholder theory to study family-based decision-making behaviors in 
traditional university settings. As explained early on in this study, I chose stakeholder theory for 
(a) its past application in higher education (e.g., Alves et al., 2010; Avci et al., 2015; Chapleo & 
Simms, 2010; Jongbloed et al., 2008; Marić, 2013; Wagner et al., 2008) and (b) its 
comprehensiveness to accounting for the major higher education organizational properties 
identified in the literature review. And as expected, stakeholder theory is indeed a good fit. It 
addressed all of the limitations of SEW theory and especially where SEW theory failed to 
account for the power-based relations of GHU. However, this does not mean that stakeholder 
theory is the only relevant theoretical model that can be applied together with SEW theory.  
While not as comprehensive as stakeholder theory, there are indeed other theoretical 
frameworks that make sense. One that may be as relevant as stakeholder theory is stewardship 
theory. This theory explains that there may be goal congruence between owners, or those in top 
leadership positions, and managers (Davis et al., 1997). Owners who take a stewardship 
approach to governance care less about employing internal controls favoring unequal power 
relations than they are about minimizing the power distance that may exist between owners and 
managers (Austin & Jones, 2015; Davis et al., 1997). In other words, stewardship-oriented 
leaders desire to flatten hierarchy and work with managers, and empower them, rather than 
control them using strict monitoring mechanisms and centralized governance structures. Further, 
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they act like stewards because goal congruence between them and non-owner personnel is vital 
to minimize organizational conflict and move the firm in a direction of long-term survivability. 
Thus, stewardship theory like stakeholder theory assumes an integrative and cooperative 
orientation to governance, and considers such an orientation to have higher utility compared to 
individualistic and self-serving behaviors (Davis et al., 1997). It also ties cooperative behaviors 
to organizational success. It certainly thus could be adapted to higher education organizational 
context where democratic decision-making behaviors are employed to advance the academic 
mission. Describing all the theoretical frameworks that may be adapted to describe family 
ownership governance in higher education is beyond the scope of this study. The point is that 
other relevant theoretical models exist and that they could provide different insights into family-
decision-making behaviors in higher education.  
Conclusion 
Family-owned businesses generally have a positive reputation. They are known for the 
warm and hospitable service they (presumably) provide, and the trust and loyalty undergirding 
the family-like culture found there. In fact, many family-owned businesses are proud to advertise 
their status as a family-owned business for this very reason. The family status carries some 
currency in the commercial context.  
However, within the context of higher education, the reputation of family-owned 
universities and colleges may be less positive, and even eroding in some countries (like Korea 
and Japan). I make this inference mostly based on anecdotal evidence found in Altbach et al. 
(2020). Many of the case chapters in Altbach et al. discuss the general landscape of FOMHEIs as 
having reputational disadvantages. The poor reputation of FOMHEIs is tied to leadership that not 
only push non-educational agendas (related to profiteering or politics), but also employ 
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questionable and opaque management practices. The book also points out that FOMHEIs 
globally are generally of low quality, which may further contribute to their poor reputation.  
Unfortunately, the negative repute of FOMHEIs is a general characterization that even 
high performing and highly ranked FOMHEIs have trouble escaping. This dissertation, in 
seeking to push against this negative discourse, highlighted the story of one FOMHEI that may 
defy the general characterization. And indeed, there is some reason to believe that GHU qualifies 
as such a FOMHEI. The leadership at GHU is devoted to the educational mission. They value 
democratic decision-making and commit to managing the institution as professionally as 
possible. Importantly, interviews suggest that the family mostly approaches decision-making 
using a cooperative, nonconfrontational approach where multiple stakeholders share in the 
responsibilities of decision outcomes. In this way, the deep managerial involvement of the Prem 
family (and desire to keep the institution within the family) is not rejected by nonfamily 
stakeholders, and broadly the academic culture. I am inclined to further infer that family 
involvement is embraced at GHU. The nonfamily stakeholders of GHU have in their interviews 
expressed their deep respect for Dr. Prem and his family, for the commitments and sacrifices 
they make and contributions to education. To a large extent, respect held for the family is 
traceable to the family’s value system. The family value system legitimizes leadership status. 
The deep and continued managerial involvement of the family in university affairs has 
other implications. On the one hand, the family’s continued managerial involvement sustains the 
vision and values driving the university culture at GHU, as several interview participants 
explained. However, on the other hand, there is inevitably a cost. This cost is related to what may 
be understood as a tension between the family’s intent to remain managerially involved and the 
presentation of GHU as a place where preferential treatment is not given to any single group. 
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Indeed, interview and document data suggest that some preference is given to family members 
over nonfamily candidates when filling top leadership positions. Dr. Vihaan, and his sister, is 
expected to climb the organizational hierarchy and Dr. Aabha filled leadership positions that 
were left vacant by her father. We may say that it is not a coincidence that family members 
occupy multiple leadership positions and come to fill nearly half of the seats on the Managing 
Committee. In this way, GHU is inevitably a family-owned or -managed organization that places 
a high premium on protecting the family’s interest to remain in control. Through the lens of 
socioemotional theory, we may say that the family is invested in protecting the SEW dimension 
of ‘renewal.’ And in this reality, nonfamily constituents may have fewer opportunities for 
upward mobility in the organization. This is indeed a unique reality relative to how leadership is 
chosen in nonfamily institutions, where typically there is a competitive vetting process involving 
many candidates and a serious consideration of these candidates relative to what they can offer.  
Which process is right? It is difficult to say, and perhaps this dissertation is not in a 
position to cast any judgments. There are benefits to either approach. Take the family-based 
succession model for example. As mentioned, the interviews suggest that incoming family 
members can continue the traditions and practices of the university culture created by older 
generation family members. This is seemingly valued at GHU as interview participants share. 
Furthermore, the family firm literature argues that family members are more emotionally 
invested in seeing their organizations succeed (Berrone et al., 2012). Having familial successors 
thus is an opportunity that the family can certainly take advantage of—of course with the right 
training and guidance. However, there may be downsides. Traditions may continue at the 
expense of change. In many situations, change can be a good thing. Change can be refreshing 
and beneficial to a work culture, especially where change is needed. While interviews suggest 
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that Grand Hall University is far from needing such change, Dr. Aabha seems to recognize the 
importance of it where and when needed. She shares in her interview that “as times grows....[the 
family has] to look at newer models of governance...” Indeed, this opens up the possibility that 
the family-based succession model at GHU could in principle be disrupted down generational 
lines, depending on what the family deems best for the university.  
But for now, the current model of succession at GHU makes sense, and works. By 
subscribing to a “right way” of family-based succession, the Prem family seems to have eased 
any tensions that may exist related to filling leadership positions by family members. By all 
appearances, nonfamily participants at GHU seem content toward the succession model at GHU. 
In large part, their acceptance of the Prem family is based on their perception of the family’s 
ability to lead the institution. The family is largely perceived by interview participants as being 
qualified, competent, and committed. And while younger generation members have yet to prove 
their capabilities as a leader, the expectation is that they will eventually walk the path of their 
parents. They are expected to receive relevant education, gain relevant experience, and operate in 
the university as intellectual equals to nonfamily personnel. The purposeful training of these 
family members is thus key to legitimizing the family’s continued involvement at GHU. We may 
even say that the training of younger generation family members is the deciding factor to the 
survival of not just GHU, but all FOMHEIs. The repute of FOMHEIs will inevitably and in large 
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Appendix A: Electronic Recruitment Letter to Interview Participants 
 
Dear (title of interview participant): 
 
Warm greetings. I hope this email finds you well. I am a doctoral candidate at Boston College in 
the US. 
 
Having already spoken with [Dr. Aabha], and receiving consent, I will be visiting [GHU] early 
April (April 3-18) to conduct research related to my dissertation.  
 
Briefly, my dissertation focuses on exploring the management of a university under family-based 
leadership. Specifically, I'll be looking at how the managing family approaches organizational 
decision-making in an environment with academic sensitivities (and stakeholders that support the 
academic mission). I attach in this email further details regarding the study's purpose should you 
require more information. 
 
As a Dean of a Faculty (and a member of the Academic Council), your leadership position and 
insight on organizational decision-making at [GHU] would be invaluable to my work. I wonder 
if you would be interested in fielding some questions during my visit in April related [GHU’s] 
organizational structure/decision-making process? The interview should last about one hour. You 
will be among 10-12 interview participants.  
 
If you are interested and available, please let me know. I would be most grateful as 
organizational decision-making at family-managed or -run institutions is a topic very close to my 
heart!  
 
I am aware that you are very busy so I completely understand if you cannot participate for any 
reason. I keenly looking forward to your reaction and please do not hesitate to raise any 

















Appendix B: Interview Protocol (for nonfamily) 
 
Background questions  
 
1. Could you briefly describe the expertise and responsibilities related to your position(s) at 
this university? 
 
2. Could you briefly describe how you came to fill your position? 
a. How long have you been in this position? 
 
3. Do you have a personal vision for this university? In other words, do you have personal 
objectives and interests, as a (faculty, staff, board, etc.) member?  
 
4. How would you describe the DR. Prem and his family’s vision for the university? In 
other words, can you share how the founder and his family influences the vision for 
GHU? 
 
For the next set of questions, I’d like to learn about the decision-making culture here. So 
decision-making related to university-wide impact. Key decision. Also about the 
organizational structure and some processes related to hiring and promotion.  
5. (present blank paper and pen) Could you briefly describe the organizational structure, or 
the hierarchy of reporting structure? To help you along, here’s a blank sheet of paper 
where you can visualize the reporting structure, specifically related to who reports to you, 
whom you report to, and whom your supervisors report to? 
a. What positions do family members related to the founder occupy in this structure, 
in the board, in top management positions?  
b. What positions do nonfamily personnel occupy, in the board, in top management 
positions? 
c. Can you describe if there is any informal networking or reporting that occur 
within this structure? In other words, is the reporting structure strictly followed? 
 
6. Could you describe how leadership positions are filled at GHU? In other words, could 
you describe the customs/policies around hiring leadership/management personnel? 
 
a. Who decides on the people for leadership positions?  
b. Can you tell me more about your own experiences with promotion and 
advancement in the university? 
c. Can you tell me more about the opportunities to negotiate your salary? 
 
7. How you would describe the leadership at GHU? 
 
a. Approaches to key decision-making, style? 
b. Centralized or decentralized? 
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c. In your opinion, how hard or easy is it for the leadership to implement university 




8. How would you describe your authority to influence decision-making in relation to the 
founder and his family?  
 
9. Who are the key stakeholders involved in making key decisions at the university, and 
affecting organizational objectives?   
a. Can you think of any external stakeholders? 
i. Perhaps Ministry of Human Resources Development, University Grants 
Commission, accreditation agencies, state government? 
b. How are they a part of key decision-making at GHU? 
c. What are the pressures coming from them? 
 
10. Which stakeholder groups (leadership, staff, faculty, etc.) do you have the most 
disagreements with around key decision-making? 
a. Can you provide an example? 
 
11. At GHU, is there a priority placed on sharing governance or management responsibilities 
at your university?  
a. Why or why not? 
b. What kind of decisions are delegated to you? 
 
12. Can you describe one or two situations where your input (or the input of the stakeholder 
group you represent) was sought or needed by the founder and his family when making 
key decisions? 
 
13. Can you recall a situation where you resisted the perspectives of the founder and/or his 
family on a key decision? 
 
14. Do different departments and programs within GHU have their own policies, protocols 
and customs?  
a. How would you describe the level of coordination between different departments 
around (research, administrative tasks, etc.)?  
 
15. What are the avenues for democratic participation (e.g., townhall meetings, academic 
council, etc.) for faculty, staff and leadership and other stakeholder groups?  
 
16. Can you describe how important (or not important) it is for you to be a part of the 





In the next set of questions, I’d like to learn about the family dynamic (relationships) at this 
institution. These questions may cause some discomfort because of their personal nature. If 
you do not want to answer any of them, please let me know and we can move on.  
1. Can you describe a situation where family members at GHU had disagreement among 
themselves about school decisions, activities or direction? 
 
2. Can such family disagreements last for long periods of time, say weeks or months? 
3. Can you describe situations where disagreement among family members affect or spill 
over into university operations? 
a. If yes, can you describe what type of university operations were affected? 
b. If yes, impact nonfamily personnel? 
 
In the next and final set of questions, I’d like to learn about leadership succession at GHU.  
17. At family-owned or -managed universities, one of the key characteristics is family-based 
succession, the passing of the institution to following familial generations to control.  
a. Are you familiar with this concept? 
b. Would you say that GHU follows the family-based succession model? 
 
18. Can you describe any challenges or tensions related to family-based succession? 
a. How is family-based succession perceived by faculty? 
 
19. Can you describe any benefits related to family-based succession? 
 
20. What are some key attributes that an effective successor should possess? 
 
21. In the tradition of succession at GHU, would the current process prioritize the personality 














22. Could you briefly describe the expertise and responsibilities related to your positions at 
this university? 
a. Board of management, managing committee, pro vice chancellor/dean 
b. Were there other candidates considered for the position of dean? 
 
23. Could you briefly describe how you came to fill your positions? 
a. How long have you been in this position? 
 
24. Do you have a distinct and personal vision for this university?  
a. What is your idea of organizational success considering this university?  
b. Are there times when your vision conflicts with that of other stakeholders (e.g., 
faculty, non-leadership staff, the board)? 
i. Can you describe a situation where there was conflict? 
 
For the next set of questions, I’d like to learn about the decision-making culture here. So 
decision-making related to university-wide impact. Key decision. Also about the 
organizational structure and some processes related to hiring and promotion.  
25. (present blank paper and pen) Could you briefly describe the organizational structure, or 
the hierarchy of reporting structure? To help you along, here’s a blank sheet of paper 
where you can visualize the reporting structure, specifically related to who reports to you, 
whom you report to, and whom your supervisors report to? 
a. Can you describe any informal networking or reporting that may occur within this 
structure?  
 
26. (explain stakeholders as all the groups and individuals that can affect, or are affected by, 
the accomplishments of [an] organization’s objectives. Also explain key decisions as 
those affecting university wide operations, which may be related to the budget, 
academics, strategic directions). Who are the key stakeholders involved in making key 
decisions at the university?   
a. Can you think of any external stakeholders? 
i. Perhaps Ministry of Human Resources Development, University Grants 
Commission, accreditation agencies, state government? 
b. How are they a part of key decision-making at GHU? 
 
27. What are two key challenges related to making key decisions at GHU? 
 
28. At GHU, how important is it to share governance or management responsibilities among 
different stakeholder groups?  
a. Why is it important to share governance responsibilities?  
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b. Can you describe your level of trust in delegating important decisions to other 
stakeholder groups?  
c. What kind of decisions are delegated to other groups? 
 
29. Can you recall a situation where other stakeholder groups resisted or challenged you on a 
key decision? 
a. How did you handle the situation?  
 
30. At GHU, how important is it to make sure that different stakeholder groups within the 
university agree on university matters, policies, direction? 
a. Why? 
 
31. What are the avenues for democratic participation (e.g., townhall meetings, academic 
council, etc.) for faculty, staff and leadership and other stakeholder groups?  
 
32.  (present list) Could you rank these university constituents in order from top to bottom, 
top with the most influence or power in decision-making? 
 
33. What types of stakeholder groups are most difficult to work with when making key 
decisions?  
a. Can you provide an example when you were met with resistance around a key 
decision or university direction? 
 
34. Do different departments and programs within GHU have their own policies, protocols 
and customs?  
a. How would you describe the level of coordination between different departments 
around (research, administrative tasks, etc.)?  
b. Can you describe whether or not it is easy for the leadership to implement 
university wide policy or take the university in a certain direction?  
i. Why or why not? 
 
 
In the next set of questions, I’d like to learn about the family dynamic (relationships) at this 
institution. These questions may cause some discomfort because of their personal nature. If 
you do not want to answer any of them, please let me know and we can move on.  
 
4. Who are the family members with whom you have found to disagree most often at GHU? 
a. What is the nature of these disagreements?  
 




a. What were the reasons for it lasting long or for it being addressed quickly? 
 
6. Can you describe situations where disagreement among family members affect or spill 
over into university operations? In other words, I wonder if you could describe how the 
family system (which includes family relationship, family emotions, etc.) interacts with 
university operations? Is there always a clear line between the family and university 
systems? 
a. If yes, can you describe what type of university operations were affected? 
b. If yes, impact on nonfamily personnel? 
 
In the next and final set of questions, I’d like to learn about the leadership succession 
process.  
35. At family-owned or -managed universities, one of the key characteristics is family-based 
succession, the passing of the institution to following familial generations to control and 
operate.  
a. To what extent is there an expectation placed on you to continue to family legacy? 
i. Are you being groomed in a sense? 
b. Would you say that continuing the family legacy and keeping the university 
within the family is an important goal at GHU?  
 
36. Could you describe the succession process at your university?  
a. How do you plan for it? 
b. What procedures or policies, if any, are officially place that safeguard it? 
 
37. What are some key attributes that an effective successor should possess? 
 
38. In the tradition of succession at GHU, would the current succession process prioritize the 
personality traits you just described? 
 
 
39. What challenges do you perceive to family-based succession?  
a. Are there any stakeholders that resist it? Or you expect to resist it when the time 







Appendix D: Consent Form 
 
 
Boston College Consent Form 
Boston College, Department of Higher Education 
Informed Consent to be in study Family-Owned or -Managed Higher Education Institutions: A 
Special Kind of University Governance 
Researcher: Edward Choi 
Study Sponsor: none 
Type of consent: Adult Consent Form  
 
Invitation to be Part of a Research Study 
 
You are invited to participate in a research study. You are being asked to participate because 
either your professional experiences with organizational decision-making and leadership position 
in and/or familiarity with your university’s organizational culture make you a reasonable 
participant in this study.  
 
 
Important Information about the Research Study 
 
Things you should know: 
• The purpose of the study is to investigate the decision-making behaviors of family-based 
leadership within the higher education governance culture where nonfamily stakeholders 
abound. If you choose to participate, you will be asked to either: 
1. participate in a single 60-minute interview, in either your office or any other location 
of convenience, during which you will be asked to discuss your thoughts, 
perspectives, and feelings on the topic of this study. The interview will last 60 
minutes. Additional time may be spent if you decide to review your interview logs at 
some point in time after the interview; or  
2. participate as a person being observed on your interactions and discussion with other 
leaders of the university community in an organizational meeting. In this case, the 
length of your participation will depend on the duration of the meeting. Additional 
time may be spent if you decide to review the field notes related to the meeting at 
some point in time after the meeting. 
• Risks or discomforts from this research include possible discomfort when answering 
certain questions, specifically related to questions seeking participant opinions about 
other stakeholder groups with respect to their involvement in decision-making.  
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• The study is expected to provide you with insights from which policy/practice lessons 
may be drawn to illuminate and enhance your work as someone employed at a family-
owned or -managed institution.  
• Taking part in this research project is voluntary. You don’t have to participate and you 
can stop at any time. 
Please take time to read this entire form and ask questions before deciding whether to take part in 
this research project. 
 
What is the study about and why are we doing it? 
 
The purpose of the study is to learn about the decision-making behaviors of family-based 
leadership within the higher education governance culture where nonfamily stakeholders abound. 
This research direction is a novel pursuit. The topic of family-based leadership, while 
extensively investigated in commercial settings, has never been examined within the context of 
nonprofit higher education where there is a strong mandate to advance the academic mission and 
pay attention to pressures coming from nonfamily stakeholders supporting the academic mission. 
This study is expected to reveal new theoretical understandings around family-based leadership 
decision-making, which may depart from dominant theoretical reasoning found in the family 
firm literature focusing on the commercial business setting.  
 
The total number of people in this study is expected to be 10-12 interview participants and 5-10 
meeting participants. There is overlap between these two groups. Interview participants may also 
be meeting participants.  
 
What will happen if you take part in this study? 
 
If you agree to take part in this study, you will be asked to either:  
 
1. participate in a single 60-minute interview, in either your office or any other location of 
convenience, during which you will be asked to discuss your thoughts, perspectives, and 
feelings on the topic of this study. The interview will last 60 minutes. Additional time may be 
spent if you decide to review your interview logs at some point in time after the interview; or  
2. participate as a person being observed on your interactions and discussion with other leaders 
of the university community in an organizational meeting. In this case, the length of your 
participation will depend on the duration of the meeting. Additional time may be spent if you 
decide to review the field notes related to the meeting at some point in time after the meeting. 
Based on your further consent (and the consent of other meeting participants with respect to 








How could you benefit from this study? 
 
You might benefit from being in this study because this study may provide you with insights 
from which policy/practice lessons may be drawn to illuminate and enhance your work as 
someone employed at a family-owned or -managed institution. Notably, you may learn about 
both effective and ineffective governance practices in an environment where the two systems of 
family and business values clash and interact. Finding a balance between these two systems with 
respect to managing a university or working with family leadership may be a key takeaway for 
you. 
 
What risks might result from being in this study? 
 
There are some risks you might experience from being in this study. They are possible 
discomfort when answering certain questions, specifically related to questions seeking 
participant opinions about other stakeholder groups with respect to their involvement in decision-
making.  
 
Related to this is informational risk. While the final report will de-identify all sensitive and 
personal information, there is always a risk that someone having familiarity with the university’s 
organizational structure can identify the individual forming the opinion. However, this risk is 
mostly related to top leadership level positions where position titles are exposed (such as the Pro 
Chancellor or Chair of the Academic Council). The presentation of this information is necessary 
to discuss organizational decision-making in detail. All other positions and findings will be 
discussed in general terms. In other words, most of the findings will not be associated with any 
particular individual or position, but with the particular stakeholder group to which the individual 
has membership. Further, you, as a research participant, will be able to review interview logs or 
field notes related to meetings and have the opportunity to omit or revise any part(s) of the data 
that you feel does/do not represent you accurately.  
 
Apart from the minimal risks outlined above, there are no other reasonably foreseeable risks 
associated with this study. There may be unknown risks, but nothing of a harmful, physically or 
emotionally invasive, painful, and embarrassing or offensive nature. Further, there is no 
perceivable reasoning to suggest that this study will have a lasting adverse impact physically or 
emotionally. 
 
How will we protect your information? 
 
The records of this study will be kept private.  In any sort of report I may publish, I will not 
include any information that will make it possible to identify you, except for the informational 
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risk described in the earlier section.  All of the research records will be kept in a locked, 
encrypted electronic folder.  
 
We will assign to each participant and your university a unique, coded identifier that will be used 
in place of actual identifiers. We will separately maintain a record that links each participant’s 
coded identifier to his or her actual name (as well as institutional level information), but this 
separate record will not include research data.  
 
All audio recording will be stored in the locked and encrypted folder. These will be deleted once 
transcribed to text, which will also be stored securely and electronically.  
 
Mainly just the researchers will have access to information including audio files; however, please 
note that a few other key people may also have access. These might include my dissertation 
supervisor, Hans de Wit, the Institutional Review Board at Boston College, and internal Boston 
College auditors may review the research records.  Otherwise, the researchers will not release to 
others any information that identifies you unless you give your permission, or unless we are 
legally required to do so.  
 
Questions about confidentiality may be directed to either the researcher by email 
(choief@bc.edu) or the supervisor (dewitj@bc.edu).  
 
 
What will happen to the information we collect about you after the study is over? 
 
All data collected will be used only for the purposes of fulfilling the requirements of my doctoral 
dissertation.  
 
All data will be deleted at the completion of the study. Any hard copies of transcribed text 
(interview logs) and field notes taken by hand at the research site will be shredded once 
transformed to digital content.  
 
We will not share your research data with other investigators. 
 
How will we compensate you for being part of the study?  
 
You will not be compensated for this study. 
 
 
What are the costs to you to be part of the study? 
 




Your Participation in this Study is Voluntary  
 
It is totally up to you to decide to be in this research study. Participating in this study is 
voluntary. Even if you decide to be part of the study now, you may change your mind and stop at 
any time. You do not have to answer any questions you do not want to answer. If you decide to 
withdraw before this study is completed, please let me know how you would like us to handle 
any data collected from you.  
 
If you choose not to be in this study, it will not affect your current or future relations with the 
University. 
 
Getting Dismissed from the Study  
 
The researcher may dismiss you from the study at any time if it is in your best interests (e.g. side 
effects or distress have resulted). 
 
Contact Information for the Study Team and Questions about the Research 
 
If you have questions about this research, you may contact Edward Choi by email 
(choief@bc.edu) or phone (001.484.238.5347) or the supervisor by email (dewitj@bc.edu) or by 
phone (001.617.552.4236). 
 
Contact Information for Questions about Your Rights as a Research Participant 
 
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, or wish to obtain information, 
ask questions, or discuss any concerns about this study with someone other than the 
researcher(s), please contact the following: 
 
Boston College 
Office for Research Protections 





By signing this document, you are agreeing to be in this study. Make sure you understand what 
the study is about before you sign. I will give you a copy of this document for your records. I 
will keep a copy with the study records.  If you have any questions about the study after you sign 
this document, you can contact the study team using the information provided above. 
 
 
Consent to be Audio/video Recorded 
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I understand what the study is about and my questions so far have been answered. I agree to take 




Printed Subject Name  
 
_________________________________________________ 
Signature                Date 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
